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Abstract 
 
This thesis offers a detailed account of early polio epidemics (between 1918 and 1945) in 
Johannesburg, where the disease was particularly severe. At this time, little was known 
about the poliovirus, and such limited understanding affected the public health and 
medical initiatives taken during this period. These actions are highlighted in the thesis, 
along with the responses of the media and lay public to the disease. The effect of war on 
the management of the disease is also examined, as it siphoned off vital medical 
personnel and jeopardised disease control. It  also lent an emotional overlay to the way 
the disease was perceived, as ‘battle’ rhetoric became the parlance used against polio, 
which was personified as the ‘enemy’ of innocent children who were disabled at the 
whim of the virus. The epidemic of 1944-1945 was the first to be systematically 
investigated, by Dr James Gear as part of his groundbreaking polio research; he later 
became part of an international team of researchers who contributed to the development 
of a prophylactic vaccine within a decade of this epidemic.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 ‘There is so much dread and fear and helplessness in the word polio.’1 
This sentence encapsulates what so many parents felt during the polio era during the first 
half of the twentieth century and many doctors felt the same way.2 Polio was equated 
with the great plague of the Middle Ages, but its victims ‘were not among the poor and 
unclean of the inner cities’, as had been true of most infectious diseases, but ‘often the 
vigorous and healthy’ were attacked and ‘those who had comfortable homes and good 
care’.3 ‘You hope things are going to get better but deep down you know they never 
will.’4 
This thesis traces the appearance of polio in Johannesburg from the first 
recognised epidemic in 1918 until a second major outbreak of the disease in 1944-1945. 
                                                 
1  C. J. Rutty, ‘The Middle Class Plague: Canada and the Polio Years’, draft copy provided by the 
author, 20 Apr. 2004, p. 1. 
2  Interview with Dr X (name withheld at his request), 22 Nov. 2002, in which he describes the sense 
of foreboding experienced by many doctors during an epidemic. 
3  Rutty, ‘The Middle-Class Plague’, p. 2. 
4  C. Webster, Post-Polio Network, RSA, interviewed 16 Nov. 2003. 
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The work focuses on the impact of these two war-time epidemics, both epidemiologically 
and socially. The course of each epidemic is examined by reviewing available statistics 
and the manifest problems they imposed on medical and health authorities, both locally 
and within higher echelons of power, and the response of the Johannesburg community to 
the disease during both epidemics is explored. The treatments available to polio patients 
at a time when the disease was regarded as ‘a mystery’5 and any new proposal of help 
was grasped at like ‘straws in the wind’ are also discussed.6  
While the period between the wars in South Africa was epidemic free, endemic 
cases continued at increasing rates. Health authorities appeared not to be concerned. Such 
cases seldom resulted in paralysis and endemic polio was regarded as a mild disease 
traceable to ancient times. Health authorities became complacent about polio, 
concentrating on other health issues, and were ill prepared for the second polio epidemic 
in 1944. Fortunately, important technological aids such as the ‘iron lung’ and the 
electronic microscope had become available from the 1930s, as had a wider literature on 
                                                 
5  Report of the discussions on poliomyelitis at meetings of the Witwatersrand and Pretoria branches 
of the British Medical Association (BMA),The Medical Journal of South Africa (MJSA), vol. 13, 
no. 14 (Sep. 1918), p. 243. 
6  B.F. Sampson, ‘A Suggested New Treatment of Poliomyelitis’, South African Medical Journal 
(SAMJ), vol. 18 (23 Dec. 1944), p. 421. Dr Sampson was commenting on a new treatment 
proposing the use of oxygen in the treatment of paralysis caused by polio: ‘But where does all this 
get us? Even assuming it to be true, what benefit in treatment could be derived therefrom? The 
answer is that we are not in so good a position in this disease as to be able to disregard straws in 
the wind.’ 
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the experiences of epidemic polio in other countries. A new treatment approach to muscle 
spasm and paralysed limbs appeared in the late 1930s, developed by an Australian bush 
nurse, Sister Elizabeth Kenny. South Africa was offered the opportunity of including this 
method in its polio policy for the second epidemic.  
Disease has a way of structuring the interactions between the medical profession 
and the lay public, as well as ‘acting as a window’7 on medical care, public health and 
government in that particular community.8 This will be the main focus of this thesis. 
Johannesburg was the city hardest hit by epidemic polio, recording the highest case 
incidence, over any other in the country, during the periods under discussion.9 Despite no 
Medical Officer of Health (MOH) reports during the Second World War,10 numerous 
                                                 
7  N. Rogers, Dirt and Disease: Polio before FDR (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1990), p. 244.  
8. C. Rosenberg, Explaining Epidemics and Other Studies in the History of Medicine (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 279. 
9  An official breakdown of polio in each major city is only available from records after the 1948 
epidemic. The overall number of polio cases was highest in Johannesburg, but not necessarily on a 
month-to-month basis. 
10  The MJSA gives information on the 1918 epidemic. The journal changed to the South African 
Medical Journal (SAMJ), details of articles on the 1944-1945 epidemic are listed in Chapter Six of 
this thesis; Public Health articles were used for epidemic figures and commentaries on 1944-1945 
epidemic. 
  4
memoranda between the MOH and the Department of Health in Pretoria11 offer 
information. Various medical journals, reports and press articles focus on the epidemic in 
Johannesburg, enabling one to follow social and political ideas, as well as ‘medical 
assumptions and attitudes’ raised.12 
Polio proved to be an extremely complex disease to understand; ‘capricious in its 
incidence’13 and terrifying in its impact, especially on the young. The dramatic and 
sudden attack of ‘The Crippler’14 left many children damaged for life, to the horror of 
parents and neighbours. A cure for polio has never been found and, during the period 
under discussion, it was never clear exactly how the disease spread, although evidence 
                                                 
11  Central Archives Depot, Pretoria: Department of Public Health (GES), Box files 533-536; 2919. 
12  R. Porter, Patients and Practitioners: Lay Perceptions of Medicine in Pre-Industrial Society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1985), p. 3. 
13  Medical Research Council, ‘Breathing Machines and their Treatment’, Report of the Respirators 
(Poliomyelitis Committee) Special Report Series, no. 237 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1939), p. 59. 
14  M. Shell, Polio and its Aftermath: The Paralysis of Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), p. 304. The shadow of polio was portrayed in a documentary called ‘The 
Crippler’ also known as ‘The Daily Battle’, put out by the National Foundation for Infantile 
Paralysis in the United States of America. 
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suggested that the virus was ‘excreted in the stool and passed through hand-to-hand or 
hand-to-mouth contact’.15  
Howard Phillips has pointed out that South African historians have been reluctant 
to include discussions of disease in general histories, possibly because they believe this 
requires ‘extensive specialised knowledge’ or they ‘have been wary of attributing too 
much weight to the “disease factor” in history’.16 This thesis hopes to strike a balance 
between the two. Chapter Two offers an outline of poliomyelitis17 as it is understood 
today. A brief outline of the epidemiology of polio until the early 1900s indicates the 
level of understanding of polio at the time of the first South African polio epidemic in 
1918. The two early epidemics, 1918 and 1944-1945, will be discussed in Chapters Three 
and Six respectively. Lay reactions to the epidemics are handled in Chapters Four and 
Seven, while Chapter Five offers a contextual examination of the inter-war period, a time 
which witnessed changes in both public health policies and in medical science. Cripple 
care was increasingly promoted during this time and medicine witnessed the development 
of new areas of specialisation such as orthopaedic surgery and paediatrics. Dr J.H.S. 
Gear, a key player in South African polio research, began his investigations into the 
                                                 
15  J. S. Smith, Patenting the Sun Polio and Salk Vaccine (New York: William Morrow and Company, 
INC., 1990), p. 36. 
16  Phillips, ‘Black October: The Influence of the Spanish Influenza Epidemic of 1918 on South 
Africa’ (Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1990), p. xv. 
17  The name will be shortened to ‘polio’, its more common usage, unless used within the context of 
medical reports and quotations. 
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disease during the Second World War, which eventually earned him the title of ‘Father of 
communicable diseases, vaccinology and immunology’ in South Africa.18 Gear’s earliest 
research into polio is discussed in Chapter Eight. 
Over the past two decades, important South African published works on medical 
history have focussed mainly on the political and economic issues raised by disease or the 
way in which state strategies such as segregation and apartheid dictated the quality of 
health service.19 The seminal work by Phillips on the 1918 Spanish influenza epidemic in 
South Africa, which is rich in social detail, emphasises industrial and economic forces in 
the context of segregation.20 Quoting George Rosen, a renowned medical historian, 
Phillips points out: 
                                                 
18  Prof. B. Schoub, lecture at the opening of the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation Training Centre, 
27 Nov. 2006. 
19  Examples of such works are: S. Marks and N. Andersson, ‘Issues in the Political Economy of 
Health in Southern Africa’, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (Jan. 1987), pp. 
177-186; S. Marks and N. Andersson, ‘Typhus and Social Control: South Africa, 1917-1950’, in 
R. MacLeod and M. Lewis (eds), Disease, Empire and Medicine: Perspectives on Western 
Medicine and the Experience of European Expansion (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 257-283; 
R.M. Packard, White Plague, Black Labour: Tuberculosis and the Political Economy of Health 
and Disease in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: James Curry Publishers, 1983); M.W. Swanson, 
‘The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape Colony, 1900-
1909’, Journal of African History, vol. 18 (1977), pp. 387-411. 
20  H. Phillips, ‘Black October’, p. xv; H. Phillips, ‘The Local State and Public Health Reform in 
South Africa: Bloemfontein and the Consequences of the Spanish ’Flu Epidemic of 1918’, Journal 
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The social history of disease, even endemic disease, can reveal much about 
the composition and workings of past societies, for not only is disease 
“related causally to the social and economic situation of the members of a 
given population, but the health care received also reflects the structure of a 
society, particularly its stratification and class divisions”.21 
To an extent, polio differed from this mould. The polio epidemics did not cause 
any significant disruption to the economy, nor could blacks in Johannesburg be blamed in 
any way for transmitting the disease. Polio was transmitted by white children; they 
infected each other. The polio epidemics engendered enormous disquiet, anxiety and fear 
within the infected communities and a sense of apprehension throughout the Union in 
case the disease spread. Contrary to the high death rate of other diseases, it was polio’s 
ability to maim that made it ‘the most feared disease of childhood’.22 It earned the names 
of ‘the crippler’;23 ‘the pestilence’;24 ‘an unmitigated evil’;25 ‘the mystery disease’;26 ‘the 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Southern African Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (Jan. 1987), pp. 210-233; H. Phillips, ‘“Black October”: 
Cape Town and the Spanish Influenza Epidemic of 1918’, in C. C. Saunders (ed.), Studies in the 
History of Cape Town, vol. 1 (University of Cape Town, 1979). 
21  Phillips, ‘Black October’, p. xv. 
22  D.J. Wilson, Living with Polio: The Epidemic and its Survivors (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), p. 1. 
23  T. Gould, A Summer Plague: Polio and its Survivors (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 
p. xi. 
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dread disease’;27 ‘a periodic scourge’;28 ‘a kind of V2 of illness’;29 ‘a grim terror more 
menacing, more sinister than death itself’;30 and ‘the last of the childhood plagues’.31 
Polio could leave a child crippled, worthless, reliant on others and the state, and 
stigmatised for life.32 Some parents have admitted that, with hindsight, death might have 
                                                                                                                                                 
24. P. J. Paul, A History of Poliomyelitis (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 
xiii. 
25  Ibid., p. xiv. 
26  The Star, 4 Dec. 1944. 
27  Bruno, R.L, The Polio Paradox: Uncovering the Hidden History of Polio to Understand and Treat 
“Post-Polio Syndrome” and Chronic Fatigue (New York: Warner Books, 2002), p. 65. 
28  R. Debré et al., Poliomyelitis: WHO Monograph Series no. 26 (Geneva: World Health 
Organisation, 1955), p. 10. 
29  The Star, 7 Dec. 1944. 
30  C.J. Rutty, ‘“Do Something! Do Anything!”, Poliomyelitis in Canada 1927-1962’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Toronto, 1995), p. 3. 
31  J.C. Ross, ‘A History of Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’ (MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 
1993), p. 105. 
32  J.H. Smith, ‘“Fear, Frustration and the Will to Overcome”: A Social History of Poliomyelitis in 
Western Australia’ (PhD thesis, Edith Cowan University, 1997), p. 419; B. Michel, Footnote to a 
Dream: Memories of a Musician’s Journey through Adversity (Johannesburg: B. Michel, 2002), p. 
6. 
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been preferable to the resulting lifetime of disability, physical limitations and 
disadvantage, but that is not how the majority of survivors felt. Many fought their 
disabilities with determination and courage, often entering the mainstream workplace and 
excelling in their careers.33 ‘We just had to get on with it!’34 
When it was suggested that I should consider doing my thesis on polio, I clearly 
recall my reaction – ‘that’s about cripples’. Such a response is notable, for it encapsulates 
the prejudice and misunderstanding which disabled people face, but it is not totally 
incorrect. Polio presents a history of disability which is contrary to the value society 
places on physical ability and perfection. ‘Society devalues and discriminates against 
those who do not conform to the physical norm.’35 This is arguably one reason why the 
polio epidemics have enjoyed so little attention in South Africa.36 The human element is 
                                                 
33  Works covering family members’ experiences and survivors’ accounts of polio are: F. Davis, 
Passage through Crisis: Polio Victims and their Families (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company Inc., 1991); P. Cockburn, The Broken Boy (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005); E. Foster, It 
Can’t Happen to Me (Cape Town: Timmins, 1959); J. Opie, Over my Dead Body (London: 
Methuen, 1957); Wilson, Living with Polio.  
34  E. Harrington, interview, 20 Aug. 2003.  
35  J. Morris, Pride against Prejudice: Transforming Attitudes to Disability (London: The Women’s 
Press, 1991), p. 43. 
36  W.K. Bettzieche, ‘Polio, People and Apartheid: The South African Poliomyelitis Epidemics of the 
1940s and 1950s with Special Reference to the Cape Peninsula’ (BA Honours thesis, University of 
Cape Town, 1998). This is a pioneering work on polio in South Africa. 
  10
central to the study of disease yet ‘rarely has there been mention of the patient in medical 
history’37 and, one might add, especially the disabled patient. 
It has been difficult to collect first-hand accounts from polio survivors. In South 
Africa, most seem reluctant to write down their stories. While some have been prepared 
to speak about their experiences, their testimony is not without difficulty for the historian. 
Oral testimony can be unreliable; memories are fragile and ‘subject to the vicissitudes of 
time’.38 Where trauma, pain or anxiety is concerned, recall tends to be even more 
selective and incomplete than usual.39 Memory can be distorted by ‘the imaginative and 
philosophical framework’ of the individual, which can result in digressions or the 
suppression of memories. Interviewees have pointed out that the stoicism of the 1940s 
and 1950s (and indeed earlier), reflected in such statements as ‘boys don’t cry’ or ‘keep a 
stiff upper lip’, did affect memory. Even the act of interviewing places pressure on the 
individual; questioning can intrude on aspects of life that many would rather forget or, 
because of the trauma involved, have forgotten. ‘I found it difficult at times to carry on 
writing because one memory would set in motion others, deep in my subconscious; I had 
                                                 
37  G. Liebenberg, ‘Disease and Disability: Poliomyelitis, Rehabilitation and Social Reform for 
Disabled Persons in New Brunswick, 1941-1955’ (MA thesis, University of New Brunswick, 
1994), p. 111. 
38  J. Stark, ‘The Task of Testimony’, History and Memory, vol. 1, no. 2 (Spring/Summer, 1999), pp. 
37-59. 
39  Smith, ‘Fear, Frustration and the Will to Overcome’. This thesis had a covering letter offering 
psychological help should the recollections result in unmanageable anguish. 
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to come face to face with the pain again, as an adult – experiences which, at times, had 
been too much for me to cope with as a youngster’.40 
The way in which information is collected can influence the integrity of the 
source. Here the historian’s role as editor comes into play; historians sift as they listen, 
selecting what seems to be relevant to the research.41 There is, however, a certain 
‘universal experience’ of polio, and I have had to resort to using testimonies other than 
those of survivors from Johannesburg in order to illustrate certain claims in this work.  
 
1.2 A Brief Historiography of Polio 
The historiography of polio is largely based on the experience of the disease in the United 
States of America (USA), although several works on polio epidemics in other countries 
are available.42 J.R. Paul’s book is fundamental to any study of the history of polio and 
                                                 
40  Interview with R. Steynberg, 22 Nov. 2004. He also provided a written account. 
41. An appeal was made to the North East Tribune (August 2002), a local paper in Johannesburg, 
requesting information from polio survivors and their family or friends. There were more than 40 
telephonic responses, but only two were prepared to write an account of their experiences, while 
the rest were recorded as notes in point form. 
42  A.B. Cross, ‘The Solomon Island Tragedy: A Tale Of Epidemic Poliomyelitis’, Medical History, 
vol. 21 (1977), pp. 137-155; A.M. Killalea, ‘The Great Scourge: The Tasmanian Infantile 
Paralysis Epidemic 1937-38’ (MA thesis, University of Tasmania, 1994); Ross, ‘History of 
Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’; C.J. Rutty, ‘“A Grim Terror More Menacing, More Sinister than 
  12
covers the story from the perspective of one of the principal researchers.43 He was also an 
important contributor at polio conferences which began in 1948 and helped to 
disseminate knowledge of the disease. Paul knew and corresponded with many of the 
prominent people linked with polio research, such as South Africa’s James H.S. Gear, 
with whom he worked on joint research projects.44 Paul’s writing is clear and objective.  
Paul frames his history within comparative medical knowledge from the earliest 
period of polio and ties in the various goals and philosophies which influenced differing 
approaches to polio. This gives insight into understanding aspects such as its 
nomenclature and how the medical approach has changed, developing according to the 
intellectual and technological boundaries over time. Gear raised this point: 
                                                                                                                                                 
Death Itself”: Physicians, Poliomyelitis and the Popular Press in Early 20th-Century Ontario’ (MA 
thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1990); Smith, ‘Fear, Frustration, and the Will to 
Overcome’; F. Wallace, ‘The Impact of the Cork Polio-Epidemic on Voluntary Provision for the 
Handicapped’ (MA thesis, University College Cork, 1994). 
43  T. Gould, A Summer Plague, p. 326. 
44  J.R. Paul, History of Poliomyelitis (New Haven and London, 1971), p. 269. Gear was part of the 
committee which, in 1955, coined the term ‘poliovirus’, which has since been universally adopted. 
Paul co-wrote the article with Gear and H. von Magnus: ‘A Recent Definition of the Poliomyelitis 
Virus’, Virology, vol. 1 (1955), pp. 185-189. Paul confirms that Gear was part of a group which 
tried to determine whether antibody patterns elsewhere conformed to those of the lower 
socioeconomic groups as first studied in Baltimore: Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, p. 359. Paul 
and Gear formed part of the WHO Expert Committee in Rome in 1953 and the 1958 Expert 
Committee in Geneva, ibid., p. 421. 
  13
I have noted that advances in Medicine result from advances in technique. 
Sometimes the technique is new, as in the case of the electron microscopy. At 
other times, an old technique has been refined and applied with greater 
understanding. Whichever way the advances were made, they depended, in 
the end, on technical skill and knowledge.45  
The war-time epidemics were very much tied into the sparse knowledge of the 
day. Paul shows how polio has been constantly reinterpreted, a process which he believes 
would continue for many years. He contrasts the stoical nineteenth century – which 
regarded paralysis during infancy as inevitable for some children – with the later, 
contemporary understanding that viewed polio with dismay and fear and follows the 
ambitious jockeying for position and recognition, which were so much part of the race to 
find an effective prophylactic. Contrasted to this high-profile approach is the altruism of 
the earlier epidemiological research of polio. In the early 1900s, through painstaking 
observation and recording of local epidemics, Swedish doctors presented a picture of the 
disease so accurate that later researchers built on these findings.46 Paul’s purpose in 
writing the book is to document 
                                                 
45  J.H.S Gear, ‘Some Highlights of Medical Technology in Southern Africa’, Presidential Address: 
The first South African Scientific Congress of the Society of Medical Laboratory Technologists of 
South Africa, The S.A. Journal of Medical Laboratory Technology, vol. 14, no. 3 (1968), p. 15. 
46  Gear returned to the observations of these early works in his research in the mid 1940s. 
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[t]he frequent, almost agonizing, efforts by individual scientists to achieve 
something which they felt would contribute to knowledge … the 
determination in the face of frustrating delays and frequent backtracking; the 
almost frantic attempts to do anything about paralytic poliomyelitis … 
methods of trial and error’ – [which] lead to the eventual control of the 
disease, with many casualties on the way.47 
Even after the vaccine was in use, Paul warned that the fight against polio was not over. 
‘The road will lead uphill for many years to come’,48 as is evident today, since polio is 
still experienced in certain countries of the world mainly due to inadequate vaccination.49 
Currently there are over 460 polio cases in the world, over 370 in Nigeria alone. A recent 
outbreak in Namibia claimed seven lives.50 Nigeria, India, Afghanistan and Pakistan are 
the four remaining countries where endemic polio is still found, but only in specific parts 
                                                 
47  Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, p. xiv. 
48  Ibid., p. 469. 
49  The following offer enlightened histories of the virus: A.B. Sabin, ‘Oral Poliovirus Vaccine: 
History of its Development and Use’ and A.B. Sabin, ‘Current Challenge to Eliminate 
Poliomyelitis from the World’, Journal of Infectious Diseases, vol. 151 (1985), pp. 57-64; D.M. 
Horstmann, ‘The Poliomyelitis Story: A Scientific Hegira’, Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine, 
vol. 58 (1985), pp. 79-90. 
50  The Star, 13 June 2006. 
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in each country. Continuing outbreaks of polio, such as the recent occurrence in Namibia, 
are the result of imported cases from any of these four areas.51 
Two other excellent histories of polio are Naomi Rogers’s Dirt and Disease52 and 
Tony Gould’s A Summer Plague.53 Rogers’s focus on the 1916 New York epidemic 
draws attention to the complexities and ironies of polio history. She emphasises that, in 
order to understand polio, it is necessary ‘to place each epidemic and ensuing drama’ 
within the context of the medical and scientific understanding of the early twentieth 
century. By the early 1900s, diagnostic tests, sera and vaccines were available to fight 
most infectious diseases, but not polio. ‘Polio proved confusing and intractable to all 
known bacteriological, epidemiological and therapeutic measures of the day’;54 polio in 
fact ‘highlighted the limitations of scientific solutions’55 and contradicted all given 
pictures of epidemic disease for many years to come.56 Rogers expands on the sense of 
                                                 
51  Prof. B. Schoub, lecture at the opening of the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation Training Centre, 
27 Nov. 2006. 
52  N. Rogers, Dirt and Disease: Polio before FDR (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 
1992).  
53  T. Gould. A Summer Plague: Polio and Its Survivors (Yale: University Press, 1995). 
54  Rogers, Dirt and Disease, p. 19. 
55  Ibid., p. 6. 
56  Ibid., p. 164. 
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inadequacy experienced throughout the 1916 epidemic and examines the responses to the 
epidemic within various social groups.  
Central to her argument is the way the disease shifted to the upper classes. Health 
officials and the lay public blamed the poor and immigrants for polio, believing that 
germs did not spread randomly.57 Insects were also blamed for transmission, especially 
flies. This policy of assigning responsibility for an epidemic and expecting ‘the authority 
of the new scientific medicine and germ theory of disease’ to conquer it, Rogers believes, 
was part of contemporary confidence which had been boosted by the successes of 
bacteriology.58 Concomitant to the emergence of a powerful ideology of motherhood 
during the early twentieth century,59 mothers were singled out as guardians ‘of the 
family’s spiritual and physical health’,60 but the irony of this early understanding of polio 
was that clean homes failed to protect the well-off child, while poorer children were able 
to build immunity to polio because of their more unsanitary environment. Rogers’s 
analysis of the tensions within a society, driven by fear and ignorance, offers useful 
insights which can be tested against other polio epidemics, such as the 1918 epidemic in 
                                                 
57  Ibid., p. 29. 
58  Ibid., p. 31. 
59  For an excellent exposé on this subject, see D. Dwork, War is Good for Babies and Other Young 
Children: A History of the Infant Welfare Movement in England 1898-1918 (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1987). 
60  Rogers, Dirt and Disease, p. 15. 
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Johannesburg. 61 Scientists and laymen alike attempted to direct medical research, driven 
by a shared sense of fear and frustration. Although the influence of popular heroes, such 
as Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had contracted polio in1929, was too far removed from the 
South African situation to be meaningful to the ordinary person locally, Rogers regards 
his influence in the USA as significant. He helped to recast the image of polio and 
disability by removing the stigma62 – although some polio survivors would disagree – and 
played an important role in setting up the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis 
(NFIP), developed in 1934 to raise money for the needs of polio patients across the USA 
and which contributed to polio research with substantial funding.63 
Whereas Rogers’s study does not offer the patients’ perspective, Gould makes a 
point of including the ‘experience of the polio patient, the actual sufferer’, in his account. 
‘It’s not just a question of “background” … but of insisting on the centrality of the polio 
experience’ as ‘the testimony of witnesses give resonance to the history’.64 His narrative 
attempts to weave together the various strands of the polio story – scientific, clinical, 
political and experiential aspects – ‘which have in the past been treated separately, if at 
                                                 
61  Ibid., p. 7. 
62  Rogers, Dirt and Disease, pp. 1-3. 
63  Ibid., p. 166. 
64  Gould, A Summer Plague, p. xiii.  
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all’.65 Such focal points have influenced the structure of this work; the political aspect is 
touched on only briefly. 
By making use of British material, Gould offsets the strong influence of the USA 
on polio history. In this context, the early South African epidemics deserve attention, as 
the 1944-1945 epidemic in South Africa offered Gear an entirely fresh field of research, 
and contributed to his pioneering insights. Gould does not focus on one epidemic, as 
Rogers does, and so his story is not as rich in analysis as her narrative, but it does include 
important new material, such as information about post-polio syndrome.  
In the 1970s, it became apparent that the polio story had yet another twist to it. 
Certain polio survivors, often those who had been least affected by the disease, found that 
thirty or forty years after the initial attack ‘their lives [were] cast into jeopardy by 
alarming symptoms of fatigue and new muscular weakness, suffered without warning.66 
Known as ‘Post-Polio Syndrome’, the ‘Late Effects of Polio’ or ‘Post-Polio Sequelae’, 
the condition still has not been totally recognised by some in the medical world. The 
effect of this ailment on polio survivors, however, has been dramatic. The functional 
deterioration experienced by many ‘polios’67 is a serious medical problem, while the 
cause has been the subject of considerable speculation and debate. Whatever the reason, 
                                                 
65  Ibid., p. xii. 
66  Ibid., p. xii. 
67  A term used by polo survivors: ‘a name that merged their identity with their disease’: Smith, 
Patenting the Sun, p. 38. 
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when fatigue and pain become debilitating, survivors once again face medical ignorance 
and disability. Many had suppressed the memory of their illness, but world-wide support 
groups encouraged them to become more open to discussion. Gould has used these 
testimonies to offer a unique aspect of the polio story. It was due in part to the post-polio 
syndrome that those who participated in this thesis were prepared to share their stories.68  
You don’t “conquer” or “overcome” polio in any meaningful sense, you 
merely adapt to the limitations it imposes and – if you’re fortunate – discover 
resources within yourself you might not otherwise have found.69 
There are several significant academic works on polio which have guided this 
thesis. Christopher Rutty’s PhD thesis offers a narrative history of polio in Canada from 
1927 to 1962. He integrates the Canadian experience within current historiography and 
shows how the USA’s ‘scientific and publicity war on polio’ influenced the Canadian 
response to epidemics. He explores certain factors fundamental to this response, 
especially polio’s ‘terrifying nature and high visibility, public expectations for action and 
protection, the profound frustrations associated with the scientific and medical 
                                                 
68  I found myself playing ‘go-between’ for the South African Post-Polio Network, as many who 
replied to my notice in the North East Chronicle thought that I might be able to help them with 
information on the condition. I pay homage to ‘Hans’, an organ builder of note in the country, who 
died within months of our conversation, ‘from respiratory complications resulting from his 
childhood encounter with the poliovirus’, according to C. Webster, 20 Nov. 2003. 
69  Gould, A Summer Plague, p. xvi. Other publications which offer polio testimonials are Wilson, 
Living with Polio and Shell, Polio and its Aftermath. 
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understanding of the disease, diagnosis, prevention, control, treatment and after-care’.70 
Canada’s experience of polio is important as it offered a broader understanding of the 
disease. This is also true of the Gear investigations into the transmission of the virus 
during the 1944-1945 South African epidemic, which contributed to the international 
understanding of polio. The Canadian government, closely connected to its provincial and 
federal health departments, set a new precedent in the management of polio.71 Strongly 
influenced by key individuals and the growing needs created by the epidemics, free and 
unconditional public health care was provided, special hospitals were built with 
convalescent facilities, physiotherapy and after-care for polio sufferers.72 The South 
African government subsidised the South African Institute for Medical Research 
(SAIMR), but not for polio research. State involvement into research on the disease was 
delayed until the 1950s. 
Rutty raises an important point about the relationship of polio to other diseases. 
Despite the fact that other infectious diseases such as measles, chicken-pox, whooping 
cough and scarlet fever had higher case numbers, polio became the focal point of 
expensive, world-wide research. He points out that, in such diseases, epidemics were rare 
and more invisible and that the illnesses were more transitory. Death could result but it 
was more likely that a full recovery left little subsequent evidence of the disease. 
                                                 
70  Rutty, ‘Do Something! Do Anything!’, p. ii. 
71  Ibid., p. 5 and p. 7. 
72  Ibid., p. 381. 
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Diphtheria, which came under control as polio was becoming a major threat, could leave 
emotional scars but not visible ones. Polio was ongoing, often associated in the public 
mind with a yearly summer season, and was therefore deserving of the attention it 
received from medical science.73 
Jean C. Ross’ scholarly work ‘A History of Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’ is 
direct and to the point. She examines the problem of quarantine measures which in New 
Zealand, were ‘extraordinarily wide in their scope’ and affected everyone. The country’s 
population was small enough to make such measures nationwide; all schools were closed 
during an epidemic. Although these measures proved useless in stopping the spread of 
polio, the public, the medical profession and the health authorities never questioned them. 
A certain race or class was not blamed for spreading the virus, as was experienced in the 
USA or, to a lesser degree, in South Africa. ‘To the general public polio was yet another 
of the hazards of infancy which could blight their child’s life forever.’74 By 1947, 
however, due to a clearer understanding of the epidemiology of polio, isolation only 
applied to the infected individuals and immediate contacts. ‘The health authorities were 
faced with the difficult task of persuading the general public that what had been 
absolutely essential five years before was now not necessary.’75 In similar vein 
Johannesburg health officials wavered in their polio policy which bewildered parents. 
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Ross raises the important issue of viral enteric infections and infant mortality as a 
screen to early polio figures.76 Studies showed that where there was a high infant 
mortality rate, polio, in its endemic form, was hidden by other infectious illnesses such as 
endemic diarrhoeal diseases. ‘It is not until the infant mortality rate drops below 75 per 
1000 that polio begins to manifest itself within a few years.’ In New Zealand, infant 
mortality figures began dropping around 1906; this was followed by the first polio 
epidemic in the country in 1916. Similarly Australia, England, Wales, the USA and Italy 
showed a marked drop in infant mortality rates by the early1920s, with a concomitant rise 
in polio epidemics within a few years.77 The link between the infant mortality rate and 
polio in Johannesburg is explored in Chapter Five.  
Although Ross believes that the fear engendered by polio was out of all 
proportion to its actual impact, the appearance of the disease in epidemic form during the 
early twentieth century was significant: 
When it was thought to be rare or unknown, it was common; when it seemed 
common it was rare … at a time when infectious diseases were being 
overcome with disinfectants, sewers, good food and clean water, polio could 
not be controlled. It made a mockery of every public health measure and 
advance in the standard of living.78 
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Although the South African polio epidemics are mentioned in several general 
historical accounts,79 the only scholarly work on polio in South Africa is Wieland. K. 
Bettzieche’s ‘Polio, People and Apartheid’.80 His focus is on the 1944-1945 and 1948 
epidemics, the establishment of the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation and the polio 
vaccine campaigns during the 1950s, with a focus on the Cape Peninsula. His main 
sources are J.H.S. Gear’s The History of the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation, Malan 
Marais’s In Quest of Health, Roger’s Dirt and Disease and Rosenberg’s Explaining 
Epidemics. Unfortunately Bettzieche has neglected to list sources diligently, especially 
with regard to his brief handling of the epidemics in the 1940s, and it is difficult to verify 
pertinent aspects of his arguments. He attempts to explore ‘the reasons for the marked 
differences in polio’s prevalence in South Africa’s racial groups’,81 hoping that the polio 
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epidemics might ‘illuminate the political, ideological, cultural and social situation of 
society at the time’.82 He concludes: 
Polio highlighted early patterns of disease and discrimination in the 
prevention and treatment which ran along the lines demarcated by apartheid. 
The differences in provision of health services according to race 
foreshadowed the segregation of health services in the 1960s and 1970s.83  
This thesis did not endeavour to pursue any discriminatory pattern in the handling of 
polio along racial lines, as the statistics for all ‘non-white’ groups during the early 
epidemics were too inadequate and unreliable to be able to make any convincing 
argument. In his socio-political view of polio in the Cape Peninsula and its impact on 
blacks and whites, Bettzieche admits that Cape records show a lack of ‘depth and of 
detail, especially in regard to “racial divisions”’. He finds this to be ‘a degrading and 
discriminating device which expresses the general lack of interest in detail in races other 
than white at the time’.84 War-time conditions, however, hampered effective gathering of 
white statistics, for various reasons which will be discussed; it can be assumed that black 
statistics were also affected by these conditions. Scientists suspected that the poliovirus 
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affected people living in poor conditions to a lesser degree.85 Ironically, polio was the one 
infectious disease from which blacks appeared initially protected by their living 
conditions, but this pattern changed during the 1950s when they succumbed to polio in 
greater numbers.  
Although he does not go into any detail, Bettzieche regards 1944 as the point 
where polio shifted ‘from sporadic appearance to epidemic proportions’.86 ‘Never before 
had incidences been so high and widespread as during this epidemic, nor had the 
mortality rate in the past been comparable with that of this epidemic.’87 This thesis, 
however, argues that there is sufficient material available on polio in 1918 – despite the 
paucity of statistics – to build up a reasonable account of the epidemic along social and 
medical lines.88 A cursory examination of available figures even suggests that the 1918 
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epidemic was more severe, with a higher mortality rate than the later epidemic in 1944-
1945. Early epidemics in other countries followed a similar trend of high mortality rates. 
As more epidemics occurred, case numbers increased, but there were a greater number of 
paralysed cases and older age-groups becoming infected, while mortality rates dropped.  
Later progress in polio research in South Africa is firmly based on the 1944-1945 
epidemic and, although the 1918 epidemic did not play a direct role in this research, it 
deserves more than the cursory mention it has received to date. As no detailed account of 
these epidemics exists, such an investigation is long overdue. 
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Chapter Two 
The Guided Missile:1 The Epidemiology of Poliomyelitis 
 
2.1 Polio diagnosis 
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, polio changed from an unremarkable 
disease into one of the most feared diseases of all time. The virus was internationally 
endemic and seldom caused death, but in its epidemic form polio was lethal. R.L. Bruno 
has likened the poliovirus to a guided missile which has a specific task: it targets only 
motor neuron cells in the brain and spinal cord which are responsible for the transmission 
of the nerve impulses to various muscles.2 If these cells are destroyed, the paralysis in 
affected limbs can be permanent. 
                                                 
1  R.L. Bruno, The Polio Paradox: Uncovering the Hidden History of Polio to Understand and Treat 
“Post-Polio Syndrome” and Chronic Fatigue (New York: Warner Books, 2002), p. 20. The 
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From Table 2.1 above, one can see in diagnostic terms that polio infections can be 
severe, mild or inapparent. Paralytic polio is a major illness, in which weakness or 
paralysis of one or more muscles develops. Non-paralytic polio is also a major illness 
because of central nervous system (CNS)3 involvement, but paralysis does not occur. 
Abortive polio is a brief, systemic illness, often limited to one or more of the following 
                                                 
3  P. J. Paul, A History of Poliomyelitis (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 3. 
The CNS includes the anatomical structures of the brain, brain stem, medulla and spinal chord. 
Table 2.1 
 
Schematic diagram of the clinical and subclinical forms of poliomyelitis 
Source: Debré, Poliomyelitis, p. 17. 
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symptoms: sore throat, headache, vomiting and fever, but clinical or laboratory signs 
pointing to CNS involvement fail to develop. Abortive polio is therefore usually only 
diagnosed during an epidemic when doctors are on the alert for the disease. Because the 
symptoms of other childhood diseases are similar to polio, an epidemic can also be a 
period of heightened misdiagnosis. A critical feature of polio is the inapparent infection, 
which is the most common (90-95 per cent) and occurs in individuals who sustain silent 
or subclinical infection, presenting no symptoms, and who, as a result of this experience, 
develop antibodies to the infecting strain of the virus.4 These healthy carriers are by far 
the most numerous and uncontrolled, as their symptom-free infection escapes detection 
and they can act as ‘a huge human reservoir’ for the spread of the disease.5  
The above diagram shows how, following a few days of flu-like symptoms, the 
disease can abort. After an incubation period of a week or more, the patient can suddenly 
become paralysed or the advent of the disease can be biphasic: following a few days of 
ill-health, symptoms can disappear and the patient seems to recover only to be struck 
down with paralysis. The ratio of paralytic to inapparent infections is difficult to measure 
but could be in the region of 1:200. It is clear that if the mild or abortive cases and the 
inapparent infections are included in any epidemiological survey, then the polio attack 
rates approach those of a highly contagious disease, giving quite a different picture from 
                                                 
4  R. Debré, et al., Poliomyelitis, WHO Monograph Series, no. 26 (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 1955), pp. 14-15. 
5  Ibid., p. 14. 
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that gained from the analysis of the paralytic cases alone.6 This means that polio was 
much more widespread in South African society than was realised in the first half of the 
twentieth century.  
 
2.2 The Pathogenesis of Polio 
This includes the origin of the disease, the way in which the poliovirus enters or leaves 
the human body, how a person becomes infected and then contaminates the immediate 
environment.  
The virus is transmitted through person-to-person contact and enters via the 
mouth. Food, contaminated hands, towels and nappies, utensils and, to a lesser degree, 
droplets in the air introduce the virus into the alimentary canal which includes the mouth, 
stomach and the entire intestinal tract.7 The virus multiplies in the spongy tissue of the 
tonsils and surrounding lymph nodes and moves down to the small intestine where it 
enters Peyer’s patches, miniature cave-like lymph nodes in the wall of the intestine. Here 
further multiplication of the virus takes place. The overabundance of poliovirus in the 
tonsils spilling back into the throat mixes with saliva and contributes to the spread of 
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infection.8 Large amounts of poliovirus in the small intestine are also passed out with the 
intestinal contents, infecting sewage systems in the region. This does not necessarily 
mean that sewage systems are the usual avenue of infection; ‘it means essentially that 
here is evidence that the community is infected’.9 
The alimentary tract and oropharynx (mouth and throat), although the first sites to 
be attacked, might also be called ‘the first line of defence’, as the virus seems to be 
stopped here in the majority of infections, doing no appreciable damage, save a slight 
swelling of these structures.10 After an incubation period of two to five days, the body’s 
automatic reaction occurs in the cells and specific antibodies are produced. Provided 
these defences are adequate, the virus can be destroyed at this stage, and the individual 
can enjoy lasting immunity from future infections of that particular poliovirus. 
If the virus is not stopped by the body’s immune system and millions of 
poliovirus particles spill into the bloodstream from the lymph nodes and the intestine, the 
infection is carried to the brain and spinal cord, where neurons of the brain stem and 
motor neurons of the anterior horn of grey matter are targeted. More distinctive 
symptoms emerge, such as a stiff neck and back, high fever and varying sites and degrees 
of muscle weakness. Once inside individual neurons, the poliovirus blocks production of 
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vital protein or neurochemicals needed to transmit messages to enable muscle 
contraction. Muscles become weaker or are paralysed as brain and spinal neurons become 
less active or stop functioning.11 These frank paralytic cases occur in about three to four 
per cent of all polio infections.12 
There are a number of provoking factors, which, if present, may change an 
otherwise silent infection into a paralytic attack. These include long, tiring journeys, 
strenuous exercise, tonsillectomy, (even if performed several months previously), 
adenoidectomy and operations on the mucous membrane of the mouth, including tooth 
extraction.13 Why this happens is not understood; ‘it is possibly a matter of timing in this 
disease’.14 
Meanwhile, within the body, invaded neurons, which did not die during the acute 
stage of the disease, become smaller than their original size. Their surviving axons grow 
again sending out sprouts – ‘like extra telephone lines’ – to turn ‘on’ the muscles cut off 
while the poliovirus was present. Some patients, who were initially paralysed, walked 
after a few weeks or months, although this process could take up to two years. Post-
infection strengthening exercises and physiotherapy can result in the surviving muscle 
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fibres growing up to twice their original size, in order to do more work. In certain cases 
deformities of varying degrees develop in the affected limbs, which would require 
surgical procedures to correct.15  
David Bodian, an American scientist and pathologist responsible for 
groundbreaking work on polio in the 1940s, claimed that, on average, 96 per cent of the 
motor neurons of the spinal cord were infected during the average case. Before an 
individual muscle showed any weakness, 60 percent of the neurons had to be destroyed.16 
If movement returned, those muscles which had been paralysed could operate on as little 
as 40 per cent of their original motor neurons. More disturbing, however, he revealed that 
neurons had also been damaged even for those who had experienced ‘nonparalytic’ 
polio.17 This revelation had important repercussions for polio survivors who, years later, 
could develop the condition known as post-polio syndrome (recognised after 1970). An 
understanding of the damage caused by the poliovirus is important in the management of 
the syndrome, although to date many doctors are divided as to the existence of this 
condition.18 
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A major stumbling block in controlling the disease was due to the unusual 
complexity of the polioviruses compared, for example, with the smallpox or yellow fever 
virus, where immunity is dependent on protection against a single virus strain. In 1931, 
Australians Frank MacFarlane Burnet and Jean MacNamara found that there were in fact 
three poliovirus serotypes, each with its own special autogenic and biological 
characteristics. This discovery opened the way to the development of an effective vaccine 
and also explained the occurrence, although rare, of repeated attacks in a person.19 
Usually one type of poliovirus is dominant during an epidemic, although it is not 
unknown for another type to accompany the main type. The Brunhilde virus,20 or Type 1, 
appears to be responsible for almost all polio epidemics, causing leg, arm and sometimes 
breathing-muscle paralysis. The Type 2 virus, or Lansing, is least likely to cause paralysis 
and responsible for endemic infections. Type 3 poliovirus (Leon) is the most rare. It can 
cause leg and arm paralysis, but is most likely to produce so-called ‘bulbar’ polio, which 
severely damages the bulb or stem of the brain. This results in difficulties with 
swallowing, breathing and blood pressure, which can lead to the death. Research has 
suggested that, during the polio epidemics, most cases were infected with only one type 
                                                 
19   Ross, ‘Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’, p. 5; Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, p. 233. This vital 
discovery lay dormant for years until the 1948 ‘Typing Project’ led to the naming of the three 
viruses.  
20  Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, pp. 232-239. Brunhilde was the name of a chimpanzee which John 
Hopkins used in a research programme; the chimpanzee is the nearest to man with respect to 
susceptibility to poliomyelitis.  
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of poliovirus, probably Type 1. Total immunity only results from infection from all three 
viruses so that the body can develop antibodies against each type.21 Within each 
immunological type, individual strains appear to vary in their virulence, with more 
aggressive strains giving a higher incidence of frank or ‘true’ polio per immunising 
infection.22 
The poliovirus, like other entero-viruses, is resistant to all known antibiotics or 
chemotherapy agents. Laboratory disinfectants, such as alcohol, Lysol and ‘quaternary 
ammonium compounds’, are ineffective against the virus. The poliovirus is viable at 
room temperature for days and for many years at freezing point, although ultraviolet light 
and temperatures of 50 degrees centigrade destroy it.23 
From this outline of the disease it is clear that one of the most difficult tasks 
facing doctors in the early part of the twentieth century was to diagnose polio correctly, 
hopefully before paralysis appeared, but there was no specific diagnostic test to assist 
                                                 
21  Bruno, Polio Paradox, pp. 21-22. 
22  J. Trueta, Handbook of Poliomyelitis (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1956), p. 10. 
There are at least fifty variations or strains of the three types: Bruno, Polio Paradox, p. 22. 
23  Ross, ‘Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’, p. 6. 
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them.24 Symptoms of polio mimicked a variety of other common childhood diseases, as 
well as other more serious virus diseases of the CNS, such as acute aseptic meningitis and 
encephalitis. This placed both professional and emotional strain on doctors, who hesitated 
to diagnose until paralysis appeared.  
The lumbar puncture or ‘spinal tap’ had emerged in the 1880s as a useful tool in 
diagnosing meningitis. A needle was inserted between the vertebrae and a small amount 
of spinal fluid was drawn off for microscopic examination for particular cells which 
could be cultured.25 This procedure could be most uncomfortable and frightening, 
especially for small children; the cell count might confirm polio, but the results often 
arrived after paralysis had set in. Once inside the body, there was no cure for polio nor 
was there any proven treatment, although an anti-polio serum, prepared from the blood of 
individuals who had recovered from a polio attack, was used until the 1930s, mainly in an 
attempt to minimise the severity of the disease.26 
 
                                                 
24  Rutty, ‘Do Something! Do Anything!’, p. 31. Diagnostic tools were available for other diseases 
from as early as 1910, such as the Schick test for diphtheria, the Widal test for typhoid, the 
tuberculin test for tuberculosis (TB), and the Wasserman test for syphilis. 
25  Ibid., p. 32. 
26  Ibid., p. 41. 
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2.3 An Outline of the Understanding of Polio 
‘This pestilence which walketh in darkness … How does it select its victims and 
where does it strike them that we might protect them from its murderous and 
cruelly disabling attack?’27 
Polio is an old disease with records dating back to ancient Egypt; references to paralysis 
in the bible might well have been as a result of polio. Before the twentieth century, 
however, the disease was little known other than as a mild, endemic infection 
experienced mainly by children, hence the name ‘infantile paralysis’. It was not 
considered infectious and for years paralysis during infancy was believed to be caused by 
‘teething, foul bowels or a fever’,28 ‘even from sitting on the damp ground’.29 In 1772, Sir 
Walter Scott described how, at 18 months old, he suffered an attack of fever which left 
him lame. The reaction of his parents to his paralysed right leg is worth noting.  
My anxious parents, during the course of many years, eagerly grasped 
at any cure which was held out by the promise of empirics, or of ancient 
ladies or gentlemen who considered themselves entitled to recommend 
                                                 
27  Rutty, The Middle Class Plague, p. 33. 
28  Paul, Poliomyelitis, p. 9. 
29  Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, p. xiii. 
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various remedies, some of which were of a nature sufficiently 
singular.30 
Michael Underwood was the first physician to give a clear clinical account of 
polio in 1784 and to recognise the disease as an entity. In his book, Treatise on Children, 
under the heading, ‘Debility of the Lower Extremeties’,31 he wrote: ‘It is not a common 
disorder (which) seems to arise from debility and usually attacks children previously 
reduced by fever, seldom those under one or more than four or five years old.’32 
Underwood recommended the use of calomel and volatile as treatment during the first 
few days or weeks of the disease. 
In 1813, in Milan, Giovanni Battista Monteggia offered a more detailed 
description of the effects of the disease on the body. He mentions the high fever and 
describes how ‘the member remains immobile and regains, with time, only an imperfect 
degree of strength’, which can be carried on into adulthood as ‘a dragging leg’. In an era 
when the medical profession paid small heed to an accurate diagnosis, these observations 
accurately outline the clinical course of the disease.33 
                                                 
30  Gear, Poliomyelitis Research Foundation, pp. 4-5. 
31  Ibid., p. 24. 
32  Gear, Poliomyelitis Research Foundation, p. 5. 
33  Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, pp. 27-28. 
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In 1835, J. Badham followed four patients in Sheffield in England over a period 
of a week, observing the symptoms of thirst and drowsiness, the unusual appearance of 
the eyes and the patient’s inability to stand.34 In 1836, Sir Charles Bell described the first 
epidemic which occurred on St Helena following a description of the mother of a little 
girl who was part of a group of children who contracted polio on the island. She called it 
an ‘epidemic fever’; the children were ‘similarly affected with a want of growth in some 
part of their body or limbs’.35 
By 1840, Jacob von Heine, in Germany, suggested that the symptoms of the 
disease ‘point to an infection of the central nervous system, specifically of the spinal 
cord’ causing sudden paralysis preceded by ‘pain in the extremties, fever, irritability and 
convulsions in most cases’.36 He advocated rest and wrapping the affected limbs in a 
warm cloth in place of the standard purges, blisters and emetics used during that time.37 
By 1870, J. Charcot, a famous French medical scientist, confirmed Heine’s theory 
of the involvement of the central nervous system in polio. With the aid of the microscope, 
Charcot demonstrated how the large motor nerve cells in the grey matter of the spinal 
cord were lost during the early or acute stage of the disease. The neuropathology of polio 
                                                 
34  Ibid., p. 41. 
35  Ibid., p. 43. 
36  Ibid., p. 53. 
37  Ross, ‘Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’, p. 10. 
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was thus established, which set it apart from other kinds of acute and chronic diseases 
involving the CNS.38  
The germ theory, developed by Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch during the 
nineteenth century, introduced the era of the bacteria; the poliovirus was only recognised 
in 1909. Although this recognition of the role of the pathogen may have led to a search 
for the cause of polio, its impact was necessarily limited. More important was the work of 
K. Medin who in 1884 gave the first description of a large polio epidemic, in Sweden, 
after which ‘the epidemic character of polio began to be taken seriously’.39 Sweden had 
the reputation as the country with the worst epidemics, although it was not understood 
why. However, Medin’s observations helped delineate the clinical course of the disease. 
The minor symptoms and slight fever of the febrile period signified a generalised process, 
which could be followed by serious damage to the CNS. He observed that the course of 
the acute disease was sometimes interrupted by a brief, afebrile period or a time when 
symptoms cleared up entirely and the individual appeared perfectly well, but within one 
or two days, without warning, the disease recommenced with paralysis. In 1917, Draper 
called this biphasic nature of the disease, the ‘dromedary course’ of polio.40 Medin’s work 
was important to the understanding of the disease and of rest as a treatment. 
                                                 
38  Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, pp. 54 -57. 
39  Paul, Poliomyelitis, p. 10. 
40  Many sources have delighted in catching Draper out; the dromedary camel has only one hump, the 
term ‘biphasic’ is more accurate in describing this feature in the course of the disease. 
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In1894, Dr Charles Caverly, a physician and public health officer in Vermont in 
the United States of America, pointed out how older children were becoming victims of 
polio, which represented a move away from the endemic pattern which affected mainly 
infants. He also recognised abortive cases. This American epidemic recorded 1031 cases, 
and high mortality rates of 13.5 per cent, revealing another truism of the disease: the 
older the polio patient, the higher the death rate.  
This gradual shift in age-incidence is an important element in the understanding 
of polio since the advent of its epidemic form. Caverly also reported a curious finding 
which, although never linked in any way to polio, is worth noting, as a similar instance 
occurred during the 1944-1945 polio epidemic in South Africa. A nervous disease, 
resulting in paralysis, killed a number of horses, dogs and fowls in the same geographic 
area as the epidemic.41 Finally, Caverly questioned whether polio was contagious or not 
as, during the epidemic, he only came upon one instance in which more than one member 
of the family contracted polio. Such systematic observations of epidemics were important 
to build up an understanding of the epidemiology of polio. While Caverly was the first 
American to have done this, arguably, Ivor Wickman was probably the most valuable. 
Wickman was a pupil of Medin, ‘indoctrinated by him in the current knowledge 
of poliomyelitis.42 He had also witnessed two epidemics in Sweden – in 1899 and 1903 -- 
                                                 
41  Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, pp. 83-85. 
42  Ibid., p. 88.  
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and had written a thorough review of the disease. During the 1903 epidemic, he observed, 
as Medin had, that overcrowding was not the cause of polio, as was the case with many 
other diseases; rather overcrowding provided an opportunity to build up immunity against 
polio, which children in remote areas were unable to do.  
Wickman also noted that, in some instances, the infection might have missed the 
CNS altogether. Such abortive cases, also mentioned by Caverly, did not result in 
paralysis, but might equal or even outnumber the paralytic ones. He thought the ratio of 
abortive cases to frank polio cases could be several hundred to one.43 As already 
discussed, this group continued to transmit the disease, although outwardly displaying no 
symptoms. Wickman discussed the incubation period of the virus, fixing this at three to 
four days from the time of exposure to the virus, and eight to ten days to the fever that 
was associated with the major illness.44  
It had become clear that polio was highly contagious. A significant difference 
from scarlet fever or smallpox was the fact that doctors were usually guided by a 
                                                 
43  J.L. Braudo, ‘Clinical Manifestations of Fifty Cases of Acute Poliomyelitis seen at the Children’s 
Hospital, Johannesburg, during the 1948 Epidemic with Special Reference to the Management in 
the Acute Phase and the Phenomenon of Spasm’ (MD thesis, University of the Wiwatersrand, 
1958), p. 8. 
45  Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, p. 94. Paul adds that for over 50 years textbook articles stated that 
the incubation period averaged eight to nine days with a minimum of five days and a maximum of 
35 days. 
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definitive rash or pustules.45 To diagnose ‘infantile paralysis’, in the absence of paralysis, 
seemed impossible to many doctors because this was so contrary to their understanding of 
the clinical and epidemiological picture of the disease in the early twentieth century. 
In 1908, Karl Landsteiner and his assistant, E. Popper, finally confirmed that 
polio was caused by a virus.46 This confirmation of the aetiological agent promised fresh 
opportunities for research but this knowledge did not help the average family doctor, 
health workers, or the parents whose children still faced the threat of ever-increasing 
polio epidemics which no one knew how to control. The next step was to grow the virus 
in order to reproduce spinal cord lesions in experimental animals which were comparable 
to those found in human spinal cord samples. Landsteiner successfully implanted the 
poliovirus into two different species of monkey.47 Together with Levaditi, a member of 
the Pasteur Institute, Lansteiner then demonstrated the presence of poliovirus in non-
nervous tissue which was vital to later vaccine work.48 
                                                 
45  Ross, ‘Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’, p. 9. 
46  Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, pp. 98-106. Landsteiner was also responsible for paving the way for 
the identification of the four major blood groups, thus laying the groundwork for the science and 
techniques of blood transfusion. 
48  These were the Macaca Rhesus and the Cynocephalus Hamadryas species of monkey; the latter 
was plentiful in South Africa and was used in further polio research here. 
48  Gear, Poliomyelitis Research Foundation, p. 10. 
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But it was Wickman who had laid the basis for the modern epidemiological 
concept of the disease; he had emphasised its infectious nature, its spread through human 
contact and the importance of mild cases and carriers. Yet polio research from 1910 
turned to the lure of the laboratory and studying the disease in animals. This side-tracked 
the vital issue of how polio worked in the human body and the possible discovery of a 
much-needed diagnostic test.49 ‘It has been said of this particular time that everything one 
discovered through the use of a microscope must be true.’50 C. Ross considers 
Landsteiner’s discovery that polio was indeed a virus as a landmark in the history of the 
disease51 but it also marked an unfortunate tangent in polio research which would affect 
the lives of thousands of people. 
The course of events was typical of the way knowledge in poliomyelitis 
seems to have progressed – in fits and starts, often punctuated by long 
periods of frustrating inactivity followed by spurts of misdirected 
effort.52 
In 1911, Dr Carl Kling and Wilhelm Wernstedt after their studies on the 1905 and 
1911 epidemics in Sweden suggested that during an epidemic the natural immunisation of 
                                                 
49  Ibid., p. 106. 
50  Ibid., p. 97. 
51  Ross, ‘Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’, p. 11. 
52  Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, p. 97. 
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thousands of people could take place. These important advances in the epidemiology of 
polio were unfortunately ignored in favour of America’s growing involvement in 
research. Simon Flexner, Director of the Rockefeller Institute in New York, was the first 
to be sidetracked into the animal study of polio. By 1908 he had succeeded in passing the 
virus between monkeys, so establishing the virus outside the human body. He also used 
immune serum from monkeys, which were recovering from the disease, to neutralise the 
active poliovirus in a test tube, thus contributing to the later use of serum as a treatment 
of polio. He was so convinced that he was on the right track with these animal 
experiments that he announced to the New York Times that, within six months, a specific 
remedy might be expected. ‘We have already discovered the disease and the achievement 
of a cure, I may conservatively say, is not now far distant.’53  
No cure for polio has ever been found and more than forty years would elapse 
before a safe and reliable method of prevention was developed. What Flexner failed to 
keep in mind was that the manifestation of the disease in monkeys might differ according 
to the species and might not follow the same course in humans. He had hoped that the 
pathology of the disease in monkeys and humans would be sufficiently similar to make a 
distinctive breakthrough in the laboratory. By the time that Dr J.H.S. Gear in 
Johannesburg became involved with polio research during the Second World War, 
Flexner’s theories had been replaced. However, it was to Flexner that the medical and 
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health authorities in Johannesburg turned for advice during the first polio epidemic which 
broke out in the city in 1918. 
By 1918 the features of poliomyelitis were well documented, mainly due to the 
immense effort put into the collection and analysis of statistical data collected during the 
1916 New York epidemic. Nevertheless, it is interesting see how an American 
epidemiologist defined polio in 1910: 
A peculiar gastro-intestinal condition possibly the result of a specific 
infection, perhaps like summer diarrhea, due to a non-specific, 
miscellaneous, bacterial interrelation with poor nutritional conditions 
under abnormal climatic surroundings, resulting in the formation and 
absorption of poisonous substances which attack the central nervous 
system diffusely, the exact clinical results depending upon the 
concentration and the effects of the poison at various points.54 
By 1918, however, certain aspects of polio were more clearly understood. 
According to the Public Health Services Report after the 1916 United States epidemic 
investigators concluded that polio was exclusively a human infection, transmitted from 
person to person without any necessary intervention of an animal or insect host. The 
precise mechanism of transmission and avenues of infection were unknown. During an 
epidemic a considerable number of the population, both children and adults became 
                                                 
54  Ibid., p. 139. 
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infected without clinical manifestations or displaying mild symptoms and were the main 
carriers of the disease. Reported cases made up a small percentage of the actual number 
infected and played a minor role in the spread of infection. During an epidemic, one to 
three recognised cases per thousand are sufficient in number to immunise the general 
population to such an extent that the epidemic spontaneously declines, ‘due to the 
exhaustion or thinning out of infectable material’.55 The degree of immunity within that 
population is sufficient to limit the incidence rate of a subsequent epidemic. Because 
infection during an epidemic was so widespread, isolation and quarantine regulations had 
little value in preventing the spread of polio. 
                                                 
55  Gear, Poliomyelitis Research Foundation, p. 12. 
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Chapter Three 
The 1918 Poliomyelitis Epidemic in Johannesburg: 
The Medical Response 
 
3.1 Epidemic polio appears in Johannesburg: the course of the epidemic 
‘It is to be feared that the present local epidemic will add nothing to our 
knowledge of this obscure disease.’1 
In January 1918, Dr E.P. Baumann, Senior Physician at the Johannesburg 
Hospital, announced to the Witwatersrand Branch of the British Medical Association 
(Witwatersrand BMA): ‘This summer, for the first time in the history of the country, so 
far as any records show, we have been visited with poliomyelitis in an extensive epidemic 
form’.2 
The first indication of an epidemic was in November 1917, when a number of 
serious polio cases were experienced in and around Johannesburg. Baumann admitted 
that once the mortality rates began to rise, he knew that the outbreak was grave. For 
                                                 
1  Editorial, ‘Poliomyelitis’, Medical Journal of South Africa (MJSA), vol. 13, no. 7 (Feb. 1918), p. 
113. 
2  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 6 (Jan. 1918), p. 87. 
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years, sporadic cases had occurred ‘as would be expected of an endemic disease’,3 but 
death was unusual during such outbreaks, although there were incidences of paralysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By January 1918, the polio epidemic was confirmed. March proved to be the 
month with the highest number of infections, by which time over 100 children in 
Johannesburg had been struck down by the disease. As the weather cooled, the numbers 
tapered off.4 By May, the epidemic was over. Johannesburg and Reef towns had been 
affected, with polio reaching Krugersdorp to the west and Springs to the east, while 
                                                 
3  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 6 (Jan. 1918), p. 87. 
4  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 7 (Feb. 1918), p. 114. 
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Source: Dr S. Heymann, ‘The Transvaal 
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Pretoria recorded the lowest toll.5 There were also outbreaks ‘at various remote places 
throughout the Transvaal’, but these remained small and contained.6 
Notification of polio as an infectious disease became compulsory on 15 February 
1918, but before this date figures were unreliable, although private practitioners, on 
request, had reported 58 cases of polio.7 Later official figures stood at 145 for the entire 
epidemic of which only six (four per cent) were of black people. 143 of the 145 cases (99 
per cent) were under 15 years old. The death toll was between 20 and 24.8 The Medical 
Officer of Health (MOH) report for 1916-1919 places the case load at 181 with 24 deaths 
and states: ‘A number of other cases existed which were neither reported nor notified and 
some cases which, on account of their mildness, escaped notice altogether.’9 Keeping in 
mind that the actual case rate was higher, the 1918 white population of Johannesburg of 
                                                 
5  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 14 (Sep. 1918), p. 245. 
6  The Star, 26 Feb. 1918. 
7  Report of the Medical Officer of Health on the Public Health and Sanitary Circumstances of 
Johannesburg during the Three Years, 1 July 1916 - 30 June 1919 (Johannesburg, June 1920), p. 
24. This report will be referred to as ARMOH (1916-1919) in later references. 
8  J.W. Millar, ‘Poliomyelitis in Johannesburg’, Public Health, vol. 13 (Mar. 1949), pp. 143-148; J. 
L Braudo, ‘Clinical Manifestations of Acute Poliomyelitis’, pp. 2-13; Eric Rosenthal’s article in 
The Star, 5 June 1944, raises the count to 181 cases and 20 deaths.    
9  ARMOH (1916-1919), p. 24.  
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140 75010 enables one to calculate an incidence rate per 100 000 of population (whites) to 
be approximately 99, which is higher than the subsequent epidemic of 1944-1945,11 
where 174 cases among whites gives an incidence rate of 52 per 100 000.12 The stated 
figures of 1918 may not be totally accurate, principally due to a lack of notification, but 
the incidence rate as shown above indicates that Johannesburg’s first polio epidemic was 
indeed a serious one. Adding the earlier 58 cases before February, a breakdown of cases 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
The epidemic seemed to take the authorities by surprise, despite the fact that the 
United States of America’s (USA’s) epidemic in 1916 had been widely publicised in both 
the press and medical publications as ‘the most formidable that had hitherto been 
                                                 
10  Ibid., p. 1. 
11  Population Statistics taken from the Official Year Book of the Union and Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, no. 24 (Pretoria, 1949), p. 1097. 
12  Millar, ‘Poliomyelitis in Johannesburg’, pp. 143-148. 
 
Table 3.1 
Incidence of polio cases in Johannesburg, February – August 1918 
 
Source: ARMOH (1916-1919), p. 24 
Feb. Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Total 
43 60 15 2 1 1 1 181 
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recorded’;13 27 000 cases and 6 000 deaths had occurred in 26 states.14 New Zealand had 
also experienced a severe epidemic in 1916, with 1 018 cases and 123 dead,15 and it was 
only a matter of time before the disease reached South Africa. Earlier in 1917, Dr J. 
Marius Moll, part-time Medical Officer of Schools in Rand Central area, had remarked 
that ‘although sporadic cases of the disease are usually to be found in most countries, 
epidemics are fortunately rare’; but his assurance was short-lived.16 Case numbers 
increased during a period of heavy rain17 in November and December 1917, but little was 
                                                 
13  J.M. Moll, ‘Epidemic Poliomyelitis: Review of our Present Knowledge’, MJSA, vol. 12, no. 13 
(Aug. 1917), p. 2. 
14  N. Rogers, Dirt and Disease: Polio before FDR (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1992), 
p. 10. 
15  J.C. Ross, ‘A History of Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’ (MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 
1993), p. 15. 
16  MJSA, vol. 12, no. 13 (Aug. 1917), pp. 2-5. 
17  The Star, 4 Nov. 1917; R. Debré et al, Poliomyelitis WHO Monograph Series, no. 26 (Geneva: 
World Health Organisation, 1955), p. 19. Debré comments on a possible relationship between 
polio and rain: ‘Something happens during summer weather which either introduces the virus into 
the community, or enormously facilitates the dissemination of the virus throughout the 
community, or makes certain people, the non-immune, far more susceptible.’ In his report the 
Johannesburg’s MOH also mentioned that the epidemic occurred during months of ‘quite unusual 
“recorded rainfall” … The subsidence of the epidemic coincided with the cessation of the rains in 
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published in the press about incidence rates, no doubt to allay any cause for alarm. 
Further, as this was the first epidemic experienced in South Africa, there was no polio 
policy on which to act.  
Eventually, on 29 January 1918, the Rand Daily Mail published a report written 
by Dr. Watkins-Pitchford, Director of the South African Institute for Medical Research 
(SAIMR), offering information on polio ‘practically all that is known of interest to the 
general public’.18 Watkins-Pitchford informed readers that the name ‘infantile paralysis’ 
was incorrect, as adults could also contract poliomyelitis, and that the disease was called 
‘acute poliomyelitis … which in plain English implies a severe inflammation lasting only 
a short time and affecting the gray matter of the spinal cord’.19 He did not consider polio 
to be ‘markedly contagious’, but was most likely spread from person to person. He 
described polio as: 
Formidable, not so much on account of its prevalence and fatality as in 
respect of the terrible frequency with which it leaves the patient 
                                                                                                                                                 
April 1918 … it would however be very unsafe to make any deduction herefrom’: ARMOH 
(1916-1918), p. 25. 
18  Rand Daily Mail, 29 Jan. 1918. 
19  Ibid., The name change did not become common parlance until the 1940s and many articles in 
newspapers continued to appear with the familiar ‘infantile paralysis’. Medical journals, however 
adopted the name change. 
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permanently paralyzed. The virus both enters and leaves the body 
through the lining membrane of the nose … distributed in the 
microscopic spray produced when a patient coughs or speaks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This was how fresh cases were spread and some infected individuals became carriers 
without showing any signs of the disease. Watkins-Pitchford had thus asserted the claim 
of doctors as unquestioned authorities on the subject, which is in keeping with the trend 
towards ‘medical interventionism’ both in Britain and in the colonies at the turn of the 
century. The superiority of Western medical science and imperial power permitted this 
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Source: M. Marais, In Quest of Health: The South African Institute for 
Medical Research 1912-1973 (Johannesburg: Lowry Publishers, 
1988), p. 26. 
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‘unprecedented right … over the health and over the bodies of its subjects’.20 As the first 
comprehensive statement yet published in the press, this information must have alarmed 
parents enormously, especially those who were not yet aware that polio was a threat. It 
was believed that the poliovirus had been brought into South Africa by returning troops 
who had completed operations in the Middle East towards the end of the war.21 South 
African doctors and health authorities looked to the USA, contemporary leaders in polio 
research, for guidance. 
Since the aetiology of polio was unknown, the control of its spread would be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. Although in close proximity to one another, there 
was never an overwhelming number of cases in one place during the Johannesburg 
epidemic. However, to some extent the pattern of cases did display the class division of 
Johannesburg society of the day. An anomaly of polio was to attack the homes where 
                                                 
20  D. Arnold, Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1988), p. 18.Tropical or colonial medicine developed in the late 1890s with the founding of 
the London and Liverpool Schools of Tropical Medicine, initially to safeguard the lives of British 
personnel working in the colonies who were exposed to life-threatening diseases such as malaria 
and yellow fever. 
21  J.H.S. Gear, The History of the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation (Johannesburg: Poliomyelitis 
Research Foundation, 1996), p. 14. 
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living standards were higher, contrary to the usual pattern of diseases such as smallpox 
and typhoid, which took hold in the poorer, less sanitised areas of the growing city.22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22  Epidemics of the plague, smallpox and typhoid had occurred in Johannesburg during the 1900s. 
Smallpox and scarlet fever cases were also numerous in 1918. 
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Johannesburg in 1912 
 
Source: H. Rudolph, Johannesburg One Hundred Years (Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg 
Publications, 1986), p. 47. 
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Newtown, Fordsburg and Mayfair, poorer working-class suburbs, had only three cases; 
Vrededorp and the locations experienced one case. Johannesburg city itself had ten cases, 
while Jeppestown and Belgravia, together with other middle-class residential areas, such 
as Doornfontein, Bertrams, Kensington and Bezuidenhout Valley, had 32 cases; Berea, 
Yeoville and Bellevue recorded ten cases. Booysens, Turffontein and Rossetenville, to 
the south, had five cases.23 By January, Pretoria had reported eleven cases, while 
Krugersdorp, Roodepoort, Boksburg and Benoni had ‘some’, and Germiston and Springs 
‘had a great many’. Other provinces were hardly affected: Cape Town, Grahamstown, 
Graaff-Reinet and Kimberley experienced ‘ordinary sporadic cases’, while Durban and 
Bloemfontein were unaffected.24 
Modderfontein Dynamite factory, a self-contained area, with workers housed in 
extensive grounds, reported one case throughout the duration of the epidemic.25 The 
reasons why polio did not spread among the other children eluded the doctors, but 
because of its isolated nature, residents were in ‘quarantine’. Some 200 kilometres from 
Johannesburg, a small town, Carolina, had ten polio cases and two deaths; the Village 
Main Reef Mine – ‘the residential part of the mine, which runs in a narrow strip, and has 
                                                 
23  Johannesburg City Council Minutes, Adjourned Ordinary Meeting, 356 (9 Apr. 1918). 
24  The Star, 5 Dec. 1944; MJSA, vol. 13, no. 6 (Jan. 1918), p. 100. 
25  The Star, 5 Dec. 1944. 
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mines on each side’ experienced approximately 20 cases with four deaths,26 while none of 
the adjacent mines had any cases at all. In Johannesburg, Dr Baumann found that the 
distribution was equally curious:  
In one street in Yeoville, on both sides of the street, in houses almost 
opposite, there have been cases, and in the street back to back with this 
particular street, there have been cases … how capricious the spread 
is.27  
Some thought that there was a common source of infection, possibly an animal 
reservoir, similar to the goat as a reservoir for Malta fever; others thought that the 
infections originated from the same source, yet often only one member of the family was 
infected. All agreed, despite divisions on the understanding of transmission, that this was 
‘a subject wrapped in mystery’ and a cause of frustration.28 Facing an epidemic never 
experienced before required a concerted and united effort between doctors and public 
health officials, yet a specific health department which could co-ordinate responses to 
such a health crisis did not exist. 
 
                                                 
26  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 6 (Jan. 1918), p. 101. 
27  Ibid., p. 101. 
28  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 6 (Jan. 1918), p. 100. 
  59
3.2 Polio and Public Health in 1918 
It is certainly anomalous that a modern State should possess a medical 
officer and no health department, but public health is one of those 
things that has waited vainly for Union co-ordination up to the present 
… [There] exists an urgent reminder of the necessity of a law enabling 
some one to ‘take hold’ at a critical moment, and with some 
comprehensive plan at once attempt to deal with and localize 
epidemics.29 
The devastating 1918 influenza epidemic is usually regarded as the event which 
precipitated a more effective public health administration in South Africa. However, the 
confused response to the 1918 polio epidemic, which immediately preceded the influenza 
epidemic, alerted the medical profession to the urgent need for more effective tools to 
combat such threats to the health of the South African public. Public Health 
administration on a national level was limited, having only existed as a separate sub-
department within the Department of the Interior since 1917. Its role was mainly 
advisory, its functions remained undefined, its powers unspecified and its establishment 
small.30 Dr J.A. Mitchell, deputy to Dr F.A. Arnold, the Advisory MOH for the Union in 
Pretoria, admitted that in 1918 the department was ‘still in embryo’ and it was ‘just as 
                                                 
29  The Star, 10 Apr. 1918. 
30  H. Phillips, ‘Black October’: The Impact of the 1918 Spanish Influenza Epidemic of 1918 on South 
Africa (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1990), p. 101. 
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inadequate as it had been since 1910’.31 After 1910, health and responsibility for most 
hospitals were provincial matters in terms of the Union Act, but local municipalities were 
still expected to take care of public health. Their ability to do so depended on the 
competency of individual Public Health Committees and Medical Officers of Health 
(MOH); such competencies varied considerably. 
In Johannesburg the war had affected many positions in the municipality. Some 
posts were made part-time to enable staff to go into war service. Dr R.W.B. Gibson, a 
general practitioner, was chosen to stand in as acting MOH for the very popular and 
capable Dr Charles Porter, while Porter assumed the role of the Union’s Sanitary Officer 
during the war. Porter was well qualified in both medicine and law, and had been the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31  Ibid., p. 101. 
 
 
Illustration 3.4 
Dr C. Porter, 
First Medical Officer of 
Health for Johannesburg 
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MOH of Johannesburg since his appointment by Lord Milner in 1901. He had proved 
himself to be an effective organiser, and had inspired confidence while in this position. 
Gibson was disadvantaged by his lack of experience as a MOH, but nevertheless was 
expected to carry on where Porter had left off. 
As MOH, Gibson liaised with the Johannesburg Public Health Committee, the 
Johannesburg Town Council and the Witwatersrand BMA on matters safeguarding 
Johannesburg’s public health. During a crisis like the polio epidemic, it was up to Gibson 
to direct quarantine procedures and to ensure that isolation facilities were available and 
functioning. He needed to inform the press on the latest precautionary measures and on 
medical information which might educate the public, and hopefully maintain a sense of 
calm. This was a great deal to ask of a man who had yet to establish public trust, as Porter 
had done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 3.5 
Dr R. Gibson, Acting MOH for Johannesburg during 
the 1918 poliomyelitis epidemic 
Source: Adler Medical Museum 
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Certain problems were unavoidable. The war had depleted the nursing staff as 
well as doctors. Even in peacetime numbers had been inadequate. Now trained nurses 
were needed to staff the local military hospitals, to serve the troops in German South 
West Africa and in East Africa, and to staff the hospital ships plying the waters between 
the Cape and East Africa. Contingents of trained nurses had also been sent to staff the 
South African base hospitals in Britain and the hospitals on the Western Front. Some 
nurses joined the British Army Nursing Services and served in Serbia and in the Middle 
East. Approximately 3 000 South African-trained nurses were believed to be serving in 
military hospitals during the course of the First World War.32 This lack of medical staff 
negatively affected all hospitals throughout the Union and in Johannesburg during the 
polio epidemic, as the disease required intensive and time-consuming treatment. 
Facing the problem of containing the epidemic, Gibson and the Johannesburg 
Public Health Committee were guided by the 1916 epidemic in the USA, which had 
resorted to strict quarantine to prevent transmission of the disease. The vastness of that 
country had forced central health authorities to allow local health officials to handle the 
quarantine individually. This proved unreliable, as the incubation period of poliomyelitis 
was unknown; carriers who appeared healthy might well have disseminated the disease 
across borders or into public places. Some states believed that if the movement of 
children under the age of 16 was restricted, the spread of polio could be contained, while 
                                                 
32  C. Searle, The History of the Development of Nursing in South Africa 1652-1960 (Cape Town: 
Struik, 1965), p. 256. 
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others had even resorted to issuing travel certificates assuring that the holder was ‘free 
from disease’.33 Posters in red were displayed at the main entry roads into certain towns 
warning travellers that children were not allowed to mix with the community within; 
churches and Sunday schools would not accept children under the age of sixteen during 
the epidemic; schools remained closed for a further two weeks after holiday breaks; 
cinemas could not admit children and ‘circuses were childless’.34 
Fortunately for Gibson, a recent article by Dr J.M. Moll, part-time MOH of 
schools in the Rand area, offered a simplified guide to quarantine measures: 
Every frank and every suspected case is to be notified; compulsory 
hospitalization of every ascertained case unless the home conditions are 
very favorable and strict measures can be carried out; quarantine of sick 
contacts for eight weeks, and of healthy contacts for at least ten days; 
the massing of children at picnics, bioscopes, etc., to be forbidden; 
mobilization and increased activity of the sanitary forces; enforced 
cleaning-up of unsanitary places; fly-swatting campaign, and re-
enforcement of anti-spitting regulations.35 
                                                 
33  Rogers, Dirt and Disease, p. 37. 
34  Ibid., pp. 33-44. 
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Because the polio outbreak was mainly within the Johannesburg municipal area, it was 
not necessary to go to the lengths pursued by people in the USA. However, in order for 
quarantine to be effective, certain strict measures were necessary. Dr Jane B. Henderson 
Ruthven questioned how one would know that a house was infected. ‘How is one to 
know, when one calls on a friend that there is not a child sick from the disease inside that 
house?’36 There is no evidence to suggest that notices were hung outside affected homes. 
No doubt warning went out by word of mouth. Colonel A.J. Orenstein, Director of 
Medical Services, was also concerned about the danger of transmission: 
The question is what we as a community should do to prevent its 
spread. We hear of drastic measures being taken in America as limiting 
the freedom of movements of the population. Apparently it had no 
definite effect on the spread of the epidemic but on the other hand we 
really don't know perhaps if those measures had not been taken instead 
of thousands of cases there would have been tens of thousands of cases 
... I am not so sure that very stringent measures should not be taken 
particularly with a view to limiting the migration of the children.37 
Despite the fact that such quarantine measures had been declared inadequate after the 
1916 USA epidemic, Johannesburg authorities had little choice but to attempt, at least, to 
                                                 
36  ‘Discussion of Dr Baumann’s Paper and Dr R. L. Daly’s Case’, MJSA, vol. 13, no. 6 (Jan. 1918), 
p. 98. 
37  Ibid., p. 96.  
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isolate the known polio cases and to quarantine family members. To achieve this, 
poliomyelitis needed to be declared a notifiable infectious disease by amending the 
Contagious Diseases Act. Medical practitioners who suspected or diagnosed polio would 
be obliged to send a certificate to the MOH naming the patient and his or her address. 
The head of the family, relatives or guardians were likewise required to inform the MOH 
in writing, giving the name of the patient and those of any recent close contacts.38 Gibson, 
however, hesitated until February 1918 to initiate a clear policy of action. This indecisive 
behaviour was perhaps influenced by the fact that he was inexperienced as a MOH, 
‘doing the work of two Medical Officers of Health’,39 running his own private practice 
and dealing with council employees who were agitating for strike action.40  
In the meantime, medical officials were very concerned about the situation in 
Johannesburg. At their January meeting, the Witwatersrand BMA pointed out that 
hospital accommodation was at a premium, due to the large number of scarlet fever cases 
in the Fever Hospital. More cases of polio were waiting to be admitted and, because of 
the frequent state of the patients’ paralysis, accommodation would have to be found for 
them ‘even if we put up a wooden or iron shanty in the grounds, or hire some houses 
                                                 
38  Johannesburg Municipality Minutes, Special Meeting of Public Health Committee (7 Feb. 1918), 
p. 64. 
39  The Star, 20 Feb. 1918. Dr Porter’s assistant MOH, Dr A.J. Milne, was also called up for service. 
40  J.P.R. Maud, City Government: The Johannesburg Experiment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), 
p. 82. 
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nearby’.41 The Witwatersrand BMA urged the brow-beaten Gibson to take the idea of 
listing polio as a notifiable disease to the Health Committee, although Dr Baumann felt 
‘that it had come too late’; he had already experienced the bulk of his most serious cases 
in November and December 1917:  
I would like the meeting to pass a resolution, emphasizing to the 
municipal and public health authorities the necessity for providing 
sufficient hospital accommodation and arriving at rules of guidance for 
the public. 
A motion was passed at the meeting to form a sub-committee, which would work on 
these issues in an advisory capacity and at the same time ‘strengthen Dr. Gibson’s hand’ 
when he met his committee to discuss the urgent need to have polio declared an 
infectious disease.42 
On 4 February 1918, three months after the outbreak began, Gibson recommended 
in an urgent report before a special meeting of the Public Health Committee that ‘Acute 
Anterior Poliomyelitis be added to the list of notifiable diseases in terms of Chapter III, 
Article 3, of the Public Health By-laws’. The recommendation was adopted by the Public 
Health Committee. For the period of a year, polio was to be a notifiable disease within 
the Municipal Area alone. This resolution became effective on 15 February 1918, one 
                                                 
41  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 6 (Jan. 1918), p. 101. 
42  Ibid. The sub-committee was made up of Drs. Baumann Gibson, Lister, Bliedon, and Moll.  
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week after the publication of an advertisement in a local newspaper.43 Doctors were 
requested voluntarily to report any cases that had occurred earlier; 58 cases were 
accounted for in this way, which the Committee believed was ‘approximate’.44 It is, 
however, safe to say that the number was far greater. Although the doctors of the 
Witwatersrand BMA considered the notification to be a ‘great step in the direction of 
stamping out the present epidemic’, to those already affected it was a hollow 
reassurance.45 
Outside the municipality of Johannesburg, the disease was not notifiable. Other 
municipalities were requested to be ‘both wise and helpful’,46 but the migration of people 
from all over the Union into and out of the bustling and rapidly growing mining town 
could jeopardise the containment of the epidemic. The Star reported: 
Municipal areas are not enclosed within four walls and the efficiency of 
municipal measures is weakened if cases of infantile paralysis occur 
across the municipal borders and are not notifiable. In such 
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circumstances there is nothing to prevent carriers bringing infection into 
the towns.47  
Neighbouring countries were aware of the epidemic in Johannesburg, but the 
South African state was remarkably dilatory in dealing with their queries. As early as 
February, Portuguese authorities in Mozambique requested verification of the disease so 
that they could judge whether there was any danger of polio spreading to Mozambique, 
‘in view of free intercourse between adults and children of [the] two territories’.48 Only 
after a month, confirmation that 73 cases of infantile paralysis had occurred in 
Johannesburg during December to early February was sent from the Prime Minister’s 
office to the Consul-General in Lourenco-Marques, by which time this figure was already 
out of date.49 As a result, the Portuguese brought in a by-law from 1 April 1918 
‘prohibiting entry into the province of all children up to five years of age’ as a first 
preventative step,50 and stated that children between five and fifteen would be medically 
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examined at the border.51 This ‘portaria’ remained in place until 1 June 1918, despite 
assurances from Pretoria that the epidemic would be over by May. Meanwhile, Pretoria 
objected that ‘farmers and others’52 were being inconvenienced by the restrictions on the 
border and that about 300 families who had come to the Transvaal to escape the heat of 
Mozambique would be affected by the by-law if they did not return at once by train.53 
These communications with Mozambique were prolonged over five months, with Pretoria 
taking up to a month to reply to each item of correspondence. It obviously felt no urgency 
to speed up the process; this matched the rather slow pace of Johannesburg’s MOH. 
By failing to take earlier steps to control the epidemic, Gibson came under 
scathing criticism. On 18 February 1918, during a meeting of the Johannesburg Town 
Council, a vote of no confidence was cast against him. ‘The public health department was 
upside down’ and although the speaker ‘had nothing against Dr Gibson,’ who was a good 
man, ‘Dr Porter is a top-notcher’ and no other man was equal to him. When he was in 
charge, ‘this was the best town for health of any in the world’. Johannesburg’s health was 
suffering. ‘We have smallpox, infantile paralysis and more scarlet fever than ever before 
in this town’; staff are ‘at sixes and sevens’, walking the floor without work to do’ and 
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the council could not let this continue.54 Such criticism undoubtedly influenced Gibson’s 
decision not to extend his appointment past the March due date. Although he was not 
totally without a support base, Gibson could not match the popular Dr. Porter, who was 
expected back in Johannesburg in March to confer with the Health Committee and, 
hopefully, to resume duties as MOH of Johannesburg.  
Almost three months into the epidemic Dr Gibson issued his long-awaited bulletin 
on infantile paralysis.55 After outlining the geographical extent of the epidemic, as well as 
the estimated number of cases, Gibson gave very little hard information about polio, 
either to maintain a distance between medical ranks and lay public or to minimize 
anxiety. ‘The symptoms of fever, a sore throat, transient flushing of the face, abnormal 
sweating, headache, drowsiness, irritability, restlessness and constipation,’ he 
acknowledged, ‘simulated any of the indefinite illnesses of childhood … a sore throat 
was not uncommon’. The preventive measures instituted by the Johannesburg 
municipality were based on information from other parts of the world and could be 
regarded as up-to-date. The late edition of The Star dated 26 February 1918 announced 
that a special polio hospital would be established in a few days. The article acknowledged 
that public anxiety ‘naturally has been considerably aroused, especially in view of the 
conflicting statements and theories which have been given’.  It was hoped that parents 
would be further cheered to hear that patients in the General Hospital were responding 
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‘splendidly’ to treatment, which concentrated on posture of the limbs ‘to avoid undue 
stretching of muscles’. Parents were advised to ensure that children received hospital 
treatment, especially in the earlier stages of the disease, as it was believed that early 
intervention would prevent the situation from becoming dangerous:  
Even if the patient is completely paralysed, restoration to practically the 
usual health is considered only a matter of time, if parents will see to it 
that no time is lost in getting expert advice.56 
The reassuring tone of these articles must have atoned, in some measure, for the 
earlier neglect of parental concerns; many felt relieved that polio patients would in future 
be in a separate establishment. This was the Otto Beit Home which, as agreed at a special 
meeting of the Johannesburg Hospital Board, would be set aside for infantile paralysis 
cases.57 The Municipality would meet costs, hoping that at a later stage the Provincial 
Government would absorb half of the expense. The sum of ₤5 000 was requested for 
equipment, management and control expenses for the following three months. It was 
hoped that this ‘prompt response’ of the MOH and the Health Committee ‘will allay the 
anxiety that has prevailed in town’.58 
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Gibson decided to withdraw from office at the end of March 1918, and the 
Defence Department indicated that Dr Porter and Dr Milne would be available to resume 
duty from the end of February. This sudden flurry of activity appeared to have been 
calculated, as the article continued to show, that ‘the committee has the situation well in 
hand’.59 This was to become a somewhat clichéd comment frequently used by public 
health officials during later polio epidemics, although such rhetoric in the light of events 
was meaningless. 
In reality the authorities pinned their hopes on the expectation that the virus would 
disappear when the cold weather set in, but there was no certainty that this would be the 
case. Uncertainty and conflicting opinions showed up a lack of cohesion among the 
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Illustration 3.6 
The Otto Beit Convalescent Home, Queens Road, Parktown 
 
Source: Adler Medical Museum 
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various health authorities. Outside districts were sending cases to Johannesburg, while the 
MOH on the East Rand had closed schools without consulting the Rand Medical 
Inspectors of Health. These schools remained closed because the Medical Inspectors had 
no authority to intervene, although they felt that school closure was futile and would 
‘cause more harm in increasing public anxiety … than controlling the spread of the 
disease’.60  
There was a desperate need to call in someone who had experience of polio, a 
person who could offer a more cohesive approach towards management and research. 
Initially the Witwatersrand BMA considered Sir Arnold Theiler as a person whose 
opinion was respected and who could make investigations into the disease.61 Finally the 
Health Committee, once again acting on the Witwatersrand BMA’s advice, decided to 
bring in an expert from the Rockefeller Institute in New York.62 The investigation into 
polio ‘was considered of National concern, not only to stamp out the present epidemic but 
as an aid to throw new light on a difficult and obtuse subject’.63 As the epidemic 
advanced, Watson-Pitchford had been in cable contact with Dr Flexner, who chose Dr 
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Edward Taylor, ‘a scientist from the Research laboratory of the Vermont State Board of 
Health in Burlington’, who would ‘carry out research and advise the local authorities as 
to the latest methods of administration in outbreaks of infantile paralysis’.64 The Council 
would give ₤500 towards the cost of the trip and the SAIMR undertook to pay the other 
costs:  
It is a matter of experience that an outbreak of infantile paralysis in 
epidemic form is invariably followed by epidemics in succeeding years 
on the same locality and for this reason it appears to us to be important 
that an opportunity of this nature for increasing the medical knowledge 
of this disease should not be lost.65 
Due to wartime conditions, transport was slow and Taylor only arrived by aircraft 
on 23 June 1918. Earlier in April, two infantile paralysis experts who formed part of an 
American Red Cross mission en route to Palestine were persuaded to call on the Rand. As 
the number of cases was dropping, they predicted that the epidemic would be over by 
May.66 Consequently Taylor was only able to investigate isolated cases in Kimberley and 
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Jaggersfontein.67 He did act on a consultative basis, examining ‘all notified and suspicious 
cases’, and giving advice on the treatment of actual cases as well as old cases with 
residual paralysis.68 His lectures were well received but added little to the scant 
knowledge about the disease; however, he was adamant that polio was contagious. ‘The 
microbic cause is conveyed from one individual to another by personal contact’.69 
South African doctors remained skeptical. The President of the Witwatersrand 
BMA asked how sharply localised outbreaks, as experienced at Modderfontein and the 
Village Reef mine, could be explained by the contagion theory: how and by what means 
was polio disseminated? 
How can we safeguard ourselves prophylactically? In order to transmit the 
disease artificially to monkeys, drastic procedures such as inoculations are 
used yet among human beings [transmission] is almost fairy-like in the 
mode and character of its spread. It flies from case to case by almost 
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untraceable channels and is so erratic in its incidence that relatively few 
members of the community appear to fall under its influence.70 
Taylor did not contest the theory of nasal transmission, but felt that nasal sprays 
were ineffective against the polio virus and might irritate the nasal mucous membrane. 
Serum treatment if administered before paralysis ‘gave very definite results’. In answer to 
a question on immunity and why often only one member of the family was infected, he 
replied: ‘There are chronic carriers in various diseases and there must be chronic carriers 
in poliomyelitis or we would have no epidemics. It would die out.’71 Taylor could not 
understand why Johannesburg’s doctors had avoided using the lumbar puncture as a 
diagnostic tool. ‘It takes five minutes to do and about five minutes to examine 
microscopically. Unless it is done, you lose a great many days in isolating your patient.’ 
To enable Taylor to have more time for polio research, the SAIMR requested that he stay 
on in Johannesburg for another six months, guaranteeing a third of the estimated ₤900 
costs and offered the Institute’s facilities for his research. Taylor was not able to observe 
polio first hand, but he did experience the Spanish ’flu epidemic which broke out on the 
gold mines of the Rand.72 
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3.3 The Treatment of Polio in 1918 
I think, as a matter of ordinary humanity we must provide hospital 
accommodation for these children. It is pitiable to see, as I suppose 
many of you have seen, a child going to pieces simply because it is in a 
poor home, in a small room, and has to share a bed with other children; 
it is not even undressed properly; it is not washed; its paralyzed limbs 
are not supported .All this because there is no hospital 
accommodation!73  
Dogged by ignorance as to the cause of polio, traditional notions about the workings of 
disease lingered on in the medical profession. Familiar terminology such as ‘poison’ was 
often used in place of the word ‘virus’, a new concept.74 The vague notion of ‘poison’ had 
long been used to refer to the invisible microbe of disease; doctors described how the 
‘poison’ of polio entered ‘into the cerebrospinal system through the naso-pharyngeal 
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region’ or how the flea, fly and bug could carry the ‘poison’ which infected the child.75 
Another doctor described the disease as dependent on a ‘definite organism, very difficult 
to identify as it cannot be seen or captured in unglazed porcelain due to its minute size’.76 
The idea of a virus so small was contrary to the known and familiar, visible bacteria. This 
mix of the new scientific language and ideas, together with the old, is a feature of this 
early epidemic, as the medical profession itself tried to accommodate changing medical 
knowledge.  
Polio was ‘a disease always to be regarded with particular anxiety by the 
physician’.77 Diagnosis was difficult; it was impossible to predict accurately how serious 
the paralytic effects might be in any given case and doctors had no effective drugs to treat 
acute polio patients. In contrast to the familiar diseases of poor sanitation and poverty, 
polio tended to strike at the heart of the sanitised suburb and home. Since the source of 
polio infection was unknown, doctors were forced to draw on existing knowledge about 
disease and its origin. 
The main obstacle the doctor faced was the diagnosis of polio. There was no 
definite indicator or diagnostic test available to assist, as was the case with diphtheria and 
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enteric fever, among other diseases. Main indicators of polio, such as stiff neck, fever, 
nausea and weakness, also characterised other, more common children’s diseases. 
Alternative diagnoses could include influenza, acute gastroenteritis, poisoning, 
pneumonia, meningitis, typhoid fever or even rheumatism, rheumatic fever, rickets and 
osteomyelitis.78 A fear of alarming parents unnecessarily prompted doctors to delay 
identifying the disease until paralysis occurred and they were reluctant to precipitate such 
dramatic actions as hospitalisation, disinfection of the home, clothes and belongings and 
the quarantine of family members. Dr M. Bliedon, a member of the Witwatersrand BMA 
Committee, argued that if carriers, as claimed, were the probable means of spreading the 
disease, ‘what is the good of isolating a patient for five weeks when according to the 
instructions I have received, the breadwinner may be the most likely person to spread the 
disease?’79 
As the diagnosis had to be made purely on a clinical basis, without the aid of 
laboratory tests, Baumann listed what he thought were notable visible symptoms of polio 
in order to assist local practitioners. The course of the disease could be divided into 
distinct stages: the pre-paralytic stage which could last from twelve hours to nine days; 
the acute stage, once paralysis had set in; the convalescent stage, which began once the 
tenderness had disappeared; and the stationary stage, generally considered beginning after 
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two years.80 In summer, and ‘especially during the prevalence of an epidemic’, symptoms 
such as a fever between of 100-104 degrees Fahrenheit, sweating and gastro-intestinal 
disturbances, diarrhoea or constipation could indicate polio. Baumann found the ‘spine 
sign’ of great importance. When lifting the patient’s head to place on the chest, the neck 
would remain rigid and the trunk would lift, ‘causing the child to cry out with pain’.81 
Sensitivity to touch and light, as well as headaches, backaches and pains in the legs, were 
also common symptoms. Tremors and muscle twitching, no matter how slight, could 
point to polio. Unfortunately such symptoms were not always clear. A child examined at 
a Johannesburg boarding school displayed only a slight tremor of the left hand and a 
fever before paralysis of the left arm set in.82 
Bulbar polio and what was referred to as cerebral or encephalitic polio were the 
most dangerous forms of the disease. The respiratory muscles, muscles of the tongue and 
the jaw, and the muscles of the throat became paralysed. This meant that the patients 
would lose the ability to swallow, cough or clear their throat in any way, resulting in 
‘drowning’.83 In 1918 little could be done for these patients, other than positioning the 
patient in the head-down position to facilitate drainage – ‘even hold the child up by the 
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heels’ – although reference is made to Meltzer’s ‘tracheal insufflation’, a form of 
artificial respiration.84 In Baumann’s experience, death could take place within 12 to 24 
hours from the onset of respiratory paralysis.85 Case-mortality could range between five 
and 30 per cent, dependent on the severity of the attack. By January 1918, Baumann 
claimed that six of his 35-40 cases had died (15 per cent), while other doctors had 
experienced worse results. On one of the mining properties, 50 per cent of polio cases had 
died. One must presume that these were mainly white cases; as has been noted, only six 
polio cases were recorded for blacks in 1918, although numbers could have been higher.86 
The characteristic ‘sudden paralysis’ was the ultimate diagnostic sign of acute 
polio. Paralysis could occur without any increase in pain; the legs usually became 
immobile first, although this was not necessarily the pattern. Baumann recalled: ‘We 
observed the onset of facial paralysis and the paralysis of the arms whilst we stood at the 
patient’s bedside.’ Abdominal muscles could be affected as well, ‘so that the abdomen is 
puffed out in an extraordinary manner when the patient cries or coughs’. 
If severely paralysed, a child would lie on his or her back, without making any 
effort to move, the face clearly showing apprehension, ‘the eyeballs moving but not the 
head, often acutely attentive to the surroundings’ and terrified of being touched for fear of 
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the resulting, intense pain.87 Treatment options were very limited. During the acute stage 
of the disease, a long-standing remedy, used by Badham eighty years earlier, was a purge 
with calomel (mercurous chloride).88 ‘We may hope, by such means to evacuate a certain 
amount of virus per rectum.’89 Urotropine, ‘for its antiseptic effects on the central nervous 
system’90  and adrenalin were also administered, but the former was of little benefit, while 
the latter, although relieving pressure around inflamed areas, needed to be injected every 
four to six hours, intraspinally, which could be traumatic for a young patient. The lumbar 
puncture could also be used to relieve pressure but, as Flexner had warned, ‘simple 
lumbar puncture attended by even very slight haemorrage promotes infection by opening 
the way for the passage of the virus from the blood into the central nervous system.’91 
Drugs used for pain relief were aspirin, as a sedative alone or used in combination with 
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other analgesics to relieve pain.92 Morphia was also on the list for pain relief.93 Throat 
washes with a one per cent solution of menthol, was thought to be effective ‘to kill the 
microbes’, as well as nasal washes which might flush out the virus.94 ‘Kaolin’,95 
surprisingly, was suggested as a nasal spray ‘to neutralise the virus’ and peroxide of 
hydrogen, condy’s fluid or salt for gargling.96 During the first polio epidemic, the children 
of Johannesburg were subjected to throat and nasal washing in a frenzied attempt to avoid 
infection. Rutty had found this to be the case in Canada, where some desperate parents 
were using salt water to wash out the nose.97 The objective of the nasal spray was to block 
the poliovirus from entering the olfactory nerve, as Flexner believed that the nose was the 
portal of entry and exit; this implied that the virus was circulating in the air.98 
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Another treatment option open to doctors was a human antipolio convalescent 
serum.99 Based on the model of the successful diphtheria antitoxin developed in France in 
the 1890s, it was used as a polio prophylaxis. In the 1916 New York epidemic, the serum 
was thought to have ‘definite therapeutic value’.100 Polio serum was prepared from the 
blood of individuals who had recovered from an attack of polio and which possessed 
poliovirus antibodies. E.C. Rosenow of the Mayo Clinic in the USA had developed an 
animal-based immune serum, by immunising horses with the ‘pleomorphic 
streptococcus’ bacteria, which he believed was responsible for polio.101 During the 1918 
epidemic, the Witwatersrand BMA committee discussed this serum at length. Results 
from the USA seemed to suggest that use of the Rosenow serum resulted in far less 
paralysis and a lesser incidence of the fatal form of respiratory paralysis. Watkins-
Pitchford indicated that supplies of Rosenow’s serum were expected from the USA, but 
he warned doctors not to be too optimistic as to its efficacy. He emphasised the need for a 
sound diagnosis and offered the services of the SAIMR in order to analyse spinal 
punctures. He also requested doctors to supply the Institute with cerebrospinal fluid 
where possible, since this could then be used in experiments. He asked that a small 
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quantity of blood be taken from any recovered patient of about ten years of age, with the 
view to making serum which could be stored for use in acute cases.102  
In desperation some doctors are known to have resorted to alternative therapies. It 
is impossible to gauge the extent of its use, but Afrikaners had used herbal remedies as 
part of their medical routine for decades. There is no reason to doubt that this practice had 
been passed on to relatives in Johannesburg. Animals were an important part of these 
therapies: ‘The intestinal contents of different animals or their excreta were believed to 
possess almost magical healing qualities’.103 Thus, it is not surprising that a doctor in 
Klerksdorp, desperate to help his young daughter, dismissed the voices of ‘his accursed 
education’ and, perhaps urged on by his female family members, resorted to the familiar 
remedies of his upbringing. He treated the girl during the acute stage of polio by covering 
her legs in warm cow dung,104 a well-known treatment for rheumatism.105 It was hoped 
that the warmth of the dung might ease the pain of the muscles in spasm and hopefully 
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draw out the ‘poison’.106 Wearing a camphor bag was also a well known ‘deterrent’ to 
disease; a clove of garlic was often added.107 
The lack of an effective treatment regime was one of the most frustrating aspects 
of polio. In the absence of effective drug therapies doctors had recourse only to 
management of the physical symptoms of the disease. Bauman’s preference was for rest. 
By this he meant: ‘Not only a comfortable bed, but careful nursing and devices to find a 
comfortable position for painful parts. There should also be freedom from excitement, 
entertainment and from visitors.’108 It was very important to avoid the stretching of 
weakened muscles by placing the legs in a certain way. Over-stretching could also be 
caused by gravity and over action of certain muscles. A deformity hastened by pressure 
was foot drop. A wire cage was advised to support the weight of the bedclothes and a 
board or box, placed at the bottom of the bed, ensured that the feet rested at a right angle 
to the legs. A splint with a foot piece at right angles was an alternative to the board. 
Baumann emphasised that a position of over-correction was advisable, using blankets and 
pillows to maintain this. (Although the diagram used [Illustration 3.7] to clarify 
Baumann’s explanation is from later articles, the principle remains the same.) Sandbags  
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were also used to control limbs.109 Alternatively splints could be used to hold the leg in 
position during rest periods. Temporary light aluminium splints, made to order for 
individual cases, were used at the Johannesburg Hospital; Dr R.L. Daly, a surgeon, 
assisted with this work. The advantage of such splints was that they could be easily 
removed when the limb needed to be massaged. Warmth was regarded as a ‘beneficial 
                                                 
109  Saunders, ‘Acute Anterior Polio-Myelitis’, p. 18. 
 
Maintenance of normal or optimum posture 
 
Source: J. Trueta, Handbook of Poliomyelitis (Oxford: Blackwell 
Scientific Publications, 1956), p. 48. 
 
 
Illustration 3.7 
The knees rest on a low pillow 
so as to slightly flex the hips 
and the knees. The hip joints 
are moderately abducted with a 
soft pillow. It is important that 
the child remains lying if the 
buttock muscles are involved. 
Sitting would stretch the 
gluteus and interfere with 
circulation. The paralysed arm 
is abducted at the shoulder; the 
fingers are slightly flexed by 
holding rolled gauze. The feet 
are placed against the board to 
prevent shortening of the calf 
muscles, rolled gauze behind 
the heels distribute the weight 
of the feet and prevent 
contracture in the Achilles heel. 
Source: G.T. du Toit, ‘The 
After-Care of Convalescent 
Poliomyelitis Cases’, SAMJ, 
vol. 19 (9 June 1945), p.193.
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treatment’110 so electric light bulbs were placed inside the wire cage to provide warmth. 
Baumann did not think that plaster or splints were necessary in the pre-paralytic stage but 
believed that simple restraining measures to prevent the patient from sitting up were 
enough, along with ‘freedom from excitement’, attention to the bowels and effective 
ventilation of the sick-room as necessary adjuvants to the treatment.111  
Baumann embarked on his own research project on the value of bed rest in the 
treatment of polio and believed that rest, if started early enough, could result in the 
cessation of the disease. His paper, ‘The Abortive Treatment of Acute Poliomyelitis by 
Physiological Rest’, was read before the Witwatersrand BMA on 21 March 1918, at the 
height of the Johannesburg epidemic.112 Bed rest, he argued, could limit the development 
of the polio attack, even to the point of aborting the disease, thus preventing permanent 
deformity. This idea was based on the observations of Dr. Leon Louria made during the 
1916 New York epidemic. The majority of doctors at the meeting agreed that rest was 
vital, but were rather cutting in their remarks about its ability to halt the disease, as most 
felt that such cases would have aborted in any case, and there were no ‘other known 
infectious diseases being made abortive by rest’.113 
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No matter how beneficial bed rest was, it was extremely difficult to keep small 
children still for long periods of time to avoid damage to the muscles. Baumann wanted 
to prevent mothers from ‘lifting and dandling [sic] children’, or taking them about town. 
Dr A.G. Brinton said that he had been horrified to see a mother descending from a tram, 
with her child’s limbs ‘wobbling about’. All agreed that: ‘An over-fond mother who 
insists upon dandling the child in her arms’ could indeed cause the child great harm. Dr. 
Bliedon recalled another instance of a young boy whose mother, an ‘uneducated and not a 
very intelligent woman’, failed to prevent him ‘from being twice out of bed when the 
doctor called’.114 Such action ‘jarred the irritable brain and cord and strained the 
weakened muscles’, which could lead to permanent crippling.115 
Unfortunately, if the muscles were ‘overstretched’, only prolonged and unpleasant 
treatment could rectify this. A young girl, who had contracted polio while at St Andrew’s 
School in Johannesburg, was allowed out of bed too soon and overstretched the muscles 
of her legs, which prevented her from walking normally. On medical advice, her father 
took her out of school to Isipingo to convalesce. She had to endure having her legs 
‘doubled up and fixed in plaster of Paris for three months, in the hope that the stretched 
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muscles would contract’. Her condition improved so that she could walk ‘almost 
normally’.116 
The 1918 epidemic had highlighted a sense of confusion and intense frustration 
within the medical community. The eagerly awaited polio specialist, Dr Taylor from the 
USA, did not allay these fears and he offered little additional information to that which 
was already known. Watkins-Pitchford observed, while thanking Taylor after a lecture: 
‘There is a considerable residuum of mystery in the disease, a residuum which Dr. Taylor 
himself has not resolved’.117 Taylor did, however, confirm that the real factor in the fight 
for the prevention of polio was the control of the human carriers, as polio spread through 
direct contact, the nasal pharynx being the source of entry: 
Naso-pharyngeal secretions in a condition of health are capable of 
neutralising the virus … while those, in whom the naso-pharynx is in a 
diseased condition, such as enlarged tonsils and adenoids, favour the 
development of the disease.118  
This was a new angle on Flexner’s naso-pharyngeal work but was not accurate; it 
was another attempt to explain the frequent sudden cessation of the symptoms and illness 
in some cases. Taylor believed that the organism was definitely neurotropic (lived in 
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nerve tissue), gaining entrance to the central nervous system through the branches of the 
olfactory nerve. 
Dr. J.A. Mitchell, deputy head of the Department of Health in Pretoria, was keen 
to seek advice on the control of polio.119 Taylor contradicted the idea that multiple cases 
in one family was rare by citing several instances during the New York epidemic, 
including one in which all three children in one family had died, while another family had 
experienced five cases. He therefore advised that isolation of the patient was the simplest 
way to contain the disease during an epidemic; at home ‘for the rich and well-to-do’ and 
in an isolation hospital for those in poorer circumstances, quarantining contacts for two 
weeks and the patient for four weeks.120 Dr. Mitchell’s hope that the latest practical 
disinfectant using steam sprays of chloride of zinc and dichloramine-T would meet 
Taylor’s approval, were dismissed as having no scientific backing.121  
There was, however, one positive treatment developed during the 1918 
Johannesburg epidemic. Sadly it was never used. Dr W. Steuart, a radiologist on a 
Johannesburg mine, came to show the Witwatersrand BMA an apparatus he had invented 
to help with respiratory problems found among miners. He had hoped that it might 
‘possibly be a means of saving some children’, but it was completed about six hours after 
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the last victim had died. There is little doubt that Steuart had created the first ‘iron 
lung’122 in South Africa, no matter how rough and ready it was.123 His demonstration led 
to animated discussion about possible adjustments; Colonel Orenstein felt that Steuart 
should test the apparatus on a dog first. Dr Watford-Pitchford had also been involved 
with the project and Steuart’s ‘iron lung’ was bought by the Johannesburg Hospital for 
the Otto Beit Home should the epidemic recur the following year.124 
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Chapter Four 
 
The 1918 Poliomyelitis Epidemic in Johannesburg: 
The Public Response 
 
Don’t wear each other’s hats. 
Don’t drink too much school water, which is not boiled. 
Don’t loiter after school hours but go straight home. 
Don’t fondle strange animals. 
Don’t put into the mouth anything off the ground. 
Don’t take a bite off anything from each other’s mouth.1 
 
If medical responses to polio were uncertain and confused, it was natural that lay 
responses should reflect this. The fear of polio haunted white South African parents for 
over half a century. ‘We dreaded the summer; that was the time we knew the children 
were at risk’.2 Children’s’ lives were turned upside down. They were closeted indoors 
unable to play with their friends, restricted from crowds and bioscopes; some were even 
                                                 
1  Advice sent to The Star, 20 Mar. 1918, by Mrs. R. Magnus for school children to follow during 
the epidemic.  
2  Interview Pat and Margaret, 3 Aug. 2002. 
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forbidden to go to Sunday school. ‘Parents taught their children to fear polio.’3 Reflecting 
a constant theme in public health and popular literature, writers consistently referred to 
the image of the home which was threatened by ‘natives’ and ‘erring mothers, who did 
not take requisite precautions’.4 
The polio epidemic and the increasing publicity spurred a number of lay people to 
ponder the nature of the disease. In letters to the editors of newspapers and magazines, 
correspondents offered their views on the causes of polio, as well as on alternative 
treatments. Some looked to religion to explain the place of disease and healing, while 
others were drawn to conditions around them as possible sources of illness. Those with 
any medical background were especially driven to ask research and health authorities 
seriously to consider the revelations of their own experiences as possible solutions to the 
polio epidemic. Fear of the unknown and anxiety for their children also acted as a lively 
spur to racist responses on the part of middle-class whites. In South Africa social fears 
tend almost invariably to play themselves out in racial terms, so this perspective needs to 
be explored in any examination of public responses to polio. 
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4.1 Polio and Racism 
We have already seen that the medical profession, clinging to long-established experience 
about the origins of disease, looked to ‘the slum’ as a source of infection. In South Africa 
the denizens of the slums, ‘the others’, were invariably equated with black people, 
whether they were coloured people in Cape Town, Indians in Durban or Africans in 
Johannesburg, although the poor whites in areas such as Vrededorp and Fordsburg were 
similarly stigmatised. To some, the Afrikaner inhabitants were rather ‘uncivilized’5 and 
Boer women had been regarded as ‘ignorant and careless in sanitary matters’ by British 
authorities during the South African War.6 In 1918, working-class neighbourhoods in 
Johannesburg were still fairly multiracial7 and formed part of the ‘septic fringe’ believed 
to contribute to racial tensions with regard to the threat of disease.8 Yet the poorer areas 
were least affected by polio during the 1918 epidemic. Lay people initially assumed that 
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the source of polio might be from black areas in and around the city, while other whites 
were deeply concerned by the mere presence of blacks within their town.  
Such racism was not unique to South Africans during polio epidemics. In New 
York, the immigrants had been singled out as carriers of polio and similarly ‘defined in 
class and ethnic terms’.9 Their presence raised feelings of prejudice and xenophobia. 
Epidemics have a tendency ‘to sharpen behaviour patterns’ and reveal ‘deeply-rooted 
social imbalances’.10 Rogers adds that in attempting to explain disease, underlying social 
and political ideologies become more explicit ‘in times of urgency, such as epidemics’.11  
The idea that blacks were purveyors of disease was a favoured theme for some of 
Johannesburg’s citizens. A letter to The Star suggested a possible source of polio: ‘The 
filthy spots all over town where the washing is done by Kaffirs, coolies and Malays in the 
dirtiest hovels and under most unsanitary conditions.’ The writer was obviously 
concerned by the link between smallpox infection and clothing; there had been a recent 
smallpox outbreak on the Rand. ‘Not many years ago we were told in the papers that a 
case of smallpox infection had been traced to a wash place and it was carried into a 
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suburban house.’12 The writer thought that the ‘boy’ or ‘girl’ might be a polio carrier, 
since domestic servants spent time ‘in dirty yards or congregating in the street with 
servants from other houses with the disease’. Added to this, the washing was done ‘in the 
dirtiest hovels’ and despite being dried in the sun, ‘a natural disinfectant’, the washing 
was then further handled, folded and bundled.  
The threat of blacks to health was taken further by J. Cunnif, who offered a 
solution to the problem: 
Everything we eat and drink and the clothes we wear are handled by 
natives. I have not the least hesitation in stating that if the white 
population in this country would quit the close association with the 
Negro they would be free from many diseases. 
He referred to this association as the ‘hidden plague’. This letter warranted a reply from 
the editor who drew the writer’s attention to the following: ‘Diseases most prevalent 
among the natives in this country today were originally introduced by Europeans … If we 
tolerate the housing conditions which exist in Johannesburg we must expect epidemics.’13 
Mothers who ‘entrust their babies entirely to natives’ were also remonstrated; a writer 
described how she had followed a servant with a ‘white baby, daintily dressed’ who then 
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entered into a native servant’s hut ‘and shut herself up with him’ while the child was 
‘obliged to share the stifling atmosphere’.14  
Nevertheless, the relatively low incidence of epidemic paralytic polio among 
blacks, combined with evidence that suggested that this was a disease of whites, meant 
that the ‘sanitation syndrome’15 did not come into play where polio epidemics were 
concerned. Racism in this case was a reflex response rather than a reaction with any real 
bite. 
 
4.2 Polio, Sanitation and Motherhood 
If blacks were not the source of infection, other explanations had to be sought. Poor 
sanitation continued to be an obvious source of concern. The general public sometimes 
linked polio with sewage and unclean toilets. Although the scientific recognition of polio 
as a gastrointestinal disease was at a discussion stage within medical circles, ‘Fairplay’ 
coincidentally made such a connection in a letter about the state of the ablution block at a 
Troyeville school: ‘Sickness of various kinds has been prevalent in this district for many 
months and last week a case of infantile paralysis appeared at the school.’ A child had 
died within five days of contracting the disease, and a correspondent called on parents 
‘who care anything for the health of their children to pressurise the authorities to improve 
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on the state of the school.16 Another reader claimed that the sewage system of 
Johannesburg was a ‘disgrace … most of the illnesses of this town are due to the present 
system of sanitation’. He demanded that the council place ‘the whole of Johannesburg 
under a water-borne system’. If this was not done immediately ‘it should be the duty of 
the Johannesburg public to elect a Council which will’.17 
The idea that the environment played a significant role in regulating disease is 
also an old belief picked up by residents in Johannesburg. ‘The enemy you have to fight 
is dampness’, ‘Agnostic’ declared. Flannel underclothes would help as would the removal 
of linen sheets and pillowslips ‘which absorb and retain damp’.18 The inability to control 
the infection in their environment often resulted in criticism of the health authorities who 
were held responsible by the general public.  
I wish to draw the attention of the Medical Officer of Health to the 
expectoration that is going on in the vegetable and fruit market. I have 
often spoken to natives about the way that they spit on the floor and 
drag potatoes along. What are the inspectors, police and Health 
authorities doing to allow this sort of thing to go on?19 
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It is important to note that, prior to the late nineteenth century, the medical 
understanding of ‘contagion’ was based on a direct, two-stage, person-to-person model of 
transmission. Pasteur’s germ theory of disease (1870-1880) had confirmed that the agents 
of such infection were micro-organisms. A new concept in the understanding of disease 
emerged over a three-decade period: a living creature, itself unaffected, which might be 
an intermediate carrier or vector of infectious disease. The intermediate causes of 
epidemic diseases such as plague, typhus, malaria and yellow fever were shown to be 
arthropods – fleas, flies, lice and mosquitoes.20 Such discoveries constituted a milestone 
and advance in medical thinking, an important shift in understanding from ‘the long-
known association of disease with poor personal and civic hygiene, with swamps and the 
miasmata associated with them’,21 to the idea of being able to prevent disease by 
eliminating the offending insects. Such visible means of disease control would have the 
                                                 
20  This relatively new concept was brought to the fore by medical researchers such as Dr Ronald 
Ross. His work on the mosquito showed that it hosted malaria. Dr Walter Reed identified 
mosquitoes as vectors of yellow fever. Dr David Bruce exposed the tsetse fly as the intermediate 
vector to sleeping sickness and Dr Charles Nicolle demonstrated that the human louse was the 
transmitting agent for typhus. Knowledge about the rat flea and the plague also surfaced during 
this period, in 1904: D. Arnold, Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 165. 
21  J. Pearn, ‘Arthropods and Disease: The Evolution of Knowledge about Vector-Borne Disease’, 
The International Society of the History of Medicine, 39th International Congress (Bari, Italy, 
2004), http://eprint.uq.edu.au/archive/00001326, accessed 2 Nov. 2006. 
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added bonus of to reassuring and allaying the anxieties and expectations of the general 
public.22  
The housefly became a favourite target for health officials during epidemics. ‘Fly 
Campaigns’ to alert the population about the dangerous link between flies and disease 
were undertaken by health departments and newspapers worldwide. The Sunday Times 
claims that it was the original newspaper in South Africa to promote a ‘Fly Campaign’. 
Free fly-swatters and bottles of formaldehyde were offered to the public; entrants were 
even asked to send their flies to the local health department.23 During the 1918 epidemic 
the anti-fly campaign continued, although reservations were expressed about it: 
We do not know the use of the housefly and have always looked upon it 
as a carrier of disease from all sources of filth and decaying matter and 
for years past a fly-swatting campaign has gone on in Johannesburg and 
along the Reef. But nothing is done in most cases to destroy the filth, 
which breeds these pests. Does it not seem possible that these so called 
pests have a way of dealing with micro-organisms, which is not 
understood by us?24  
                                                 
22  Rogers, Dirt and Disease, p. 18. 
23  The Best of the Sunday Times, Part One, 1906-1931: The Beginning, supplement to Sunday Times, 
4 Jun. 2006, p. 8. 
24  The Star, 7 Mar. 1918. 
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The fly was considered to be a possible vector of polio in 1918, although ‘the target of 
much scientific debate’25 – within the Witwatersrand BMA26 and abroad – but after the 
1944-45 epidemic, South African researchers investigated this link more closely. The fly 
theory, however, placed the responsibility for infection squarely on the mother as 
                                                 
25  Rogers, Dirt and Disease, p. 63. 
26  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 6 (Jan. 1918), p. 98. 
Illustration 4.1 
Images and articles – scare tactics – to involve the public 
in the fly campaign, 1912 
Source: The Best of the Sunday Times, Part One, 1906-1931: 
The Beginning, Sunday Times, 4 Jun. 2006, p. 8. 
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housekeeper; if houses were clean there would be no flies. At the same time this kind of 
thinking emphasised one of the many ironies in polio history: ‘flies that supposedly 
spread the polio germ by flying in only one direction from the slums to the suburbs.’27  
 Yet another revelation of the early twentieth century was the understanding of the 
relationship between motherhood and infant mortality. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, although adult mortality had declined in countries like Britain, infant mortality 
was still high, at a rate of 100-150 deaths per 1 000 births. The major focus of public 
health in the new century was to come to terms with this problem. The South African 
War of 1899-1902 had highlighted certain worrying issues about ‘the longevity or even 
viability of Great Britain as an Empire’.28 Soldiers were found physically unfit to carry a 
rifle; many lacked physical stamina and were constitutionally prone to illness. An 
alarming decline in the birth rate and increased infant mortality rate was regarded as the 
root of the dilemma which threatened Britain’s global pre-eminence. In short, infant life 
needed to be protected; Josephine Baker, an activist in child care work put it bluntly: 
‘When a nation is fighting a war or preparing for another … it must look to its future 
supplies of cannon fodder.’29 The Bishop of London illustrated this with chilling 
                                                 
27  Ibid., p. 189. 
28  D. Dwork, War is Good for Babies and Other Young Children: A History of the Infant and Child 
Welfare Movement in England 1898-1918 (London: Tavistock, 1987), p. 167. 
29  Ibid, p. 209. 
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statistics: ‘[w]hile nine soldiers die every hour in 1915 twelve babies die every hour, so it 
is more dangerous to be a baby than a soldier.’30 
The First World War engendered a renewed sense of urgency to establish a 
comprehensive infant and child welfare system. Infant deaths were due to epidemic 
diarrhoea, enteritis, respiratory diseases, premature births, wasting disease (meningitis 
and convulsions) and congenital defects.31 Many were also at risk because of incorrect 
feeding; breast milk was frequently substituted by tainted cow’s milk, unsuitable infant 
food such as condensed milk and mixed food, such as bread, rusks, oatmeal, sago, tapioca 
and patent foods.32 The babies who survived suffered from teeth problems, stunted 
growth and continuing ill-health. It was necessary to protect infant and child life both 
legislatively and in the home.  
The principle was to interest women in the growth and health of their infants 
while at the same time inducing them to observe strictly all physicians’ directions. After 
all, although mothers were ‘ignorant and poor’, they were ‘eager to fulfill their 
obligations to their children’.33 And so the mother in the home became the new centre of 
attention; baby clinics and health nurses drove home the lessons of the value of breast-
                                                 
30  Ibid., p. 211. 
31  Ibid., p. 167. 
32  Ibid., p. 30. 
33  Ibid., p. 98. 
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feeding and the need to manage an orderly and safe home environment. ‘First concentrate 
on the mother, what the mother is the children are … let us glorify, dignify and purify 
motherhood by every means in our power.’34 Such was the rhetoric at the First National 
Conference on Infantile Mortality in 1906 in London, but the reality of the matter was 
different. 
In class-conscious Britain the medical profession often viewed the working-class 
mother negatively, stereotyping her as incompetent, ignorant, and a poor mother. In 
South Africa, with its high infant mortality rate,35 doctors readily adopted similar 
attitudes. As long as the source of polio infection remained unclear, such stereotyping 
was also transferred to the mothers of polio victims. Mothers were blamed for not calling 
the doctor at the first symptoms of illness, for ‘[they] attempt to hide their suspicions 
until it is too late’. Dr Baumann criticised the average mother ‘of the uneducated classes, 
the more the child yearns for rest, the less will she allow it to rest’.36 In one instance a 
                                                 
34  Ibid., p.114. 
35  A high rate of 108.8 was recorded in Johannesburg for 1916-17. This had dropped to 80-90 by 
1918 but was higher than that of 50 recorded in New Zealand at the same time: Report of the 
Medical Officer of Health on the Public Health and Sanitary Circumstances of Johannesburg 
during the Three Years, 1 July 1916 - 30 June 1919 (Johannesburg, June 1920) (hereafter  
ARMOH, 1916-1919), p. 10. 
36  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 7 (Feb. 1918), p. 119. 
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mother was acting out of fear, having lost a child to meningitis. She probably had 
confused instructions and thought she had to keep the child awake.37 
Despite medical criticism of mothers, the evidence suggests that many women 
responded to the plight of their children with courage and self-sacrifice. Almost 
invariably, the responsibility for home care fell on the mothers who frequently 
demonstrated heroic efforts, based on a powerful emotional need to do something 
practical to help their suffering children. For most, this involved massage, heat and water, 
either separately or in combination. In later epidemics polio survivors reported how their 
mothers, and sometimes their fathers, spent hours each day massaging and exercising the 
affected muscles. This attention could become overwhelmingly burdensome. A work 
colleague described how an exhausted father came to the office for weeks on end, after 
spending half the night massaging his son’s limbs in a warm bath, in an attempt to ease 
the pain.38 In other cases mothers were required to ensure that the child reached a 
treatment centre. Thelma Warren, who had polio in 1918, explains:  
Daily my mother pushed me in my pram from Eckhart Street in 
Braamfontein to the Children’s Hospital in Hillbrow for water treatment 
in the “bubble bath”.39 Over the years she also dragged me to healing 
                                                 
37  Ibid., p. 117. 
38  Miss A Thomas, interview 8 June 2003. 
39  This was the Transvaal Memorial hospital established in 1923. 
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sessions, a big thing in those days, where I sat on the stage step waiting 
for something to happen. I soon lost faith but my mother never stopped 
trying.40  
Some parents wanted to do the best for their children and sought reconstructive 
surgery. After consulting several doctors, Thelma’s mother discovered Dr. E.F.A. 
Sthamer, a Pretoria medical practitioner with a special interest in orthopaedics,41 who 
consulted at a chemist shop in Johannesburg on Saturday mornings. Despite being 
warned that he was a ‘butcher’ by other parents, the mother went ahead and the operation 
was successful. ‘If my mother had not chosen to trust her instincts, I would have lost the 
opportunity to walk again with hardly a limp.’42 It is noteworthy that Dr. Sthamer 
collected Thelma from her home in Braamfontein in his own car, a Model T Ford, and 
                                                 
40  Mrs. Thelma Warren, interview 25 Aug. 2004. She contracted polio in 1918 when she was 18 
months old. 
41  G.F. Dommisse, To Benefit the Maimed: The Story of Orthopaedics and the Care of the Crippled 
Child in South Africa (Johannesburg: The South African Orthopaedic Association and the National 
Council for the Care of Cripples in South Africa, 1988), pp. 14 and 101. 
42  Ibid., During the operation for a claw foot, tendons were removed from the front of her foot in 
order to make the back tendon longer. Tendons were also removed from her big toe to supply the 
other toes of her foot in order to release them. Finally, an incision was made under the foot to 
straighten it. She was in hospital for three weeks and plaster for a further month. ‘The leg was 
corrected from a four-inch deficiency to half an inch.’ 
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took her to the Pretoria Hospital for the operation to save the family from the train 
journey.43 
During the 1918 epidemic, a difficult task confronting doctors was to persuade 
parents to send their children to hospital. Many survivors of the South African War had 
developed an innate distrust of hospitals. Mothers in the concentration camps chose to 
hide their children rather than allow them into hospitals, fearing that they would be 
neglected, starved or never come out alive. It was also the Boer mother’s role to nurse her 
child at home.44 This negative view of camp hospitals had become deeply entrenched in 
the mythology of the camps and this fear was retained by urbanised Afrikaners more than 
a decade after war. Similar difficulties were experienced during the 1916 New York 
epidemic. Mothers refused officials permission to take their children to hospital or, in one 
instance, a mother kept her children locked up in an unventilated room, fearing outside 
                                                 
43  MJSA, vol. 14, no. 9 (Apr. 1919), p. 441. Another doctor held a different view on philanthropy 
within the profession: ‘We have taken so much credit for the humanitarian aspect of our work that 
the community would glorify us as missionaries and blame us for not accepting as duty what is but 
charity … We have selected [the] profession as a means of earning our living. [The Union] … 
must voice the statement that we expect the monetary rewards to be commensurate with the 
responsibility and arduousness of our work; that we do not want super-praise for the philanthropy 
…’ 
44  E.B. van Heyningen, ‘The Voices of Women in the South African War’, South African Historical 
Journal, vol. 41 (1999), p. 36; Van Heyningen, ‘Women and Disease’, p. 11.  
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contact might result in contracting the disease or that the virus might enter through the 
windows.45 
Ignorance about contagion led some mothers to fear that their children might 
contract polio in hospital. In fact, doctors were as fearful. Johannesburg practitioners 
queried the possibility of hospital infection. Dr J.J. Lynch explained how a young patient 
of his, while awaiting an operation in the Johannesburg Hospital, had developed polio in 
the last few days of January and the case was ‘pretty bad’.46 Considering the evidence that 
there was rarely more than one infection per family, other doctors felt that it was unlikely 
that infection would take place in hospital, especially in ‘well-conducted fever hospitals 
where the necessary precautions were taken by the staff’, such as face masks and frequent 
washing of hands. This had worked in hospitals in Germany and the United States, where 
diphtheria and scarlet fever cases were kept in the same wards without cross-infection.47  
 
4.3 Lay Explanations for Polio and its Treatment 
Johannesburg resident Catherine Blomfield’s view on infantile paralysis was published in 
the main body of The Star early in the epidemic, which suggests that the editor 
                                                 
45  Rogers. Dirt and Disease, p. 42. 
46  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 6 (Jan. 1918), p. 87. 
47  Ibid., p. 96. 
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considered it newsworthy. Other editors refused to print lay theories on illness claiming 
that these ‘throw no more light on the subject.’48 Blomfield was confident that her ideas 
were based on facts that had come to her knowledge. She ventured that infantile paralysis 
was a form of ‘Beri-Beri’, closely akin to the destructive cattle diseases in South Africa 
of lamsiekte and stijfsiekte. She believed such diseases were caused by insufficient 
‘proper food lacking in the constituents necessary for nourishing the nervous system and 
the body generally’.49 Prevention of infantile paralysis could be achieved by ensuring that 
the children avoided imported, coloured sweets, by keeping their mouths clean and 
ensuring that they did not suffer blood loss from fleas, lice and bugs which would leave 
them exhausted and unable to fight disease. The idea that good nutrition enabled the body 
to fight disease was part of a modern approach to health which developed throughout the 
twentieth century. Insects, as vectors of disease, we have seen, formed part of the recent 
successes of medical entomology in explaining the spread of bubonic plague, sleeping 
sickness, yellow fever, malaria and typhus. A letter from Dr J. McMullen, a former MOH 
assisting in public health work in Liverpool, thought that the local research institute 
‘should experiment with white mice, guinea pigs or poultry’, as there was ‘sufficient 
reason to believe the [polio] germ is introduced by fleas and bugs and that rats and mice 
help to harbour the germ.’50.  
                                                 
48  Editor, Sunday Times, 10 Mar. 1918. 
49  The Star, 20 Feb. 1918. 
50  The Star, 8 Mar. 1918.  
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A former hospital nurse who had worked in London believed that the cause of 
poliomyelitis was ‘a congenital weakness handed on by a progenitor who had been 
known to suffer from spinal diseases or brain trouble’. It was ‘catching’ and not due to a 
germ but: 
the action of the nerve centres, those delicate wireless messages sent off 
from one brain to another. If the nervous system which receives the 
suggestion of sickness be strong and free from impurities, the 
suggestion will be thrown off as a ball will rebound from something 
solid; but if there be weakness, exhaustion, impurity of blood, the 
suggestion will be retained and the disease “caught”. 
She believed that fear was the most infectious of all nervous complaints and that ‘we 
must keep our children in a healthy state of body and mind’. A wise axiom for mothers to 
remember was: ‘An empty bowel makes a clear brain.’51 Although rather wide of the 
mark, the letters display the modern concern that diet and disease are linked. It could be 
argued that the role of stress in illness was recognised at this early stage, as stress and diet 
continue to be linked to disease today. ‘Leonard’ blamed too much meat and its products 
in the diet which prevented children from being ‘really healthy and immune from 
disease’. He advocated complete abstinence from meat, especially during the epidemic.52  
                                                 
51  The Star, 27 Feb. 1918. 
52  The Star, 19 Mar. 1918. 
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Lay writers displayed ready knowledge of medical terminology, which could have 
been picked up from the press, but their understanding of polio was rather clouded. It is 
interesting how these writers were attempting to cross the divide between the old and new 
medicine by picking up on the information that polio is a disease affecting the nervous 
system. Others were inclined to have their hopes raised by any suggestion of a cure:  
I would like to ask if any of the doctors of Johannesburg have had the 
foresight to obtain the wonderful Rosenow Serum. One reads the 
comforting assurance that this terrible disease need not be fatal, and the 
realization that the cure for it is possibly a few thousand miles away, 
brings a chill to the hearts of mothers of tiny children.53  
This mother was referring to an article entitled ‘An Arresting Serum’, which offered no 
cure but a possible means of preventing and arresting the paralysis by killing ‘the 
invading organism so that the work of destruction is stopped’.54 Such misinterpretations 
of published medical articles must have been the bane of many doctors who firmly 
believed that medical matters should be left in their capable hands. Yet during the 
epidemic even the doctors were not confident about their knowledge of polio, especially 
how to avoid infection. Baumann admitted that he gave ‘a very guarded opinion when 
                                                 
53  The Star, 14 Feb. 1918. 
54  The Star, 8 Feb. 1918. 
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rung up’.55 It is little wonder then that rather radical treatments were considered. Three 
years previously, the Radium Institute in London had treated cases of paralysis with great 
success ‘by giving patients one tumbler-full of radium emanation water three times a 
day’.56 The writer thought that the medical men in the Union should give radium a trial. 
Religious opinions as to why the epidemic occurred are rather mixed. One writer 
attributed the epidemic and other ‘dread’ diseases to the lack of correct Christian 
observations. Good Friday should be set aside as a ‘Day of Intercession’, like the Jewish 
Day of Atonement, instead of for picnics, sports galas ‘and a great agriculture show’(the 
Rand Easter Show at Milner Park). ‘What use is it to waste money in research 
investigating disease when the very evil lies at our own door?’57 One wonders about the 
epidemic beyond the Easter period. Another writer believed that if the members of the 
medical profession studied ‘Higher Laws’, germs would be rendered totally harmless. He 
stated that some doctors had turned to psychology having found ‘material medica [sic] a 
failure’, while other doctors ‘are beginning to see the summit, studying and practicing 
“spiritual” psychology which takes into account the Creator and His spiritual laws which 
are something more than ethical’. Having advised the medical profession that spiritual 
psychology ‘overcame all diseases’, E.J.W. declared that he was looking forward to the 
time when ‘the fine building [SAIMR] recently erected on Hospital Hill for the purpose 
                                                 
55  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 6 (Jan. 1918), p. 101. 
56  The Star, 9 Mar. 1918. 
57  The Star, 26 Mar. 1918. 
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of finding the cause of disease, which will never be discovered by such means, will be 
turned into a museum and good money put to a better purpose’.58 This could be regarded 
as an implicit attack on the religious scepticism thought characteristic of modern 
scientists. ‘Inquisitive’ wondered why the miracle workers of ‘the apostolic faith’ were so 
slow in coming forward with a cure for polio after a recently publicised cure in 
Krugersdorp.59 
This collection of letters reveals how health and illness had been understood by 
various citizens of Johannesburg. ‘As medicine is a dynamic process of negotiation 
between doctor and patient within the context of the family and community’,  these 
testimonies offer an opportunity to understand the development of medical culture in 
South Africa.60 In their responses to epidemic polio, members of the public were no less 
entranced, reflective and confused than the health officials and doctors. The 
correspondence shows how the writers were trying to integrate the theories of germs, 
laboratory research and medical orthodoxy with their own ideas and notions. Dr Haven 
Emerson, health commissioner of New York City during the 1916 epidemic, commented 
on the letters his department had received: ‘One hardly knows whether to laugh at the 
                                                 
58  The Star, 11 Mar. 1918. 
59  The Star, 19 Mar. 1918. 
60  Rogers, Dirt and Disease, p. 107. 
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fantasies or weep over the ignorance and superstition exhibited’.61 No doubt similar 
sentiments were held by health authorities in Johannesburg.  
This cross-section of letters, however, also reveals a thinking public, concerned 
about the disease and disorder within their environment over which they had little 
control, leaving many feeling susceptible and vulnerable not only to possible infection of 
their children by polio but to other diseases. A perceived lack of commitment from health 
authorities to eliminate the sources of contamination by means of increased sanitation 
inspections and the removal of slums became a source of increasing aggravation. 
As happens during most times of tragedy, there is always a group which can put 
the fear experienced by others to their financial advantage. Manufacturers advertised 
household products as a defence against germs. ‘Ronuk sanitary polish’ left furniture and 
linoleum ‘smooth and dry to which dust, dirt and germs cannot adhere’. Disinfectants 
were popular in treating disease and to prevent its spread. An advertisement announced 
that Lysol would ensure that germs and dust would be sanitised. Camphor as a 
disinfectant against infantile paralysis ‘is unequalled’, claimed The Transvaal Drug 
Company.62 ‘Vigilant’ proposed that the interior of all cars should be disinfected ‘with 
one of the many efficacious mediums now on the market. This would benefit the 
community and enable mothers (who will not leave their children to the tender mercies of  
                                                 
61  Ibid., p. 109. 
62  The Star, 12 Mar. 1918. 
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a coloured servant), to take their children in the car with less likelihood of infection’.63 
Doctors were also warned to ‘make a point of disinfecting themselves thoroughly after 
visiting a case of infantile paralysis before proceeding to another case, no matter what the 
illness may be’.64 Advertisements of familiar children’s remedies were adapted to be used 
during the epidemic. Ashton and Parson’s Infant Powders, ‘for little princes and 
princesses’ would ease the symptoms ‘if the child is cross or feverish’.65 Dr Cassell’s 
Tablets claimed to have helped a crippled boy in Strydenburg, Cape Province to walk 
again. Such psychologically loaded advertising at the height of the polio epidemic must 
have persuaded worried parents to try these tablets where just in case the virus was 
                                                 
63  The Star, 14 Mar. 1918. 
64  The Star, 26 Mar. 1918. 
65  The Star, 5 Mar. 1918; Cape Argus, 22 Mar. 1918; The Star, 12 Mar. 1918. 
Illustration 4.2 
 
A carefully worded advertisement 
Taking advantage of the polio 
outbreak and mothers’ fear during the 
month with the highest number of 
cases must have seen a substantial 
rise in sales. 
 
Source: The Star, 12 Mar. 1918. 
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lurking nearby. A closer examination of the small print in this advertisement revealed that 
the boy had become paralysed from typhus.66  
Just as the press was used by the health authorities to control and educate the 
community during an epidemic, it was an equally useful platform to launch a critical 
attack on such authorities, since their somewhat haphazard communications had failed to 
impress. Mathilda Cohen, a concerned parent, wrote: 
It would be decidedly of service to know what actual cases are in 
existence locally and also what steps parents should take as immediate 
remedies. If infection is being carried abroad would it not be advisable 
to consider closing all schools until the epidemic abates? It behoves the 
authorities to issue sound advice and for the parents to follow it with 
extreme care. Unfortunately many parents are ignorant of the dire and 
terrible malady.67 
Cohen has in fact set out the basic polio policy which health authorities, in their own 
convoluted manner, eventually arrived at during Johannesburg’s first polio epidemic. At 
last Dr Alexander Mitchell was able to draw together important issues learnt from the 
epidemic and publish these in a ‘Memorandum on Acute Poliomyelitis’ in April 1918.68 
                                                 
66  The Star, 11 Mar. 1918. 
67  The Star, 20 Feb. 1918. 
68  Cape Archives Depot (KAB), Town Clerk, Peddie, 1/PDE, vol. 9,  22/18/37. 
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For doctors and health officials alike, the handling of the epidemic had been rather a hit-
and-miss situation. The epidemic was finally over but one thing was clearly understood – 
polio in its epidemic form would be back, and the question was when? Dr Baumann 
warned the Witwatersrand BMA: 
The disease seems to run in peculiar cycles through the world. We are 
probably only at the beginning of the cycle … if the disease follows the 
same lines as in other countries we are bound to get a worse out-break 
next year.69 
                                                 
69  MJSA, vol. 13, no. 6 (Jan. 1918), p. 101. 
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Chapter Five  
Poliomyelitis Research between the Wars 
 
5.1 Like the Plagues of Egypt1 
Early in September 1918, the worst epidemic of the twentieth century broke out on the 
mines near Johannesburg. The final death toll of the Spanish influenza epidemic was 
estimated at more than 300 000,2 with South Africa sustaining ‘one of the highest per 
capita death-rates in the world’.3 The Department of Health had been labeled ‘tardy and 
inco-ordinate’ in its handling of the polio epidemic,4 while during the influenza epidemic 
its conduct was described as ‘masterly inactivity’.5  
                                                 
1  H. Phillips, ‘Black October’: The Impact of the Spanish Influenza Epidemic of 1918 on South 
Africa (Pretoria: The Government Printer, 1990), p. 153. A comment made to describe the troubled 
times of 1918. 
2  Ibid., p. 159. 
3  Ibid., p. 176. 
4  The Star, 10 Apr. 1918. 
5  Phillips, ‘Black October’, p. 105. 
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Phillips points out that during the influenza epidemic the department was ‘in 
constitution, scope, staffing and resources wholly inadequate for the task of safeguarding 
the health of the Union’s population’.6 As had been the case with the polio epidemic, the 
onus of coping with the crisis was once again placed on local authorities, while the 
Department assumed the role of advisor and assistant. In fact, local authorities throughout 
the Union, knowing that little assistance would come from the impotent department, were 
forced to take control of the situation for themselves as matters worsened in their 
respective areas.  
Problems presented by the influenza epidemic were far more dramatic and visible 
than those experienced during the recent polio epidemic. The infection had spread like 
‘quick silver’.7 People died ‘like flies’8 and at times ‘the dead lay unattended for hours’,9 
while makeshift mortuaries were set up.10 In Cape Town the daily death toll rose to three 
figures.11 In Johannesburg schools and all places of entertainment were closed to be 
                                                 
6  Ibid., p. 123. 
7  Ibid., p. 121. 
8  Ibid., p. 62. 
9  Ibid., pp. 13 and 19. 
10  Ibid., p. 48. 
11  Ibid., p. 19.  
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reopened in November 1918.12 The municipality, as in other provinces, set up food and 
medical depots.13 Although the epidemic was over in a matter of weeks, it profoundly 
affected the Union demographically14 and economically, creating and leaving in its wake 
huge societal problems which needed to be addressed by state intervention.15 The public 
were shocked at the ‘revelation of slums and degradation’ exposed by the epidemic.16 
The 1918 influenza epidemic can be used as an example of how the concept 
‘epidemic’ is ‘almost by definition frightening’ as ‘a grave illness’ infects large numbers, 
‘one after another’, creating enormous ‘fear and anxiety’;17 ‘influenza was the worst 
pandemic of modern times in terms of speed and toll’.18 On the other hand, the 1918 polio 
                                                 
12  Report of the Medical Officer of Health on the Public Health and Sanitary Circumstances of 
Johannesburg during the Three Years, 1 July 1916-30 June 1919, p. 26. In the Johannesburg 
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13  Ibid., p. 26. 
14  Phillips, ‘Black October’, p. 230. 
15  Ibid., p. 183. 
16  Ibid., p.165. 
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18  H. Phillips, ‘The Re-Appearing Shadow of 1918: Trends in the Historiography of the 1918-19 
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epidemic dragged on for months with a much more modest death toll of 24. Although the 
polio epidemic had raised similar problems of quarantine, staff shortages, limited 
treatments, and an abiding sense of desperation and uselessness, it did not paralyse daily 
life,19 but only individuals. The influenza epidemic did not return, as feared, but polio did, 
on an ever-increasing scale. Ross rather bluntly sums up how she understands the 
difference between the terms ‘epidemic’ and ‘polio epidemic’: 
An epidemic that kills its victims leaves a reduced population to mourn 
its dead and then gradually to forget. But the community could not 
forget its polio victims. Most did not die; they lived, their wasted limbs, 
their calipers and their crutches a constant reminder of the fate which 
could befall anyone.20 
 
5.2 Administrative Changes after the 1918 Influenza Epidemic 
It is difficult to determine the extent to which the 1918 polio epidemic influenced the 
ground-breaking Health Act of 1919, if at all. However, one can only suggest that some 
doctors present at the Bloemfontein discussions on the draft Act, which was designed to 
                                                 
19  H. Phillips, ‘South Africa’s Worst Demographic Disaster: The Spanish Influenza Epidemic of 
1918’, South African Historical Journal, 20 (1988), p. 58. 
20  J.C. Ross, ‘A History of Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’ (MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 
1993), p. 104. 
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promote a more efficient health system, did so with a very vivid memory of the polio 
victims. Many at the conference realised that practical medicine needed a collective 
investigative approach and specialised expertise to cope with the type of diseases they 
now encountered. A centralised health department, under the control of a minister, would 
help co-ordinate this combination of theory, practice and specialisation, and convey this 
to the general practitioner, ‘who, after all is the ultimate agent whereby the citizen reaps 
the benefits of modern medicine’.21 The influenza epidemic had made the public and local 
authorities more aware of just how inadequate public health policies were in the face of 
epidemic disease.22 ‘Had it not been for the compelling forces of the dreadful and 
disastrous epidemic of influenza it is doubtful whether such a measure would have been 
passed.’23 
The Public Health Act was finally passed in June 191924 and the administration of 
the country’s health was put on a national footing under a fully-fledged Department of 
                                                 
21  ‘London letter, from our Special Correspondent’, MJSA, vol. 14, no. 10 (Dec. 1919), p. 463. 
22  The Star, 13 Jan. 1919. 
23  Phillips, ‘Black October’, p. 206. 
24  Ibid., p. 206. 
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Public Health.25 This Health Act was called ‘an outstanding piece of legislature’, ‘a 
revolutionary measure in its day’, and a ‘pioneering act in the Union’.26 Relevant to polio 
was the improved epidemic notification network to neighbouring countries and to other 
parts of the British Empire which the Act expanded. Hopefully this would be an 
improvement on the lethargic communications which had passed between the Union and 
Mozambique during the polio epidemic. In 1920 South Africa joined the International 
Bureau of Public Health in Paris, which issued monthly bulletins by post on epidemic 
outbreaks all over the world.27 The Act also imposed stricter quarantine measures and the 
government undertook to refund two-thirds of the expenses incurred by local authorities 
while ‘safeguarding public health’,28 with the proviso that the government might intervene 
where necessary and gazette special regulations.29 
                                                 
25  H. Phillips, ‘The Local State and Public Health Reform in South Africa: Bloemfontein and the 
Consequences of the Spanish ’Flu Epidemic of 1918’, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 13, 
no. 2 (Jan.1987), p. 210. 
26  Ibid., pp. 204, 205. 
27  Ibid., p. 207. 
28  A. Jeeves, ‘Public Health in the Era of South Africa’s Syphilis Epidemic of the 1930s and 1940s’, 
South African Historical Journal, 45 (Nov. 2001), p. 79. 
29  H. Phillips, ‘Black October: Cape Town and the Spanish Influenza Epidemic of 1918’, in C.C. 
Saunders (ed.), Studies in the History of Cape Town , vol. 1 (Cape Town, 1979), p. 100. 
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The question was: how would such changes help the future handling of polio 
epidemics? No adjustment to quarantine measures would make any difference in 
containing the disease, for in its epidemic form infection spread rapidly. Financial help 
would assist local health departments, burdened by the cost of opening and running 
special isolation wards, a vital requirement during a polio epidemic. Finally, the more 
South Africa could glean from international public health experience and research, the 
better. For the next 26 years the Union was free from polio epidemics. The poliovirus did 
not disappear; later research indicated that such a hiatus between the first epidemic and 
the next was a trend in polio ‘in transition’ from its endemic state to ‘epidemic stage’.30 
As other countries were hit by increasingly severe epidemics, the Union was lulled into a 
false sense of security and inattentiveness. In an under-developed country such as South 
Africa, polio infections continued in primitive communities. Those protected from the 
virus by their sanitised surroundings for a generation or more could expect a severe 
epidemic when an invasive strain of the poliovirus was introduced.31 The children who 
had experienced the disease in 1918 would be reminded of the horror as the next epidemic 
struck their children. 
 
                                                 
30  R. Debré, et al., Poliomyelitis, WHO Monograph Series, no. 26 (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 1955), p. 41. 
31  Ibid., p. 56. 
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5.3 The Incidence of Polio between the Wars 
Between 1918 and 1938, approximately 64 cases of polio were notified in Johannesburg, 
47 of which were among the white population.32 From 1939 until 1944, there were 85 
cases, with 70 being white:33  
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32  Dr J.W. Scott Millar, ‘Poliomyelitis in Johannesburg’, Public Health (May 1949), p. 143. 
33  Ibid., p. 143. 
Year White Black Total 
1939-
40 8 (2) 2 (3) 10 
1940-
41 20 (4) 3 (1) 23 
1941-
42 7 (1) 3 10 
1942-
43 6 (2) 0 6 
1943-
44 29 (4) 8 (2) 36 
   85 
 
Table 5.1 
Incidence of polio in Johannesburg 1939-1944 
Figures in brackets indicate the number of deaths. 
 
Source: Scott Millar ‘Poliomyelitis in Johannesburg’, p.143. 
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Table 5.2 indicates a sudden increase in the number of cases in the Union during 
the mid 1930s and in 1940-1941. In 1934, Bloemfontein recorded 40 cases with a 35 per 
cent mortality rate, but this remained a localised outbreak.34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34  Ibid., p. 143.  
Year Whites Blacks Total 
1922 27 6 33 
1923 2 3 5 
1924 0 3 3 
1925 15 6 21 
1926 8 4 12 
1927 11 10 21 
1928 22 10 32 
1929 14 8 22 
1930 22 8 30 
1931 17 8 25 
1932 15 7 22 
1933 29 17 46 
1934 40 24 64 
1935 35 26 61 
1936 10 16 26 
1937 57 25 82 
1938 9 9 18 
1939 15 18 33 
1940 36 26 62 
1941 65 27 92 
1942 34 11 45 
1943 31 5 36 
1944 52 23 75 
 
Table 5.2 
Incidence of polio in the Union 1922-1944 
 
Source: H. Nelson, ‘Poliomyelitis: Epidemiology and Preventive 
Measures’, Public Health, vol. 13 (Mar. 1949), p. 133. 
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Case numbers in New Zealand, Canada and Australia were generally over 1 000. 
While these countries had already experienced more than three epidemics, South Africa’s 
outbreaks were still localised. It was becoming clearer that epidemic polio was linked to 
1916 1918 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1936 1937 1938 1941 1944-45
South Africa
New Zealand
Australia
Canada
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
N
um
be
r o
f c
as
es
South Africa New Zealand Australia Canada  
Poliomyelitis epidemics in the Union and other countries 1916-1945 
 
Sources: J.C. Ross, ‘A History of Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’ (MA thesis, University of 
Canterbury, 1993), p. 108; C.J. Rutty, ‘“Do Something! Do Anything”! 1927-1962’ (PhD thesis, 
Toronto University, 1995), p. 397; J.H. Smith, ‘Fear, Frustration and the Will to Overcome: A 
Social History of Polio in Western Australia’ (PhD thesis, Edith Cowan University, 1997), p. 112. 
 
 
Figure: 5.1 
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the stage of development of a country. Later research revealed that the infant mortality 
rate of a country might be used as an index of such development and an indicator of an 
approaching epidemic.35 Generally, those countries with an infant mortality rate below 50 
were more likely to experience polio epidemics.36 In 1918, the white infant mortality rate 
in Johannesburg was 81.04 per 1 000 births, the black rate was 298.50.37 The white infant 
mortality rates dropped dramatically over the 26-year interval between 1918 and 1944 but 
the black infant mortality rates remained high at 264.16.38 Where there was a high infant 
mortality rate, the poliovirus, although ‘hidden’ by other infectious diarrhoeal diseases, 
continued in its endemic state immunising black infants. It was really only a matter of 
time before the next serious epidemic broke out in the Union and the vulnerable white 
children, screened from normal exposure to the virus, would be the main victims. 
 
 
                                                 
35  A.M. Payne, ‘Polio as a World Problem’, Poliomyelitis Papers and Discussions presented at the 
Third International Poliomyelitis Conference (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1955), pp. 
393, 395. 
36  Ibid., p. 396. 
37  Report of the Medical Officer of Health on the Public Health and Sanitary Circumstances of 
Johannesburg during the Three Years, 1 July 1916 - 30 June 1919 (Johannesburg, June 1920), 
(hereafter ARMOH, 1916-1919), p. 9. 
38  ARMOH, 1949-1950, p. 200. 
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5.4 Interwar Care for Polio Victims 
Initially, medical authorities did not push for hospital isolation of all polio patients, but 
only for those whose homes were inadequate or if there was an immediate danger of 
contamination. After 1919, however, all notified polio cases were required to be 
hospitalised. Most acute polio cases were sent to the Fever Hospital, which had been 
opened in Hoofd Street in Hillbrow in1916, initially with 59 beds. Once the infectious 
stage was over, after approximately three weeks, the patients were transferred to the 
Transvaal Memorial Hospital for Children (TMHC, also referred to as the Children’s 
Hospital), which opened in 1923.39 The TMHC was used for post-polio cases and 
corrective operations in paediatric cases up to the age of 14, with Dr J.M. Edelstein in 
charge, assisted by Dr M. Davis. The professional staff also consisted of clinicians in 
private practice. Representative bodies and private individuals endowed cots and wards 
which in turn were named after their benefactors.40 A full Orthopaedic Department was 
                                                 
39  L. Schreiber, Johannesburg Hospital 1890-1990 (Johannesburg: Johannesburg Hospital Board, 
1990), p. 26. 
40  S. Heymann, ‘The Transvaal Memorial Hospital for Children 1923-1973’, SAMJ, vol. 47 (13 Oct. 
1973), p. 1827. The Sunday Times, Primary Schools, Musicians’ and Red Cross wards were used 
for observation, isolation and surgery during polio epidemics. 
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established in the Johannesburg General Hospital Complex in 1935 under Mr F.P. 
Fouché.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Otto Beit Home continued to serve as an annex to the General Hospital for the 
next thirty years. The East Rand was served by the East Rand Hospital which was able to 
admit polio cases into isolation. The establishment of the Children’s Hospital was a 
pioneering move, vital to the well-being of the children of the province, while paediatrics 
and paediatric surgery, together with the relatively new and major disciplines of 
orthopaedics and physiotherapy, were becoming established. 
                                                 
41  M. Beaconsfield (ed.), The Transvaal Memorial Hospital for Children 1923-1973: 50th 
Anniversary Golden Book (Johannesburg: TMHC, 29 Oct. 1973), p. 22. 
 
Illustration 5.1 
 
The Transvaal Children’s Memorial Hospital, Johannesburg 
Source: L. Schreiber, Johannesburg Hospital 1890-1990 (Johannesburg: Johannesburg Hospital 
Board, 1990), p. 26. 
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Convalescence of polio patients was a long, drawn-out process which could last 
up to two years or longer before mobility returned, if indeed paralysis was not permanent. 
If the limb remained paralysed for four months, paralysis was regarded as permanent.42 
Some fortunate patients were able to walk within weeks, but many still needed 
physiotherapy and medical care. It all depended on how severe the initial infection had 
been. The Hope Convalescent Home played an important role in the rehabilitation of 
polio patients. In 1915, Mr R.W. Schumacher, chairman of Rand Mines, and his wife 
donated their home ‘Pallinghurst’, in Westcliff, to the City of Johannesburg and district of 
Witwatersrand ‘as a home for sick and needy children’.43  
It was to be ‘free and open to all white children resident in the Witwatersrand 
from Springs to Randfontein’.44 Hope Home, bearing Mrs. Schumacher’s Christian name, 
eventually became a major rehabilitation centre, not only for polio children, providing 
accommodation for extensive periods of convalescence and offering necessary medical 
treatment. Initially, there were 40 beds, but within 20 years the number had increased to 
over 60. Dr E.P. Baumann was the first doctor in charge. Although originally the home 
                                                 
42  G.T. du Toit, ‘The After-Care of Convalescent Poliomyelitis Cases’, SAMJ, vol. 19 (9 Jun. 1945), 
p. 193. 
43  A. van der Walt, ‘The History and Scope of the Hope School and Homes, Johannesburg’ (BEd 
thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1972), p. 13. 
44  The Star, 16 Feb. 1918. 
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was intended for local children, by 1938 children from other provinces were accepted, as 
well as some from African countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Hope Home assured a certain number of beds to convalescing patients from 
the Children’s Hospital, but during later epidemics, polio cases were drafted directly from 
the Fever Hospital and the TMCH to the Hope Home once all infection was over.45 Polio 
directly influenced other developments at the Hope Home. Schooling was provided for 
children, especially those who needed to undergo surgical procedures and after-care. 
Initially the school was a rather haphazard affair, with only kindergarten lessons given in 
the wards, but after the 1928 Vocational Education and Special Schools Act, a more 
                                                 
45  Van der Walt, ‘History of the Hope Homes and Schools’, p. 28. 
 
 
Illustration 5.2 
Early painting of Pallinghurst, front view 
 
Source: Hope School 75th Anniversary Magazine 
(Johannesburg: Hope Home, 2004), p.6. 
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formal school was started.46 ‘The scheme of work followed is of necessity one to meet 
their special needs. Recreative exercises are done daily giving mental and physical 
stimulation to the children.’47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1929, the Transvaal Provincial Education Department took over all 
expenditures and ‘the school continued to be a great success’.48 There was an increasing 
                                                 
46  Interview with Mr J.B.V. Snow, ex-principal of the Hope School, 6 Nov. 2003. 
47  Van der Walt, ‘History of the Hope Homes and Schools, p. 33. 
48  G.F. Dommisse, To Benefit the Maimed: The Story of Orthopaedics and the Care of the Crippled 
Child in South Africa (Johannesburg: The South African Orthopaedic Association and the National 
Council for the Care of Cripples in South Africa, 1982), p. 11. 
 
Illustration 5.3 
Hope Home School 
 
Source: Hope School 75th Anniversary Magazine 
(Johannesburg: Hope Home, 2004), p. 7. 
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need to provide for the older children who, beyond the ages of twelve for boys and 
fourteen for girls, could no longer remain at the Convalescent Home.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Through the auspices of the Cripples’ Care Association of the Transvaal, 
established in May 1934, and at the request of the National Council of Women, the Hope 
Training Home was officially opened on 9 September 1936. Earl Clarendon announced:  
There are no limits to what we can make of the crippled child … they 
are highly intelligent in utilizing their depleted physical powers to best 
advantage … By training them we can make of them an asset instead of 
a liability to the State and at the same time give them abiding joy … we 
 
Illustration: 5.4 
 
 
Hope Convalescent Home, circa 1930 
 
Source: Museum Africa. 
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shall enable them to become self-supporting … we shall be amply 
repaid by their radiant joy.49 
Of the 24 children admitted, the majority were polio sufferers.50 In 1939 a fully 
equipped government school was completed, with eight classrooms and provisions for 
bed cases. By 1944, 122 children attended the school up to Standard Seven. ‘Radiant joy’ 
is not how the residents of the Hope Convalescent Home would have described their 
experience: 
We were all in the same boat. Our afflictions united us and like normal 
children we teased each other and had fun. When I returned to ‘normal’ 
schooling I was met at the gate by a boy who shouted out: ‘Hello funny 
face!’ Now I was different. The home had been a refuge from all this.51  
Morris offers an explanation for this behaviour: ‘Each entry into the public world will be 
dominated by stares, by condescension, by pity and by hostility … Prejudice we 
experience is often a reaction to physical difference’, the notion of being defective.52 The 
                                                 
49  Ibid., p. 12. 
50  Ibid., pp. 36-38. 
51  Interview with Eden Harrington, 20 Aug. 2003. 
52  J. Morris, Pride against Prejudice Transforming Attitude to Disability (London: The Women’s 
Press, 1991), p. 25. 
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Cripple Care Association and the National Council for the Care of Cripples became 
synonymous with the image of the disabled polio child.  
An enormous boost to the development of the National Council and thus to polio 
in South Africa, was Lord Nuffield’s generous donation of ₤100 000 in 1937. Similar 
donations were also given to other Commonwealth countries. This money was intended 
for: ‘the development of orthopaedic surgery and organised services, for the discovery of, 
and cure for crippling disabilities on a carefully considered plan in South Africa’.53 
Nuffield hoped that the donation go towards a ‘living organisation’ rather than spent only 
on buildings and equipment. Scholarships were offered to enable doctors to specialise in 
orthopaedics overseas and postgraduate training for orthopaedic nurses was initiated. 
Ultimately Nuffield’s money, together with funds raised by the National Council, was 
used to establish orthopaedic clinics and facilities and to subsidise universities for 
research into cripple care. After-care facilities for crippled children also benefited them, 
as did workshops and training centres. The National Council emphasised the point that 
the Nuffield’s Gift ‘should in no way be used to relieve the Union Government or the 
Provincial administrations of their ordinary responsibilities’.54 
                                                 
53  Dommisse, To Benefit the Maimed, p. 25. Nuffield, a motor magnate, was regarded as one of 
Britain’s greatest philanthropists who during his lifetime donated more than ₤27 million to 
charitable causes. The donation was also referred to as ‘the trust’ or ‘the gift’. 
54  Ibid, p. 37 and p. 48. The main function of The National Council for the Care of Cripples, 
established in 1939, was to ensure a comprehensive service for physically disabled people of all 
ages and population groups. 
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The sole fund-raising appeal to the public for cripple care was the Easter Stamp 
Fund. The first campaign was launched in March 1944, prior to South Africa’s second 
polio epidemic. Fortuitously the interwar years had seen a vital infrastructure set in place 
to support the increasing number of disabled, especially through polio. 
 
5.5 Interwar Developments in Treatment and After-Care 
The 1918 polio epidemic in South Africa had illustrated some of the significant 
difficulties the country could face in any future epidemic. Lack of knowledge about the 
poliovirus and limited treatment for its victims caused much concern. During the interwar 
period, research continued in the United States (USA), prompted by ongoing epidemics. 
Canada was only affected by polio epidemics after 1927, when the Connaught 
Laboratories in Toronto began their own polio research. The SAIMR, however, focused 
its research on other diseases, since there were no serious polio outbreaks until the 1940s.  
Convalescent or blood serum was believed to be most effective if administered 
before paralysis set in, yet there was no way of predicting when this might happen. Any 
treatment applied at the pre-paralytic stage, by the very nature of the disease, would 
appear to have a high success rate, as generally only one in 100 cases developed 
paralysis.55 In principle, serum treatment was therapeutically correct but it failed because 
of the small doses used. By the time the serum was administered, the body was already 
                                                 
55  Debré et al., Poliomyelitis, p. 22. 
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manufacturing its own antibodies to polio. By 1937, after two failed vaccines, the 
consensus of medical opinion was that serum treatment had little value and could in fact 
be dangerous.56 Emphasis in treatment continued to be placed on the management of the 
paralysis, prophylaxis and the after-care of polio victims. 
During the 1918 epidemic, the only treatment during the acute stage of the disease 
was bed rest, with affected limbs immobilised in splints or plaster. Where these 
precautions failed to prevent deformity, surgery was an option. Orthopaedic after-care, 
although still in its infancy in 1918, grew rapidly after the First World War. There was a 
worldwide need to repair or rebuild damaged bodies and the expertise of nations such as 
the USA and Germany led others.57 Polio survivors benefited from this spurt of 
orthopaedic knowledge. Convalescent homes which first met the need of returning 
soldiers became the institutionalised structures polio victims would require in the wake of 
ensuing polio epidemics. 
                                                 
56  Ross, ‘Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’, p. 48. Most works on the development of the polio vaccine 
cover the failed vaccine attempts of Drs M. Brodie and J.A. Kolmer in America which resulted in 
the death of a number of vaccinated children. 
57  Dommisse, To Benefit the Maimed, p. 2. The American Orthopaedic Association was formed in 
1887, the German Orthopaedic Association came into being in 1901 and the British Orthopaedic 
Association (BOA) was formed in 1918. Dommisse considers that the BOA, more than any other, 
influenced South African orthopaedic events. In South Africa the Orthopaedic Surgeon’s Group 
came into being in 1942. 
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Orthopaedic surgery developed according to the increased need for reconstructive 
surgery. Polio accounted for 25 per cent of crippling cases which required lengthy and 
meticulous care.58 In South Africa recognition for this specialised discipline was slow. 
According to Dr P. Edelstein ‘it took many years to break down the resistance of general 
surgeons who at that time included orthopaedic work in their activities’.59 Reference to Dr 
E.A. Sthamer’s role in reconstructive surgery was made at an earlier point.60 Dommisse 
acknowledges Sthamer’s pioneering work as the first orthopaedic consultant in the 
Transvaal until 1925, when Dr F.P. Fouché returned from overseas training. Prior to the 
Second World War, postgraduate training in orthopaedics was not available in South 
Africa. The pioneer orthopaedic surgeons such as Drs Pieter Moll, P. Roux, P. Edelstein, 
A. D. Polonsky, F.P. Fouché and G.T. du Toit studied further at Liverpool or Edinburgh 
Medical Schools.61 
Surgeons developed a wide variety of procedures to correct or reduce the 
characteristic deformities of polio. The sheer variety of such deformities was a challenge 
to any surgeon’s skill and ingenuity. Treatment needed to be highly individualised and 
although most operations were standardised, surgeons developed variations to adapt to the 
                                                 
58  Ibid., p. 116. 
59  Ibid., p. 12. 
60  See Chapter Four. 
61  Ibid., p. 179. Before his appointment to the General Hospital, Fouché created the first orthopaedic 
unit at the Germiston General Hospital. 
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patient’s needs. The development of deformities was caused by muscle imbalance, and 
each case needed to be carefully supervised during the growing years as that is when the 
deformities became severe if unattended. 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 5.5 
Deformity of the leg  
Overstretching of the knee has been caused by 
possible incorrect treatment during the illness and 
lack of support during rehabilitation. This child 
should have been fitted with a caliper to keep the 
knee in place and support the weakened muscles of 
her leg. The ankle joint and foot have also been 
affected. 
Source: 
http:www.dokter.ch/krankheten/kinderlaeh-
mung.html, accessed 19 Nov. 2006. 
 142
 
 
 
  
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 5.6 
If polio weakened or destroyed the muscles of the torso, 
especially if one side was left stronger than the other, 
scoliosis or spinal curvature often developed. It could 
take the form of an ‘s’ or bring the head or neck forward 
to the chest. Here the feet are in a typically dropped 
position, the hands and arms display contracture, the joints 
are swollen and stiff. The size of the upper body and 
lower body are disproportionate, the pelvis has subsided 
and the legs hang uselessly, contracted and atrophied 
(withered) from disuse. 
 
Source: http://www.netterimages.com/image/2009.htm, 
accessed on 19 Nov. 2006. 
D.J. Wilson, Living with Polio: The Epidemic and its 
Survivors (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005), pp. 
159-160 
 
Illustration 5.7 
 
Spinal surgery was a difficult, painful and drawn-out procedure. If 
the curvature of the spine, or scoliosis, was severe and left 
unattended, internal organs might become compressed and breathing 
impaired. Lengthy periods in a brace or plaster preceded the operation 
in order to stretch the spine and straighten it as much as possible 
before it was fused. The operation could be done through a hole cut in 
the back of the cast. The spine was fused with bone taken from the hip 
or leg. Later a ‘Harrington rod’ was developed which was inserted 
along the spine to keep it straight. This was followed by several 
months in a body cast to allow the spine to heal. 
 
Source: Ibid; Wilson, Living with Polio, pp. 160. 
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Paralytic deformities of the feet 
A. 
The mid tarsal and joints are 
removed to make the foot more 
stable. 
 
B 
A wedge of bone is cut out to 
flatten the foot after a previous 
operation which detaches or splits 
ligaments and short muscles to 
enable the foot to be wrenched 
straight. The foot is then encased 
in plaster for six weeks before the 
wedge operation. If the patient is 
young it is usually sufficient to 
manipulate the foot flat by using 
‘a Thomas wrench’ and encase in 
plaster. This might need to be 
repeated up to three times or 
more. 
C 
The heel bone is moved 
backwards and the bones of the 
foot are fused to ensure greater 
stability when muscles are too 
weak to assist with mobility. This 
is also referred to as ‘flail’ foot. 
 
Source: H. Bell, ‘Poliomyelitis 
Post-Paralytic Treatment-
Orthopaedic Aspect’, SAMJ, vol. 
24 (20 May 1950), pp. 384-386. 
 
Illustrations 5.8 
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Illustration 5.10 
 
 
Illustration 5.9 
 
Atrophy and paresis (muscle weakness) of the right leg 
 
The picture shows the high grade atrophy of the muscles and fatty 
tissue of the right leg. Polio has also affected growth in the leg 
which is now counter balanced by a subsiding pelvis and sloping 
shoulders. This picture, dating back to the 1920s was taken seven 
years after polio was contracted. The young man was able to walk  
and would have been able to compensate for the shorter right leg 
by having the sole of his boot built up. He did not use a cane or 
crutch at the time of the photograph. 
 
Source: 
http://www.artandmedicine.com/cursch1/plates/Plate26.html 
Atrophic paralysis of both legs 
 
The back and abdominal muscles have been affected so that the 
man is unable to hold himself up unaided. His legs are paralysed 
and his knee cap tendons are permanently damaged; his left foot 
is more inverted than the right. Growth in both legs has been 
slowed by the disease, more so in the left leg which is shorter; 
both are atrophied. In contrast to his weak lower body is his 
powerful trunk and arms. The disease was contracted at the age of 
thirty. There are no details about surgical procedures but he 
would most likely be wheelchair bound or use crutches and 
calipers locked at the knee on both legs. 
 
Source: 
http://www.artandmedicine.com/cursch1/plates/Plate24.html 
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Most surgeries required the patient to be hospitalised and in plaster for weeks and, 
dependant on the procedure, manipulation of the limb could be repeated two or three 
times. That meant another six weeks in plaster for each manipulation. (The psychological 
aspect of polio treatment is covered in Chapter Seven). Then there was always the chance 
that the operation could fail. After years of pain, emotional stress and financial hardship, 
many polio survivors decided to live as best they could with their disabilities and steer 
clear of the operating room.62 
This is the decision that Benny Michel made after more than 50 operations to his 
legs before the age of seventeen.63 He had contracted polio when eleven weeks old in 
Lithuania in1923.The first operations had been performed in Germany when he was four 
and from 1929, over the next ten years, he endured further operations performed at the 
TMHC under Drs W.T. Ross, P. Edelstein and A.D. Polonsky. The first was to correct 
foot-drop. ‘An incision was made from the outer side of the left knee down to the small 
toe, and by stretching the shortened tendon to its normal length again, corrected the 
ankle’s function.’64 Michel recalls the stench of ether and chloroform, the post-operative 
agony, months of boredom while immobilised in plaster of Paris castes which caused his 
                                                 
62  D.J. Wilson, Living with Polio: The Epidemic and its Survivors (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
2005), pp. 155-161. 
63  B. Michel, Footnotes to a Dream: Memories of a Musician’s Journey through Adversity 
(Johannesburg: Benny Michel, 2002), p. 14. 
64  Ibid., p. 29. 
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skin to itch and bleed.65 School holidays were spent in hospital undergoing yet more 
procedures. When the last operation needed to be redone because the tendon had failed to 
grow properly, Michel had reached breaking point:  
I envied the dead and felt that death would spare me a tortuous path 
which would no doubt be life-long … It seemed as if I had always been 
on the outside looking in – and I could no longer maintain my docile 
attitude. I was sick and tired of the struggle of it all.66 
Michel spent the rest of his life in calipers, on crutches and, later, in a wheelchair. 
 
5.6 Angels of Salvation:67 The Iron Lung 
One of the most significant advances in the interwar years was the development of the 
iron lung. Doctors were desperate for some form of respiratory aid with cases where the 
virus had severely affected the breathing muscles. Usually in such cases, death occurred 
very quickly. 
With the onset of respiratory difficulty, it seems almost as if the 
children were suddenly awakened and made to realise the struggle 
                                                 
65  Ibid., p. 55. 
66  Ibid., pp. 106-107. 
67  Wilson, Living with Polio, p. 44. 
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before them. Little children seem to age in a few hours. One sees a 
heedless, careless, sleepy child become all at once wide-awake, high -
strung, alert to the matter in hand, and this is breathing. The whole mind 
and body appear to be concentrated on respiration. Respiration becomes 
an active, voluntary process and every breath represents hard work … 
He is nervous, fearful and dreads being left alone. The mouth becomes 
filled with frothy saliva, which the child is unable to swallow so he 
collects it between his lips and waits for the nurse to wipe it away… 
With a sense of foreboding, those attending the child awaited the end as the tell-tale signs 
appeared: 
There is a little bluish tingeing of the lips and tongue but much more 
distinctive is the pallor, which is sometimes striking. Sweating is 
profuse. Then, as respiration gets weaker, the mind becomes dull, and 
with the occasional return of a lucid interval, he gradually drifts into 
unconsciousness. An hour or later respiration ceases’.68 
The iron lung worked on the principle of positive and negative pressure and would 
take over from the paralysed or weakened respiratory muscles of the patient to enable the 
process of breathing. The outward movement of the bellows reduced air pressure inside 
the tank; air pressure or atmospheric pressure outside was then higher than the pressure 
                                                 
68  T. Gould, A Summer Plague: Polio and Its Survivors (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 
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around the patient’s thorax and abdomen and air was forced into the lungs. When the 
bellows moved inwards the air pressure in the tank reverted to the atmospheric level, and 
the passive recoil of the patients’ expanded thorax and lungs pushed air out. The pressure 
within the respirator could be controlled according to the patient’s physiologic demands.69 
The lung allowed the injured or affected nerves supplying the breathing muscles an 
opportunity to recover. The patient could remain in the lung for days, even weeks; some 
were there for life. 
 
 
 
                                                 
69  T.M. Daniels and F.C. Robbins (eds), Polio (New York: University of Rochester Press, 1997), p. 
104. 
 
 
Illustration 5.11 
First iron lungs made by John Emerson, 1931 
 
Source:http://americanhistory.si.edu/polio/howpolio/images/imgiron_001g.jpg, 
accessed 6 June 2005. 
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The name ‘iron lung’ was given to the first American respirator built by Dr P. 
Drinker in 1929 ‘with all its gruesome implications’.70 Drinker had been moved by seeing 
young polio patients on the ward: ‘He could not forget the small blue faces, the terrible 
gasping for air.’71 It was recognised that certain patients should not be placed into an iron 
lung which worked best in cases of spinal polio that attacked the respiratory muscles and 
not bulbar polio. ‘Bulbar polio that affected the cranial nerves of the throat also caused 
respiratory insufficiency by closing the airway’ and in these cases the iron lung was 
ineffective.’ Such patients were also at risk of pneumonia, choking on secretions and 
other complications; approximately 60 per cent died.72 Patients who had both types of 
polio had a very poor prognosis. Nurses were alerted to other possible complications such 
as increased blood pressure, kidney and heart problems. ‘Respirator wards were in many 
respects precursors of today’s intensive care units.’73 A tragic aspect of treating patients in 
an iron lung was the agonising decisions doctors needed to make when deciding who 
                                                 
70  J.R. Paul, A History of Poliomyelitis (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 
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71  Gould, Summer Plague, p. 90. 
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would benefit most from the respirator.74 During epidemics iron lungs were often in short 
supply and the patient thought to have the best chance of survival was placed in the lung. 
Part of the Nuffield gift referred to earlier was to supply basic wooden lungs to hospitals 
throughout the Commonwealth. Johannesburg General Hospital received four in readiness 
for the next outbreak. Nuffield felt very strongly that no child with any respiratory 
inadequacy should be compromised because of a hospital’s inadequate funding.75 In 1944, 
during the early stages of the next major epidemic, one of the Nuffield lungs was used in 
conjunction with another which had been hastily built.76 The Nuffield lung was used as a 
prototype when South Africa began to manufacture its own lungs to keep pace with the 
demand imposed by the epidemic. 
 
5.7 Sister Kenny and her Alternative Treatment  
She has knocked us so completely out of our complacent groove of 
thought.77 
                                                 
74  Interview with Dr X, 22 Nov. 2002. 
75  C.J. Rutty, ‘“Do Something! Do Anything!”: Poliomyelitis in Canada, 1927-1962’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Toronto, 1995), p. 117. The Nuffield lungs were made of ‘five-ply wood’, based on 
designs by an Australian inventor, E.T. Booth. 
76  The Star, 14 Dec. 1944. 
77  Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, p. 342. 
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Sister Kenny, although generally regarded as a rebel against orthodoxy, 
has evolved a method of treatment in which all the useful elements are 
orthodox and all the useless (and even dangerous) elements are 
unorthodox.78 
Rarely are medical facts or opinions of any kind accepted unanimously; 
medical treatment for better or worse almost always differs widely with 
local judgment, custom, and competence.79 
These three quotes give an idea of the controversial nature of Sister Kenny’s form of 
treatment which appeared in the 1930s. She approached the South African Health 
Department in the hope that it would invest in her ideas but it was not easily won over. 
Sister Elizabeth Kenny, an unqualified nurse from Queensland, Australia, was regarded as 
a contentious figure during the polio years, from the late 1930s until her death in 1952. 
This notoriety appears to have strongly influenced the South African Health Department’s 
decision whether or not to adopt her system of treatment in hospitals. 
Kenny’s step-by-step method of treatment is remembered best now, rather than 
her claims about the disease, which were generally regarded as unscientific and 
inaccurate. She maintained that the poliovirus attacked muscles first, and then the nerves 
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– not the nerve tissue alone as contemporary science stated.80 Her treatment offered pain 
relief through the use of hot packs, while active and passive manipulation of the unused 
muscles promoted a quicker recovery. By involving the patients in her graded exercise 
programme, she felt they were psychologically boosted by being involved in their own 
recovery. She derided the standard treatment of bed rest and immobility; her programme 
played a major role in ending ‘a century of the abuse of rest’.81 
Warm baths, massage, passive stretching and exercise had been used as early as 
1884 in the treatment of polio, and hot packs in various forms had been a standard remedy 
for many years.82 Orthodox medicine came to believe that the muscles affected by polio 
were very frail, hence the immobilisation of the patient in plaster, braces or stretched out 
on a frame to prevent deformity. Kenny challenged this view by arguing that deformities 
were the result of persistent muscle shortening, due to muscle spasm. Children would 
therefore assume unnatural positions because of the intense pain, and this caused 
contracture and shortening in the limbs which could become permanent.83 Relief from 
pain through heat lessened such contracture, and so reduced deformities such as curved 
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spines, sway backs, twisted feet and arms. Kenny believed that the hot packs also kept the 
skin and tissues healthy.84 The controversial hot packs were often a source of dread to 
some patients. The strips of wool used in the treatment were carried in a tank of boiling 
water on castors.  
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To this day I can remember the smell of a hot pack. The other memory I 
have is of the scalding hot nature of them when they went on, the 
                                                 
84  Cohn, Sister Kenny, p. 253. 
 
 
Illustration 5.12 
Sister Kenny demonstrating how to apply her ‘hot pack’  
 
Source:http://americanhistory.si.edu/polio/howpolio/medworld2.htm, accessed 6 June 2005. 
‘As it arrived on the ward you heard 
the squeaking wheels … you started to 
cry way before it was your turn … 
even the little baby next to me started 
to cry and it was terrible lying next 
door listening to the sobs as the 
treatment proceeded.’ 
 
Source: Interview with Patsy, 15 Aug. 
2003. 
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relatively short period of time when they were warm and comfortable 
and the inordinately long period of time when they were like having a 
wet nappy on … When these hot packs were taken off and replaced, you 
were treated with methylated spirits and powder to prevent bed- sores.85 
Kenny made the most of the muscles that were left intact, which would ultimately lead to 
muscle function and coordination. She treated painful limbs as soon as possible, even 
during the acute stage of the disease, stroking and manipulating the muscles in spasm, 
cajoling the patient to concentrate and relax and push past the pain. By working on one 
muscle at a time she would re-educate it back to life.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85  Gould, Summer Plague, p. 239. 
Sister Kenny demonstrating her method of muscle re-education 
Source: T. Gould, A Summer Plague (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1995), photograph section. 
Illustration 5.13 
 155
Sister Kenny looked me right in the eye and said, ‘I am here to try to 
help you. But, before I can help you, I have got to hurt you’. I had no 
idea how painful the treatment could be, I’d fight to control myself but 
inevitably I’d end up screaming … She would actually pull up the 
pectoral muscles, getting her thumb underneath and tormenting and 
pulling, stretching them into their limit and then beyond. I knew it was 
for my own good but I dreaded each visit … And oddly enough, as 
much as it hurt during the treatment, afterward I seemed better.86  
Kenny believed muscle fibres did not die immediately ‘like cut flowers’, but could 
be kept alive while nature repaired usable nerve connections and branching fibres.87 The 
longer the patient did not walk, the more the brain forgot how to walk. Deformities 
thought to have been caused by the pull of the normal muscle against the paralysed 
muscle, she believed, could be caused by the unrelenting pull of the over-toned muscle 
against another not affected by the disease.88 Each patient had an individual exercise 
regime and treatment was carried on as long as necessary – no-one was considered 
incurable.89 
                                                 
86  Downloaded from the Smithsonian exhibition on polio: 
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Kenny hated the thought of leaving a child immobile and lashed out at ‘the archaic 
torture devices’ such as splints and braces which she called ‘medieval contraptions of 
leather and steel’; iron lungs were ‘torture chambers’,90 which according to her, impeded 
natural recovery and created dependency.91 Her anti-doctor rhetoric alienated her and her 
treatment from many in the medical world during the war period, especially when she 
indirectly likened doctors to the enemy:  
Anyone who stands between the child and his chance of a happy earthly 
existence is guilty of as great a crime as the torturers of the prison 
camps.92  
However, her ‘bull dog courage’93 and apparent success gained the attention of the public 
in the USA, who, for a time, regarded her with awe. Known as ‘the Messiah for polio 
victims’, she reveled in her celebrity status.94 Doctors regarded her as an imposter who 
dared speak out against their position of authority, even if limited as far as polio was 
concerned. Medical science preferred to rely wholly on pathological observation of 
damage; in the case of polio, complete or incomplete damage to the anterior horn cells. 
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Kenny used her skills of observation: ‘Just by watching a child breathe she could tell how 
much involvement there was in the chest wall, diaphragm, neck and throat’.95  
She resented all criticism and did not understand the innate conservatism of 
conventional medicine. This is evident in her correspondence with the South African 
Health Department referred to earlier. Kenny envisioned operating clinics in as many 
countries as possible throughout the world, and was keen to share any reports on her work 
with the relevant health departments. Her motto was: ‘Let my record speak.’96 She began 
correspondence with the Secretary of Health in South Africa as early as 1936, by 
forwarding a report to him. Authenticated by the Brisbane Under Secretary for Health, 
E.E. Chuter (who added a character reference), the report included information from Drs 
Dungan, Guinane and F.F. Pincus, all supporters of her method. Dr Dungan lauded her 
treatment as revolutionary, claiming that ‘splinting and consequent operations had been 
placed in a wrong perspective’. He was sure Kenny’s method would reduce the number of 
cripples. He argued that the placing of patients in plaster and splints resulted in painful 
joints, whereas frequent movement of weakened muscles and improved nutrition to all 
parts prevented stiffness of joints.97 Dr Pincus felt that the most striking feature of the 
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treatment was the change it had on the psychological condition of the child: ‘A whining 
little idiot was converted in a few months into a bright and cheerful child’.98 
Kenny also corresponded with business men in Johannesburg. K.S. Hall (of R.V. 
Cullinan & K.S. Hall) began to write to her in 1935. Both Hall and Lord Albu, the mining 
magnate, were interested in the case of a wheelchair-bound, Johannesburg man, 53-year 
old Captain Jones, who worked for the municipality and who had contracted polio in 
1927. He had been pronounced ‘definitely incurable by three local doctors’. A small 
committee had sent him to Australia in 1936 to be treated by Sister Kenny: ‘He is now 
able to move around with the help of sticks and is returning in six to eight months.’99 Due 
to this success, both men were interested in having a Kenny clinic in South Africa. Hall 
had passed his correspondence with Sister Kenny onto Sir Edward Thornton, the 
Secretary for Public Health, who requested that a sub-committee of the Medical 
Association of South Africa (MASA) investigate her work.100 In Hall’s letter, Sister 
Kenny had set out certain conditions to be followed by the South African government, 
should the clinic go ahead. These included, among others: an invitation from the 
government or Committee inviting her to open the clinic; payment of all costs incurred; 
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the appointment of two Kenny nurses, with salary; the appointment of a doctor who she 
would train. ‘Dr Harrington of Harley Street, London is intensely interested … and is 
willing to accept the post’, she added.  
You need to finalise this as soon as possible, because [when once all is 
recognised by London], ‘all other countries will follow suit and my time 
will be very much occupied.101  
Thornton reacted negatively to what he must have thought were rather high-handed 
requests from a mere nurse. ‘It would be extremely unlikely that the Government or 
Provincial Administration would be willing to import medical men or other staff for the 
purpose of starting a clinic here’.102  
Meanwhile, Thornton’s sub-committee studied Kenny’s book, ‘Infantile Paralysis 
and Cerebral Diplegia’. ‘To our mind the most important portion’ was the foreword, 
written by an eminent anatomist, Professor H.J. Wilkinson. ‘Sister Kenny’s work on 
Infantile Paralysis seems to have a scientific basis if Professor Wilkinson’s ideas are 
correct’, but the committee was concerned that there was insufficient scientific proof that 
the cases studied were indeed polio cases. It added that most cases, ‘without treatment, 
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undergo spontaneous cure’.103 During the sub-committee’s investigation, Thornton also 
consulted Colonel P.G. Stock of the Ministry of Health, Whitehall, in connection with a 
test programme started at the Queen Mary’s Orthopaedic Hospital, Carshalton, under the 
supervision of ‘an expert committee of medical men’ who would observe Kenny over a 
period of three months and attempt to substantiate her method scientifically.104 Kenny was 
so confident that she would pass with flying colours that she informed the Health 
Department: 
If the medical men of Johannesburg are interested it would be wise for 
them to wait for this verdict. As a matter of fact I do not see my way 
clear to further this work to any country until this [report] is available as 
an honorable test of the methods, under the best supervision available, I 
should say, in any part of the world, is in progress now … It is my 
intention to take this [report ]as final.105 
Unfortunately for Kenny, her ‘record’ did not speak for itself. The three-month 
experimental period to observe Kenny’s system was regarded as insufficient time to be 
able to arrive at ‘definite conclusions’, although a doctor known to the Ministry was 
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‘absolutely convinced of her disinterestedness and her complete lack of desire for either 
money or fame’.106  
It was not, however, in Kenny’s nature to give up, nor did she stick to her word 
that she would accept the report as final. In a letter to the ‘Director of Health’ – she must 
have meant the Secretary of Public Health, now Dr E. Cluver – she referred to a recent 
visit to Cape Town in September 1938, during which she received an undertaking from 
Cluver.107 According to her, he had agreed to the possibility of a Kenny clinic if she could 
supply ‘an official statement … from an Australian medical man’. She later produced a 
report from Drs W.R. Forster and E.E. Price, who had been involved with an investigation 
of 23 cases under Kenny’s supervision. These doctors concluded that ‘after a very few 
trials’ it had been felt that one or two of her ideas were good and one or two definitely 
harmful.108 Accompanying the report were Kenny’s own comments, correcting or adding 
to points she felt the doctors had missed. The integrity of the report was jeopardised by 
Kenny’s meddling, and South African medical authorities took due note.  
During the 1944-1945 epidemic, Dr Allan dismissed the Kenny method based on 
both the Carshalton report and a later investigation carried out by the American Medical 
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Association. ‘Using hot packs for all patients with the minimal evidence of “spasm” is of 
questionable value and a waste of manpower and hospital beds.’109 Individual doctors in 
South Africa would most likely have advised the use of hot packs, but it did not become 
hospital policy. Radiant energy from light bulbs inside a wire cage continued to be used at 
the Fever Hospital.110 
But the Kenny method was not just about hot packs. The psychological value of 
the idea of being healed was irresistible. With the Hampton report, Kenny included a 
letter she had received from two Southern Rhodesian women, aged 17 and 23, ‘one letter 
of many’ which, she claimed she often received from the Union. ‘We have been in 
hospital for two years … but for all this we are not better and not likely to get better.’ One 
woman revealed how she slid along the floor when doing housework. ‘I found this was 
bad for me.’ She then described an operation on her heel which had evidently failed. ‘We 
know that you will make us better there is no doubt about it, others have been cured and 
so shall we too!’ The women went on to ask about accommodation: ‘For whatever 
happens we are coming, we both know you will cure us, we are determined and all our 
faith is with you in Australia.’111 
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In contrast to the carefully deliberated medical approach to Kenny, the utter faith 
and child-like confidence revealed by this letter partly explains why Kenny fought as hard 
as she did to spread her help to others. Such blind faith must have inspired her to stand 
firm in her belief that she was a healer, when some doctors attempted to discredit her, ‘it 
would seem out of professional jealousy’.112  
Letters from the Johannesburg public highlight alternative points on the Kenny 
debate. ‘Her treatment should be available at each hospital and added to the curriculum at 
every medical school’, declared one.113 Another accused the medical profession of being 
antagonistic towards Sister Kenny’s treatment: ‘Had the same medical treatment been 
referred by a medical practitioner all would be well.’ The writer believed that a full 
description of the treatment for the benefit of the public was necessary to show up the 
‘hidebound convention’ practiced by the medical profession.114 
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By 1948, although Kenny remained popular with the public, she was dismissed as 
‘no longer topical … We have dropped this topic … public interest having died down’.115 
Ross, however, argues that the radical changes in the management of paralysed patients 
and the increasing use of physiotherapy techniques were the result of a high level of 
acceptance of Sister Kenney’s methods. ‘Sister Kenny offered more than treatment: she 
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Illustration 5.14 
 
‘Don’t close that door!’ 
Source: Gould, A Summer Plague, 
photograph section. 
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offered hope, she offered results and she broke the log jam of medical control’.116 She 
gave hope to patients and their families by taking a positive approach to treatment that 
might help, rather than highlighting the incurable aspects of polio as doctors were 
inclined to do. She spoke up for suffering children, a cause the press supported: ‘They 
[Kenny and her staff] have weakened the wizard of his power to twist and torture bodies 
into gross caricature’, one columnist wrote.117 
It seems, however, that South African doctors preferred to stay in control and 
dictate what they considered best for the polio patient in South Africa. Such control, 
however, was squarely based on other countries’ experiences of the disease. Because 
South Africa had had no direct experience of polio epidemics since 1918, which would 
have promoted its own strategies, it was ill-prepared for the reality of the next polio 
tragedy which was about to strike the country in 1944. 
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Chapter Six 
The 1944-1945 Poliomyelitis Epidemic in Johannesburg 
 
6.1 Outline of the Epidemic and Statistics 
The first extensive epidemic in Johannesburg after 1918 did not occur until the later 
months of 1944, during the Second World War. The infection started in Durban in 
mid September, and by 11 October there were seventeen notifications of polio.1 The 
disease reached Pietermaritzburg by 17 October.2 Within eleven days, five cases were 
confirmed in Zwartruggens, approximately 160 kilometres west of Pretoria.3 By the 
end of October, polio was raging in Johannesburg and had claimed its first life. Health 
officials speculated that the virus had been imported from Durban by returning 
holidaymakers, but initially were not unduly concerned.4 Durban officials, however, 
viewed the increase in polio cases very seriously: ‘We are approaching the 
proportions of the severe 1916 epidemic in New York State’, Dr G.H. Gunn, the 
MOH for Durban warned, adding that the steps ‘contrived to control the infection’ 
                                                 
1  Rand Daily Mail, 11 Oct. 1944. 
2  The Star, 19 Oct. 1944. 
3  Rand Daily Mail, 28 Oct. 1944.  
4  The Star, 31 Oct. 1944. 
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were not proving successful.5 By November the number of polio cases had escalated 
throughout the Union. Finally, in mid November, a localised polio outbreak in the 
eastern Cape town of Cradock unnerved authorities when it became necessary to send 
a special ambulance train to the small town to transport patients back to an emergency 
isolation hospital in Cape Town ‘for manipulative treatment’.6 The outbreak was 
described as ‘explosive’, with 27 known cases.7 Meanwhile, in Johannesburg, the 
number of cases had risen to 48 for November, 73 for December and 23 in January, 
1945. Johannesburg schools were confident to reopen reassured by a School Board 
official that ‘there was no danger of the disease spreading when classes resumed’.8 
February recorded 32 cases,9 but as the weather cooled numbers tapered off. The 
disease had peaked in December, at the height of summer. It severely affected 
Johannesburg, as well as the eastern Witwatersrand and Pretoria.10 (See Map 1.) The 
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final official count for Johannesburg was 174 cases among whites. One hundred of 
them recovered completely, while 48 were left with residuals of the disease.11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is no available breakdown of recovery figures for the other population groups in 
Johannesburg. However, Figure 6.1 gives an idea of the distribution of polio in 
Johannesburg for 1944-1945. The total number of polio cases for all population 
                                                 
11  SAB, GES, 536 578/2/12F, memorandum by Dr J.W. Scott Millar, Acting MOH, Public 
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Map 6.1 
Distribution of poliomyelitis in the Witwatersrand and Pretoria, 1944-1945 
Each dot represents one case. 
 
Source: ARDOH, 1944-1945, p. 17. 
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groups in Johannesburg was 201; there were 26 deaths (22 white and 4 black), but no 
deaths according to records occurred in among either Indians or Coloureds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All figures should be viewed with some scepticism, as any study of the 
epidemiology of polio is riddled with ‘the usual statistical errors, due to such factors 
as slackness in notification or incorrect diagnosis, which are unavoidable’.12 There are 
far greater margins of error in the recordings of polio, compared with other infectious 
diseases, because so many cases are non-paralytic and are therefore less likely to be 
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(May 1949), p. 133. 
Figure 6.1 
Distribution of poliomyelitis in Johannesburg, 1944-1945 
 
Source: Dr J.W. Scott Millar, ‘Poliomyelitis in Johannesburg’, Public Health, vol. 13 (May 1949), 
p. 143. 
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recognised.13 As mentioned earlier, the signs and symptoms of non-paralytic polio 
may be very vague and in some cases almost completely absent, and can easily be 
mistaken for another illness or missed completely. The ratio of clinical cases, or 
paralytic cases and silent infections, can be as high as 1:1 000 during an epidemic.14 It 
is safe to assume that the true incidences of polio cases during an epidemic are 
generally much higher than the recorded figures. Dr J.H.S. Gear, the renowned South 
African virologist, considered that the 1944-1945 epidemic ‘involved the whole 
country, affecting every city, town and village’.15  
It is important to note that the statistics for the 1944-45 polio epidemic were 
regarded as provisional until 1949, and no Medical Officer of Health (MOH) annual 
reports are available from 1941 until 1949.16 As numbers were changing during the 
epidemic, it would seem that corrections to already-submitted statistics were not 
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14  R. Debré, et al., Poliomyelitis, WHO Monograph Series, no. 26 (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 1955), p. 15. 
15  J.H.S. Gear, The History of the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation (Johannesburg: 
Poliomyelitis Research Foundation, 1996), p. 6. 
16  These documents could not be found at the Central Archives Depot in Pretoria, the Pretoria 
National Library or at the Johannesburg Local Government Library, where the file boxes were 
clearly marked: ‘MOH Annual Reports for Johannesburg from 1941-1948 not issued and not 
attached to the Mayor’s Minutes.’ The MOH reports resume in 1949. 
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carried out.17 Mr H.G. Lawrence, the Minister of Welfare and Demobilisation, 
however, assured the House of Assembly that ‘careful records of the incidence of 
infantile paralysis had been kept by the Department of Public Health since 1920’.18  
The need for close analysis and comparison of polio figures is emphasised in 
the following graphs. According to Figure 6.2, the Transvaal had the highest number 
of polio cases, yet, when this information is translated into the incidence per 100 000 
of population, it is clear that the Orange Free State was ‘the province hardest hit’ by 
the 1944-1945 epidemic, with an incidence rate of 17.82;19 the Cape Province had the 
lowest at 10.07; the rate for the Union was 12.47.20 (See Figure 6.3.) For Natal and the 
Transvaal, the main incidence of polio occurred in November and December and by 
February the epidemic was beginning to wane. The Orange Free State, however, had a 
                                                 
17  SAB, GES, 536 578/2/12F, minutes of meeting of Polio Action Committee, Johannesburg, 2 
July 1948. 
18  SAB, GES, 533 190/2/12B, question XLIX, asked by Mr Tighy of the Minister of Welfare and 
Demobilisation, House of Assembly, 30 Jan. 1944. The problem could be one of processing 
backlogs at the archives in Pretoria, where personnel admitted that there was a great deal to 
sort regarding public health in Johannesburg. 
19  ARDOH, year ending 30 June 1945, p. 14. 
20  Official Year Book of the Union and Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, 
no. 28, 1948 (Pretoria: The State Printer, 1949), p. 1097. The incidence rate per 100 000 in 
Johannesburg, was 0.06 and 0.007 for blacks. In the 1946 census, on which these figures are 
based, the white population stood at 332 026 and black population 433 431. The Transkei, 
with a population of over one million, only had seven cases. I have not included these in the 
Cape’s statistics. 
 172
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 
Incidence rate per 100 00 of population of poliomyelitis in the Union of South Africa, 1944-1945 
 
  
Source: ARDOH, 1944-1945, p. 15. 
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Figure 6.2 
Distribution of poliomyelitis in the Union of South Africa, 1944-1945 
 
Source: ARDOH, 1944-1945, p. 14. 
Figure 6.3 
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resurgence of the disease in February, and cases continued until April. The Cape’s 
peak month was in January with a total of 71 cases. Even after the epidemic was 
considered over by May, isolated incidences of polio continued in the various 
provinces throughout the Union. Isolated cases in Johannesburg also continued; Gear 
was able to investigate a polio outbreak as late as November, 1945.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It was noted, with increasing concern, that polio was affecting juveniles and 
young adults at a higher rate than ever before. These patients were usually severely 
                                                 
21  J.H.S. Gear and B. Mundel, ‘Studies in Poliomyelitis: The Study of an Outbreak of 
Poliomyelitis Occurring in a Suburb of Johannesburg’, SAMJ, vol. 20 (9 Mar. 1946), p. 110. 
Map 6.2 
Distribution of poliomyelitis in Union of South Africa, 1944-1945 
 
Each dot represents one case. 
 
Source: ARDOH, 1944-1945, p. 16.
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affected by the disease, but this age pattern also confirmed that polio had crossed over 
from its endemic state into its frightening epidemic form, where it could remain and 
reappear for years to come. Although the1918 figures represent only part of the 
epidemic – from February until May – the incidence rate in the 5-15-year age group 
and older had more than trebled by 1944-1945, while throughout the Union, 49 per 
cent of the total number of reported cases (1 380) still occurred in the under five 
group; 23 per cent in children between the ages of five and under ten; and 17 per cent 
in the ten to 19 age group (see Figure 6.5). 
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Figure 6.4 
Age incidence of poliomyelitis in Johannesburg, 1918 and 1944-1945 
 
Source: Scott Millar, ‘Poliomyelitis in Johannesburg’, pp. 144-145. 
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The over twenty age group in the Union was at 11 per cent, which was on a par with 
numbers in that age group in other countries.22 Figure 6.6 gives a more detailed age 
distribution of the disease in the Johannesburg community. (See Table 6.1 for the 
relevant numbers for Figure 6.6.) 
 
                                                 
22  ARDOH, year ending 30 June 1945, p. 14; J.C. Ross, ‘A History of Poliomyelitis in New 
Zealand’ (MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 1993). In 1937 the over twenty group in New 
Zealand was ten per cent of its total incidence. 
Figure 6.5 
Distribution of age incidence and deaths of poliomyelitis in the Union of South Africa,  
1944-1945 
Source: ARMOH, 1944-1945, p. 15 
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Age in 
years <1 1 2-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 55-54 >55 
Deaths   1 1 6 8 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 
Residual paralysis 7 8 12 12 4 0 0 3 0 1 0 
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Incidence of poliomyelitis in Johannesburg, 1944-1945 
 
Source: Scott Millar, ‘Poliomyelitis in Johannesburg’, p. 145. 
 
Figure 6.6 
 
Table 6.1 
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In Johannesburg, whites dominated the 10-14 age group, unlike the rest of the 
Union. The percentage for the twenty-and-over age group also exceeded the Union 
figures by more than five per cent. A possible explanation for this difference could be 
that, as the major epicenter of the epidemic, Johannesburg was hardest hit. It was 
affected earlier in the epidemic than most places, for many Union towns experienced 
outbreaks only in 1945. It has also been observed that as an epidemic proceeds, cases 
do become milder. 
A number of soldiers and nurses infected with polio, including several 
Canadian nursing sisters who had come to South Africa to help in the care of the 
soldiers, were admitted to the military hospitals, and one of them died of respiratory 
paralysis in Robert’s Heights Hospital, Pretoria.23 Polio within the ranks had 
concerned the military; in the Middle East, lives had been lost to polio, and an 
outbreak on the domestic front was not a good sign. Gear, as head of the Medical 
Laboratory Service of the South African Medical Corps (SAMC),24 recalls that this 
outbreak influenced his decision to become involved in polio research.25 He had 
established a Poliomyelitis Research Unit within the SAMC, and after the war this 
                                                 
23  Gear, Poliomyelitis Research Foundation, p. 16. 
24  J.H.S. Gear and R.M. Yeo, ‘The Medical Laboratory Service of the South African Medical 
Corps’, SAMJ (26 Jul. 1947), pp. 527-534; M. Marais, In Quest of Health: The South African 
Institute for Medical Research 1912-1973 (Johannesburg: Lowry Publishers, 1988), p. 224. 
25  Gear, Poliomyelitis Research Foundation, p.16. 
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research was continued at the SAIMR in the Virus and Rickettsial Research Unit, in 
collaboration with the City Health Departments of Johannesburg and Germiston. The 
Johannesburg Fever Hospital’s staff was also closely involved.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2 Local Authorities React to the Epidemic 
As polio first erupted in Durban, Dr Gunn, the MOH, assumed responsibility for his 
area, but expressed his reservations about the Health Department’s advisory role 
during epidemics, first set out in the 1919 Health Act. This policy of limited 
responsibility placed a heavy burden on the Union municipalities, which Gunn was 
experiencing first-hand as polio cases increased. ‘We have pointed out before that, in 
                                                 
26  Marais, In Quest of Health, p. 224. 
 
Illustration 6.1
Major J.H.S. Gear, with members of his unit, next to the SAMC Field 
Laboratory truck, outside SAIMR 
 
Source: Personal photograph 
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all these diseases Durban fights in vain, so long as it is left to fight alone … this most 
terrifying of all infectious diseases.’27 The major problem was that local authorities 
were powerless to prevent carriers transmitting the disease from moving in and out of 
other provinces. The fact that the epidemic took place during war-time conditions is 
most significant. A national quarantine policy, backed by the Department of Health, 
would have proved ineffectual and costly, especially in terms of personnel, which was 
already stretched by war-time demands. Border closures were difficult to maintain, as 
experienced during the 1916 epidemic in the USA. Moçambique’s 1918 closure of its 
borders had caused delays and inconvenience to both countries. Gunn was well aware 
of the problems:  
Conditions favourable to occurrence and reoccurrence of epidemic 
poliomyelitis now exist in Durban and these conditions relate to the 
accumulation of war-time stresses and strains on the community as a 
whole.  
The population had increased over the last five years due to trade, industry and traffic, 
‘both human and material. The town is overcrowded.’28 Having had time to access 
different polio policies from abroad, the Department of Health demanded weekly 
notifications from local authorities. This was a time-consuming operation; 
responsibility already rested heavily on the shoulders of the local authorities which 
were in the unenviable position of watching the onslaught of a disease for which 
                                                 
27  Daily News, 6 Nov. 1944. 
28  SAB, GES, 533 2/12/B, memorandum to Durban’s Town Clerk regarding the outbreak of 
poliomyelitis’ control programme from Dr G.H. Gunn. 
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‘there was no clear cause of infection, no universally adopted method of treatment, no 
adequate means of control and which caused dread and panic in the general public’.29 
 
6.3 Misleading Directives:  The Course of the 1944-45 Epidemic in Johannesburg 
At first, it seemed that the increased incidence of polio cases was almost ignored. 
Newspaper reports on the appearance of ‘infantile paralysis’ were appended to 
information on the smallpox epidemic, which was more the editor’s decision but 
nevertheless indicative of general lack of concern.30 At the end of October, Dr J.W. 
Scott-Millar, the deputy MOH, reassured readers that, although the incidence of the 
disease was higher than usual, ‘Public Health Officials were watching all suspected 
cases of infantile paralysis very closely’. Contacts were being placed under quarantine 
and, thus far, there was no question of an epidemic.31 Within days, however, the 
civilians in Johannesburg had been bombarded with information about the increasing 
threat of smallpox, of typhoid cases in Durban, and an allegation that six dogs had 
developed paralysis after eating whale meat in Durban.32 Umtata was stricken with 
pneumonic and bubonic plague, and a child had died from infantile paralysis in the 
                                                 
29  Ross, ‘Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’, p. 60. 
30  Rand Daily Mail, 11 Oct. 1944. 
31  Rand Daily Mail, 1 Nov.1944. 
32  The Star, 1 Nov. 1944. 
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Johannesburg suburb of Linden.33 It is not surprising that a public meeting was called 
for the following week, to discuss ‘the Union’s health situation’, posing the question: 
‘Are South Africans a sickly people, or is the spread of disease due to inadequate 
health services?’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr G.D. Laing, MOH for Johannesburg, felt that public anxiety was getting 
out of hand. He chose to defuse what he saw as ‘undue alarm’, by withholding any 
figures in the next weekly report and by assuring readers that cases were only slightly 
above average. He pointed out that this number (purposely not disclosed), had been 
equaled in June 1941: in fact cases had dropped since February, and none at all had 
been recorded in September.34 Laing blamed the uneasiness of the public on the 
                                                 
33  Rand Daily Mail, 30 Oct. 1944. 
34  ARMOH, 30 Jun. 1945, p. 12. There had been a sudden spate of 20 cases in February 1944, 
but the outbreak subsided quickly.  
 
Illustration 6.2 
Dr G.D. Laing, Medical Officer of 
Health for Johannesburg 
 
Source: J.R. Shorten, The Johannes-
burg Saga (Cape Town: Cape and 
Transvaal Printers, 1970), p. 393. 
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growing number of newspaper reports concerning the accelerating Durban outbreak. 
He spoke against the ‘absolutely unfounded rumours with regard to whole batches of 
cases in particular areas’, and against the unnecessary action on the part of parents, 
‘preventing children from attending public swimming baths’. Laing offered the 
following directive to ensure that calm returned: 
Parents are advised not to alarm themselves and their children by 
unnecessary restrictions … see that children lead normal active lives, 
eat proper meals and keep their bowels open.35  
Laing was only downplaying the situation; the rest of his announcement turned to the 
smallpox epidemic in Johannesburg. He was, in fact, missing a vital opportunity to 
win the confidence of the parents, as well as their co-operation, which was so 
essential to cope with an obviously serious health situation developing in the city. He 
had also underestimated parental concern as the disease took hold in several suburbs. 
By isolating their children and keeping them indoors, parents were merely acting out 
of concern and on previous directives issued by the health authorities on infectious 
diseases. Laing’s advice may, in fact, have promoted the spread of the virus if parents 
had followed it. 
Fortunately, within a week of his announcement, Laing was forced to change 
his guarded position, and the case numbers were published in The Star. By 18 
November, the total number of polio cases throughout the Union stood at 213, with 
the Transvaal’s 29 cases behind Durban’s estimated 100; the situation was regarded as 
                                                 
35  The Star, 13 Nov. 1944. 
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‘the most serious in years’. Yet the statement denied that infantile paralysis had 
reached epidemic proportions.36 Parents must have felt very edgy and confused by this 
turnaround from the previous week’s secrecy. The following day, the Department of 
Public Health intervened, ‘fully alive’, it declared, ‘to the serious increase in the 
number of cases of infantile paralysis’ throughout the Union.37 Case figures dating 
back to 1934 were published, and the Health Department assured ‘co-operation in 
every way’ to limit the incidence of the disease. A warning was issued that people 
should be aware that the virus might be carried in milk and sewage. It added that only 
a few of those infected were likely to develop the disease, and that there was no proof 
of the existence of ‘healthy carriers’.38 In his article on ‘Poliomyelitis’, issued by the 
Department of Health two weeks later, Dr R. Turner contradicted this statement by 
clearly identifying a ‘carrier’ as someone who was already infected with the abortive 
or non-paralytic form of polio. ‘Because of their great infectivity, their large number, 
and because they are unrecognized, they would appear to be the chief sources of 
spreading the disease.’39 
The Star’s editorial chose to side with the health authorities, calling Laing’s 
warning prudent and urging ‘any persons temperamentally inclined’ to avoid taking ‘a 
graver view of the matter’. The onus was once again placed on the parents to ensure 
                                                 
36  The Star, 24 Nov. 1944. 
37  The Star, 25 Nov. 1944. 
38  Ibid. 
39  SAB, GES 533 /2 /12B, 14 Dec. 1944. 
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that their children did not mix with large crowds, to contact the doctor if any 
suspicious symptoms were displayed, and to follow the general rules of health and 
hygiene ‘with a strictness corresponding to the gravity of any particular visitation’. It 
warned that precautions were vital because of ‘a malevolent evil lurking somewhere 
in our midst’.40 The idea of ‘a malevolent evil’ ready to pounce on any child would 
have had the majority of parents on tenterhooks, and not only those of a nervous 
disposition. Naturally parents reacted to these mixed messages; one asked that the 
schools be closed: 
In common with other parents, I have read with considerable anxiety 
the articles on infantile paralysis. The statement by the medical officer 
of health says that it has not reached epidemic proportions in 
Johannesburg, but that the number of cases notified is increasing…How 
many children must contact this appalling disease before the authorities 
will consent to take this simple action? With the example of Durban and 
Cradock before us, are we to wait till all possible harm has been done?41 
Nevertheless, the closure of schools was not a clear-cut decision during epidemics and 
was generally avoided, as medical evidence suggested that closed groups, such as 
schools and hostels, were less at risk to infection than exposure at open gatherings, 
such as parties. As the outbreak had not been confined to any one suburb, school-
closure, ‘as a single measure, without restrictions on other public and private activities 
                                                 
40  The Star, 25 Nov. 1944. 
41  The Star, 29 Nov. 1944. 
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where children and adults may congregate in numbers, would serve no useful 
purpose’, announced Mr H.H.G. Kreft, Director of Education for the Transvaal.42  
The authorities also requested that Christmas parties be cancelled despite the 
hardship imposed on children.43 Isie Smuts, wife of Prime Minister Jan Smuts, set the 
example by canceling the Soldier’s Orphan’s party for over 1 000 children, which was 
to have been held in the Johannesburg City Hall, but the children were assured that 
toys would be distributed through their parents or guardians. The Crown Mines 
decided to discontinue their annual Christmas treat, primarily because of the difficulty 
in obtaining presents during war conditions.44 Schools were instructed to cancel prize 
ceremonies or hold them outdoors. Should Armistice be declared while the schools 
were in session, a simple service, held in the school hall, was advised.45 Parties in 
orphanages and hostels, however, could go ahead, ‘provided nobody is introduced 
from outside’.46 
Having lost the call for school closure, parents had to wait anxiously until 13 
December, when the normal school term closed for the Christmas holidays. They 
were advised not to let children go to cinemas or swimming baths, and to avoid over-
exertion. For many, restricting the children’s movements was extremely difficult. 
                                                 
42  Rand Daily Mail, 7 Dec. 1944. 
43  Rand Daily Mail, 8 Dec. 1944. 
44  Rand Daily Mail, 9 Dec. 1944.  
45  Rand Daily Mail, 8 Dec. 1944. 
46  The Star, 9 Dec. 1944. 
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Temperatures soared into the 80s for eleven consecutive days; Johannesburg’s highest 
record for water consumption during a single day since 1941 was exceeded.47 The 
swimming baths were overcrowded. One would expect that, within a week to ten 
days, allowing for the incubation of the virus, new polio cases would appear.48 Sadly, 
this was indeed the case. In the week ended 17 December, there were 24 new cases of 
polio in Johannesburg, while numbers in the Union had dropped by 50 per cent.49 
On 28 November 1944, a conference was held at the Johannesburg General 
Hospital to consider steps to be taken to deal with the disease in the Transvaal.50 The 
acting director of the hospital, Dr Hugo, called together various representatives of the 
Union Department of Health, the Provincial Administration and local authorities, as 
well as the Pretoria Hospital. Hugo thought that ‘a cooperative effort of all authorities 
concerned’ would ‘provide a satisfactory defensive barrage to meet this disease’.51 
The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (NFIP), founded in 1938 in the USA, 
was held up as a good example of the way ‘war’ against polio could be managed. 
                                                 
47  The Star, 12 Dec. 1944. 
48  J. Trueta, Handbook of Poliomyelitis (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1956), p. 16. 
Incubation of polio could take from three days up to three weeks. 
49  Rand Daily Mail, 21 Dec. 1944. This report gives the figure, since July 1944, as 1560 cases in 
the Union. Note this discrepancy against the figure of 1380, given by ARMOH, 30 June 1945, 
p. 18. 
50  The Star, 28 Nov. 1944.  
51  The Star, 29 Nov. 1944. 
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Delegates at the meeting were especially impressed with the NFIP’s pronouncement 
that ‘no poliomyelitis victim must be allowed to be without medical care because of 
the lack of money’.52 
As cases increased, so the shortage of hospital staff became a concern. Laing 
placed a notice in The Star seeking volunteers to help with the nursing of polio 
patients in Johannesburg. He required either partly trained and untrained nurses, or 
women who had some experience of children. A bonus amount would be added for 
nursing in the contagious wards.53 The response was immediate. Within hours, 
sufficiently trained women had been found. Some married nurses were willing to 
return to the profession for a while; one firm in Johannesburg offered a trained nurse 
employed on its staff.54 By 20 December, authorities declared that recruits were 
plentiful and that the names of qualified nurses would be taken for later consideration. 
It must have been encouraging to parents and authorities alike when so many nurses 
were prepared to respond to the needs of the polio patients, despite the risks posed by 
the disease.55  
With the schools closing on 13 December for the Christmas holidays, 
important precautions were set in place. Cape Town made special arrangements to 
keep Transvaal visitors in isolation for at least a week after their arrival at the coast. 
                                                 
52  The Star, 28 Nov. 1944. 
53  The Star, 14 Dec. 1944. 
54  Rand Daily Mail, 15 Dec. 1944. 
55  Rand Daily Mail, 13 Oct. 1944. 
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The number of polio cases in Cape Town had dropped, and it was hoped that this 
measure would prevent any further infection.56 In the Transvaal, however, many 
children remained at home: their parents cancelled the annual holiday rather than 
expose them to tiring journeys or possible infection. 
The South African Railways (SAR) agreed to remove hand and roller towels 
altogether from passenger trains during the epidemic. It also arranged for floors of the 
carriages to be cleaned each day, and for the leather to be wiped down with a 1 in 40 
disinfectant solution.57 The SAR disallowed the visitation rights of black ‘nurse 
maids’, who previously were permitted to spend part of the journey in the 
compartment with their wards: ‘not that this option was used that often’, a spokesman 
for the Railways admitted. ‘Only 280 permits had been granted for this privilege over 
the past year’, he added, according to Western Transvaal System records.58 The 
Department of Health did point out to the Railway Health Office, that ‘the “non-
European” cannot be regarded as the source of the infection of infantile paralysis; in 
                                                 
56  W.K. Bettzieche, ‘Polio, People and Apartheid: The South African Poliomyelitis Epidemics of 
the 1940s and 1950s with Special Reference to the Cape Peninsula’ (BA Honours thesis, 
University of Cape Town, 1998), p. 35. The average incidence of polio in Cape Town 1944-
1945 was 13. 
57  Rand Daily Mail, 9 Dec. 1944; ARDOH, year ending 30 June 1945, p. 18. 
58  SAB, GES, 533 163/2/12B, Letter of South African Railways to Secretary of Health, 9 Jan. 
1945. 
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fact, perusal of the Department’s weekly bulletins would show that ‘approximately 
twice as many “Europeans” as “non-European” cases are reported’.59  
Every notification from the health department underlined the importance of 
personal hygiene. Polio had singled out the middle class and wealthy, so something in 
this more sanitised environment needed to be examined as the possible carrier of the 
poliovirus. Some house-proud mothers developed an exaggerated passion for 
cleanliness, instilling peculiar ideas in their young children, such as the need to line 
the toilet bowl with toilet paper to prevent any splash-backs which might carry the 
virus. In public toilets, it was thought prudent to perch on top of the seat and to avoid 
any contact with the ‘disease ridden seat’.60 Kissing on the mouth was regarded as 
inadvisable, and children were discouraged from picking up anything off the street or 
touching balustrades. One polio survivor recalls that her mother would never discuss 
her illness with her, and she assumes that her mother felt responsible for allowing the 
virus into their ‘spotless’ home.61 There was a strong element of shame in polio, both 
for the sufferer and the family.62 Mothers – who were constantly reminded by the 
press, by family doctors and, no doubt, by neighbours and friends, that flies were the 
cause of disease – became fixated with the idea that if they allowed flies into their 
homes, they would be responsible for any ensuing illness. 
                                                 
59  SAB, GES, 533 165/2/12, 19 Jan. 1945. 
60  Interview with K. Sauer, 10 Apr. 2005. 
61  Interview with E. Broido, 5 Aug. 2003. 
62  This aspect of the disease will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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Although the support of the public was vital in combating the epidemic, the 
medical profession in the 1940s seemed reluctant to admit its limitations. It has been 
suggested that their ‘use of technical language and their reference to colleagues in the 
United States served to close the medical community off from the public and 
positioned doctors as the gate keepers of scientific knowledge’.63 Two ‘distinguished 
Johannesburg doctors’, writing to the press, suggested that both preventative and 
clinical decisions be placed wholly in the hands of professional medicine. They 
added:  
The belief on the part of the South African public that infantile paralysis 
is a mystery disease – a kind of V2 of illness – and that almost nothing 
is known about it, is not borne out by the facts.64  
The doctors went on to explain the basic outlines of the disease, starting with the 
inaccuracy of the term ‘infantile paralysis’ itself, and pointing out how few of the 
cases actually had paralytic results. The high incidence of mild undiagnosed cases was 
a mere ‘trifle’, with symptoms similar to a mild attack of influenza. The addition of 
these ‘harmless’ cases to the statistics of the paralytic cases, they believed, ‘distorted 
the view of the disease’; the population was largely immune. The article was aimed at 
informing the public, but it was also a ploy to downplay parental concerns. Medical 
science, they continued, had made great advances and was working on a means of 
prevention. 
                                                 
63  Anon., ‘Science, Civics, and Cripples: Polio in the Transvaal, 1944-1948’, unpublished 
manuscript, pp. 17-19.  
64  Rand Daily Mail, 11 Dec. 1944. 
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A vaccine has been prepared from the virus and this has successfully 
protected rats against the induction of the disease. It is not 
unreasonable, therefore, to expect that such a vaccine for the protection 
of children against poliomyelitis will be prepared in the not distant 
future – in much the same way this has already been done against 
diseases such as smallpox, typhus, diphtheria, typhoid and tetanus.65 
Polio was not like other diseases, as the doctors well knew, but parents were grateful 
for any mention of a possible cure no matter how misguided or inaccurate it was.66 
Independent action and thinking by lay persons were discouraged; quarantine, the 
‘distinguished doctors’ believed, was ‘a moot point’, as the disease was so widespread 
and the modes of contact so manifold, that ‘any attempt to isolate individuals would 
probably be ineffectual’ and would ‘tend rather to have the effect of producing, in 
children and parents, mental reactions of a neurotic nature towards disease in general’. 
Once again parental concern and anxiety was regarded as ‘neurotic’.  
There is little doubt that this article was aimed at refuting some ideas about 
polio which were ‘currently circulating through the white community’. A suggestion 
has been made that the tone of the article also subtly separated medical knowledge 
from the ignorance of the masses, by the implication that medical professionals must 
                                                 
65  The Rand Daily Mail, 11 Dec. 1944. 
66  J.R. Paul, A History of Poliomyelitis (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), 
p. 261. Due to the tragic failure of the Brodie and Kolmer vaccines in 1935 human vaccine 
trials were halted. ‘The subject of human vaccination had received such a blow that attempts 
to reopen it in the decade following 1935 would have been regarded with horror’.  
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overturn public ignorance. The article concluded with the idea of scientific research as 
the ‘heroic cure-all’.67 The superior knowledge of the medical profession was 
emphasised by the announcement that both doctors had made a point of keeping 
informed about research developments in the United States. 
The authorities needed to play down anxiety about the disease. They had very 
little choice. Twenty-five years after the 1918 epidemic, neither the source nor the 
cause of polio was yet understood. The only consolation was that all countries 
experiencing polio epidemics at this time were in the same boat. Authorities realised 
that it was vital to display a united front when handling polio. 
The National Council for the Care of Cripples in South Africa held an 
executive committee meeting in Cape Town on 22-23 January 1945 to discuss the 
epidemic. It was suggested that during future polio epidemics, the Johannesburg Fever 
Hospital should work in close contact with the Transvaal Cripple Care Association, 
which in turn would liaise with the Johannesburg Municipality to establish 
orthopaedic clinics and after-care for convalescent polio cases. It was hoped that the 
Department of Public Health might subsidise the province for the supply of 
orthopaedic appliances. Another concern was that full use had not been made of 
orthopaedic nurses during the epidemic.68 The Orthopaedic Surgeons Group, formed 
in July 1942, wanted a closer relationship with Cripple Care so that orthopaedic 
                                                 
67  Anon., ‘Science, Civics, and Cripples’, p. 18. 
68  Minutes of the Executive Council Committee Meeting held at the Council Chamber, 
Government Archives, Cape Town on 22 and 23 Jan. 1945 at 9.30 a.m. 
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surgeons could be involved with treatment in the early stages of the disease.69 Such 
involvement of the various official bodies emphasised that the infrastructure begun in 
the 1930s was still intact and growing because of first-hand experience of polio.  
Another essential requirement in facing polio was research into the disease. At 
the request of Dr Gear, local authorities throughout the Union were asked to complete 
questionnaires on notified polio cases so that a comprehensive profile of the disease 
could be drawn up which would help to investigate polio within the South African 
context. Details on the name of the patient, location, race, age and sex were to be 
supplied, as well as information concerning the outcome of the disease in each 
individual: death or recovery, and the degree of residual paralysis, if any.70 Gear 
would then collate all the information to form part of a scientific study. 
Citizens were also invited to become more proactive in order to compensate, 
in some way, for the overwhelming sense of uselessness during the epidemic. 
                                                 
69  G.F. Dommisse, To Benefit the Maimed: The Story of Orthopaedics and the Care of the 
Crippled Child in South Africa (Johannesburg: The South African Orthopaedic Association 
and the National Council for the Care of Cripples in South Africa, 1988), p. 110. 
70  SAB, GES, 533, 227 and 231/2/12 C; correspondence between Dr Gear, the Secretary for 
Public Health, and Johannesburg Public Health Department, 8 June 1945, 14 June 1945 and 
22 June 1945. 
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6.4 ‘The Only Good Flies are Dead Flies’71 
As we have seen in 1918, when the source of disease was not clear, blame was placed 
on familiar carriers of disease, in this case the fly.72 The fly theory implicated the 
mother as housekeeper; if houses were clean they did not have flies. The fly’s role in 
the spread of polio had been raised as early as the 1916 New York epidemic73 and 
during the 1918 polio epidemic. Research in this area had continued in the interwar 
period. By 1943 articles once again linked the fly with polio. Researchers claimed to 
have observed the presence of the virus in flies collected at epidemic centres in the 
USA, and considered this as a possible avenue of transmission, similar to other 
excremental diseases such as enteric and dysentery.74 Now Durban authorities, 
encouraged by local medical opinion, listed ‘fly vectors, person-to-person contact and 
food-handlers’ as the main channels of transmission and added polio to the list of fly-
borne diseases.75 In this way, they strengthened the fly debate for other provinces. 
                                                 
71  The Star, 22 Dec. 1944. 
72  ‘Poliomyelitis’, SAMJ, vol. 18 (25 Nov. 1945), p. 375. Trask and Paul claimed scientific proof 
that flies were proven vectors and that it was as likely during an epidemic to trap the virus on 
flies as in sewage. 
73  Ibid, p. 189. ‘Flies that supposedly spread the polio germ by flying in only one direction, from 
the slums to the suburbs.’ 
74  Paul, History of Poliomyelitis, p. 293. 
75  SAB, GES, 533 2/12/B, Control Programme, MOH, Dr G.H. Gunn, 12 Oct. 1944. 
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Although there were many aspects of polio on which medical men disagreed – 
the term ‘infantile paralysis’ being an example – ‘right or wrong, they are agreed that 
flies are carriers of the disease’.76 ‘War on Flies’ became the slogan as the next ‘Swat 
the Fly Campaign’ was announced nationally.77 Radio talks, slide shows in cinemas, 
newspaper articles78 and street posters were used to educate the people about the 
‘deadly nature of the common housefly and the need to eliminate it’.79 Anti-fly ditties 
reinforced the message of fly annihilation. Fly swatters, traps, sprays and screens 
fitted to doors and windows, were promoted. The efficacy of DDT as a successful 
insecticide was broadcast. By marketing the image of the fly regurgitating on food in 
the family kitchen and leaving its excreta in ‘flyspecks’ on surfaces and walls, people 
were horrified to discover that ‘a single buzzing Musca domestica can infect a whole 
household’.80 The fly campaign intensified the association of dirt with disease. It 
enabled authorities to develop a specific approach to anti-polio work and provided a 
subject for research on the spread of polio. It also offered a broader explanation of the 
disease, as well as bringing in other specialists like entomologists. Psychologically it 
                                                 
76  The Star, 12 Dec. 1944. 
77  Cape Argus, 12 Dec. 1944. 
78  Sunday Times, 5 Feb. 2006. The 100th Year Commemorative Sunday Times Publication, Part 
One: 1906-1931, p. 8. This publication efficiently comments effectively on the various anti-fly 
campaigns started by the newspaper as early as 1913; The Star, 14 Dec. 1944. 
79  The Star, 12 Dec. 1944. 
80  The Star, 26 Dec. 1944. 
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was an effective way to ‘bring down to size the epidemic by offering a visible and 
manageable target’.81 
Various methods of fly control were discussed. Dr F.W.P. Cluver, a public 
health authority in Durban, thought that the fly-larvae should be targeted. This set in 
motion an animated debate on the subject of flies in The Star: ‘A female fly can, 
within one summer, have 18 million, million descendants and every one of them a 
potential carrier.’82 ‘All the fly-paper, fly-sprays and swatters in the world would not 
lessen the risk of infection.’83 In short, ‘flies can breed faster than humans can swat 
them’.84 
Dustbins, in particular, were thought to be the favoured haunts of the fly for 
breeding purposes, as well as compost heaps and manure. It was suggested that these 
should be covered with soil and manure dug well into the garden. Two Johannesburg 
residents described fly-traps that they had designed: one lured flies with a bed of 
manure above a tin, which caught the larvae as they fell through; the other, designed 
by a mine compound manager, was a gauze trap attached to the dustbin’s lid. ‘The 
smell emanating from the dustbins’ lured flies through small gaps into the trap, which 
                                                 
81  Rogers, Dirt and Disease, p. 57. 
82  The Star, 22 Dec. 1944. 
83  The Star, 26 Dec. 1944. 
84  The Star, 29 Dec. 1944. 
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could be cleaned out once a month’.85 A Star correspondent advised readers when 
swatting flies to ‘aim half an inch behind a fly as owing to the construction of his legs, 
he has to take off backwards before he can fly forwards’.86 ‘Battle prose’ was a 
characteristic of the ‘Swat the Fly Campaign’. A Star correspondent, strongly ‘anti-
swatting’, expostulated:  
Your correspondent is like a general who abandons all strategy and 
tactics in the belief that the war simply consists of killing as many of 
the enemy as you can. Such a general might find himself outflanked’.87  
Yet another claimed that flies could be caught more effectively by switching on the 
bathroom light, closing all doors and windows, plunging the house into darkness and 
spray: ‘drive flies into the lighted bathroom which was then sprayed cutting off the 
flies last line of retreat.’88 
By-laws already existed to limit animals in the suburbs of Johannesburg. Now 
neighbours keeping cows, horses and poultry were blamed for the increase in flies. ‘I 
would like to point out that the suburb of Highlands North is swarming with flies’, 
one resident complained. ‘Cattle graze beside our fences and horses are frequently 
                                                 
85  The Star, 20 Dec. 1944. 
86  The Star, 23 Dec. 1944. 
87  The Star, 29 Dec. 1944. 
88  The Star, 28 Dec. 1944. 
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paddocked in close proximately to our houses.’89 Authorities were asked to ensure that 
each household rid the premises of the ‘fly menace’.90 A correspondent to The Star, 
Dr K. Chapman, thought the only way this could succeed was to have experts ‘with 
mass-scale weapons like traps’, used on a sufficiently large scale, to get the fly 
population ‘on the run’.91 Under the headings of ‘Refuse disposal’, ‘Human 
excrement’, ‘Household refuse’, ‘Stable refuse’ and ‘Flies’, Dr Eustace Cluver, 
Director of the SAIMR, explained rather elaborately the correct way to site privies 
‘where humans are aggregated together and where there is a danger of putriscibility of 
organic matter which could lead to the breeding of flies and spread of diseases’. He 
also offered a diagram of a fly trap for effective control.92  
War-time restrictions, however, inhibited really effective measures against 
flies. Steel gauze was in short supply.93 As a result, The Sunday Times advocated a 
more frivolous measure. During the Fly Campaign residents were encouraged to send 
dead flies, ‘without the flypapers and sticky traps’, to the municipal health department 
                                                 
89  ‘The Star, 26 Feb. 1944. 
90  The Star, 28 Dec. 1944. 
91  The Star, 29 Dec. 1944. 
92  E.H. Cluver, Public Health in South Africa, 4th edition (Johannesburg: Central News Agency, 
1946). 
93  The Star, 14 Dec. 1944. 
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to be weighed. A prize was awarded to the person who killed the highest number of 
flies.94 
The issue of flies also raised the question of contaminated food, which became 
a further source of concern to both authorities and consumers. Food created a sense of 
intense vulnerability. The health authorities advised that milk be boiled and fruit and 
vegetables washed in potassium permanganate.95 Even ice-cream was cited as a 
culprit, having ‘been proved to be responsible for scarlet fever, typhoid fever and 
diphtheria’.96 An individual, resentful of war-time restrictions, suggested that 
malnutrition, especially the lack of meat, was a contributory factor to polio: ‘too long 
have the speculators run things because the Government does not keep on paying the 
subsidy for meat’.97 Food neuroses fed into the racism of whites, never far from the 
surface. During the war there was a shortage of milk bottles, and householders 
supplied their own containers into which the milk was decanted. Milk delivery, 
according to ‘Pro Bono Publico’, was a contributing factor to ‘the existing prevalence 
of epidemics’ because of ‘the milk delivery boy of filthy habits … who produces a 
dirty piece of wire from a pocket of a filthy pair of trousers and stabs his milk tops, 
                                                 
94  The Sunday Times, 5 Feb. 2006. 
95  Interview with B. Durlacher, 13 Aug. 2002. 
96  The Star, 26 Dec. 1944. 
97  The Star, 4 Dec. 1944. 
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placing the same piece of wire on the ground while he pours the milk’ into the 
container.98 
At a medical conference in Durban in 1946, Gear questioned the importance of 
flies as vectors of polio. He reasoned that one would have expected the incidence of 
the disease to be higher in fly-infested areas than was the case. In Johannesburg, the 
lowest incidence of cases was reported from the worst fly-infested suburbs. He also 
expected that incidence would be higher in areas where the bucket system of sewage 
disposal was used, yet this was not supported by any evidence.99 The fly campaign 
might have encouraged a more pro-active approach in handling the epidemic, but 
failed to explain how and why the middle-class clean homes experienced the highest 
incidence of the disease. Cleaner homes and streets did not stop the advance of polio. 
                                                 
98  Rand Daily Mail, 9 Dec. 1944. 
99  J.H.S. Gear, ‘Poliomyelitis in Southern Africa, with Special Reference to the Epidemics of 
1944-1945’ (Paper, 34th South African Medical Congress, Durban, 1946), pp. 14-15. 
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Chapter Seven 
Treatment, the Polio Experience and Research during 
the 1940s 
 
7.1 Use of the Iron Lung during the 1944-1945 Epidemic in Johannesburg 
As the case load increased during December 1944, hospital facilities in Johannesburg 
were strained to their limit. An alarming aspect of this polio epidemic was the 
shortage of iron lungs, while the number of bulbar cases was higher than ever before. 
This form of polio causes respiratory and throat paralysis, which impairs breathing 
and swallowing and often results in death. The increased incidence of respiratory 
problems may have been due to the virulence of the imported virus strain from the 
Middle East. 
During the epidemic, South Africa only had the ‘Both’ iron lungs donated by 
Nuffield, although other manufacturers, such as Emerson, were on the market.1 A 
series of crises forced doctors to improvise. On one occasion, a doctor from Springs, 
with the help of three East Geduld Mine artisans, constructed a ‘lung’ from plywood 
for a critically ill child in the East Rand Hospital. This ‘lung’ was to ‘piggy-back’ on  
                                                 
1  John Emerson had refined Drinker’s device and cut the cost by half. Inside, the patient lay on 
a bed that could slide in and out of the cylinder as needed. The side of the tank had portal 
windows so attendants could reach in and adjust limbs, as required. 
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the electricity supply of a Nuffield iron lung already at the hospital. Working through 
the night, the iron lung was completed within nine hours, sadly just thirty minutes too 
late to save the child.2 A few days later the Nuffield lung itself was struck by 
lightning. Once again the Geduld Mines supplied personnel to replace the blown fuse 
in fifteen minutes. The sister in charge operated the pump manually while the drama 
unfolded. After these emergencies, the East Geduld Mines offered to install and 
maintain any future iron lungs at the hospital. This generosity of spirit, so evident 
                                                 
2  The Star, 14 Dec. 1944. 
 
Illustration 7.1 
 
The Both respirator, now in the Adler Medical 
Museum 
 
Source: P. Joyce (ed.), South Africa’s Yesterdays (Cape 
Town: Reader’s Digest Association, 1981), p. 55. 
‘The chamber of the machine is made out of 
laminated wood and the head and end are 
supported by chromium plated brass tubes 
mounted on castors. The head of the machine is 
fastened by four quick-acting clamps’. The lever, 
below the chamber, adjusts the tilt of the 
machine’. The Both respirator or ‘iron lung’ was 
regarded as the most reliable and practicable 
machine available for mass production at the 
time of the Nuffield gift. The fact that it was 
lighter than machines made of metal made it 
more manoeuvrable. 
 
Source: Medical Research Council, ‘Breathing 
Machines and their Treatment’, Report of the 
Respirators (Poliomyelitis Committee) Special 
Report Series, no. 237 (London: His Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1939), p. 13 and 65. 
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throughout the epidemic years, also came to the rescue of the doctor and his helpers 
while building a second, full-sized iron lung for the hospital. Within days of an appeal 
to the newspapers, a motor was donated, matching the specifics laid down by the 
doctor and his team.3  
When three adult polio cases broke out in the ranks of the South African Air 
Force, in early December, Brigadier A.J. Orenstein requested that twelve iron lungs 
be built by South African engineers at Robert’s Heights in Pretoria. The technicians 
stripped an iron lung and made over 50 drawings of the parts. Improvements were 
made and, by working day and night, the first lung was functioning within eight days 
and sent to the Boksburg Hospital for a needy patient. A week later a further eleven 
iron lungs were manufactured. 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3  The Star, 20 Dec. 1944. 
 
 
Illustration 7.2 
Men of No. 1 Air Depot, Robert’s Heights, at work on the ‘iron lung’ 
 
Source: Rand Daily Mail, 19 Dec. 1944. 
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The next emergency required an iron lung to be sent by air from Durban but 
bad weather delayed its arrival, forcing Orenstein to borrow respiratory equipment 
from the Rand Mine’s rescue station.4 Sir Ernest Oppenheimer stepped in to offer the 
province a gift of 30 iron lungs on behalf of the Transvaal branch of the Red Cross 
Society, Anglo-American and other mining houses, to be part of a pool available for 
any hospital as the need arose.5 By centralising the stock of iron lungs, one expert 
team could manage the servicing, interchange of spare parts and supply.6 To maintain 
uniformity, the ‘Both’ machine which had been highly recommended by the 
Respirator’s British Research Council, was chosen.7 
The iron lungs were usually placed alongside each other, adults and children 
together.8 A teenager described how he witnessed the death-throes of the man 
alongside him as he lay in his own iron lung.9 A twelve-year old remembered the 
                                                 
4  Rand Daily Mail, 9 Dec. 1944. 
5  The Star, 6 Dec. 1944. 
6  SAB, GES, 533 234/1/12C, Correspondence between The South African Red Cross Society 
and Dr Allan, Secretary for Health, 26 Jan. 1945. 
7  Rand Daily Mail, 5 Jan. 1945; technicians from the South African Air Force built these iron 
lungs. 
8  Medical Research Council, ‘Breathing Machines and their Treatment’, Report of the 
Respirators (Poliomyelitis Committee), Special Report Series, no. 237 (London: His Majesty’s 
Stationer’s Office, 1939), p. 65. ‘If there is one thing the study of epidemics of poliomyelitis 
teaches us, it is the value of centralising treatment’. 
9  Interview, G. Thom, 28 Aug. 2002. 
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intense fear he felt when the iron lung was moved next to him, ‘just in case’.10 Other 
survivors remember the sound of the machine. A patient described ‘the loud whine of 
the motor’ like ‘a thrashing machine with a cold’.11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10  Interview with R. Steynberg, 8 Apr. 2005. 
11  http://americanhistory.si.edu/polio/howpolio/ironlung.htm, accessed 6 June 2005. 
Illustration 7.3 
The Both lung 
‘The patient’s head is supported on a pillow placed on a fabric sheet slung between 
two short metal rods fastened to the end of the cabinet. There are two small side 
ports allowing access to the patient. The pump unit is housed separately in a 
cylindrical perforated metal chamber mounted on three castors. A ½ h. p. motor 
drives the bellows through a reducing gear. The motor has a motor car fan belt and 
the bellows are constructed from a standard motor car tyre inner tube’. 
 
Source: Medical Research Council, ‘Breathing Machines and their Treatment’, 
Report of the Respirators (Poliomyelitis Committee) Special Report Series, no. 237 
(London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1939), p. 14. 
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There was a tremendous psychological element at work in all of us in 
our relationship to the lung. The metal respirator assumed an almost 
animate personality and became the symbol of protection and security. 
The idea of leaving it would always make our hearts beat a little faster 
and bring an anxious lump into our throats. We were incomplete 
embryos in a metal womb.12  
Whereas some polio survivors only needed to spend a short period in the respirator to 
assist breathing, a small number relied on it for the rest of their lives.13  
Not all cases with breathing problems needed the iron lung. Respiratory 
complications could be alleviated by positioning the patient at an angle to drain the 
lungs (Illustration 7.4). The rocking bed was widely used overseas, although it is not 
clear whether there was one in any Johannesburg hospitals during the 1944-1945 
epidemic. The bed, driven by an electrical mechanism, could be controlled to rock up 
and down through an arc ranging from five to 30 degrees a number of times per 
minute causing ‘the weight of the abdominal contents to actuate the diaphragm’.14 The 
rocking bed was mainly used in the weaning process of iron lung patients. 
                                                 
12  D.J. Wilson, Living with Polio: The Epidemic and its Survivors (Chicago: University Chicago 
Press, 2005), p. 92. 
13  P. Maylam, ‘Some Reflections on the Life and Career of Christopher Gell’, The Annals of 
Grahamstown Historical Society, no. 23 (1993), pp. 58-65. Christopher Gell is regarded as 
South Africa’s longest-surviving iron lung patient. 
14  Medical Research Council, ‘Breathing Machines and their Treatment’, p. 67. 
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Hand devices were available to assist breathing such as the Oxford inflator. 
Oxygen was delivered from a cylinder via a face mask with a stop cock valve. ‘The 
lungs are inflated with oxygen at a suitable pressure, the stop cock is then engaged 
Illustration 7.4 
The polio bed 
Source: W. Ritchie Russell, Poliomyelitis  
(London: Edward Arnold Ltd, 1956), p. 65. 
Changes of posture were especially 
important in cases of respiratory weakness as 
they reduced the danger of pulmonary 
complications. A complete change of posture 
was desirable every two to four hours. Polio 
patients were especially sensitive to 
movement (hyperaesthesia) which increased 
if they were left in one position. Gentle 
passive movements to all the main joints and 
muscle groups needed to be done, day and 
night in order to reduce the development of 
tight muscles or spasm and help the patient’s 
comfort. 
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which allows expiration to occur by passive recoil of the lungs.’15 
As discussed previously (Chapter Five), bulbar cases could not be placed in 
the iron lung and might require a tracheotomy used in conjunction with intermittent 
positive pressure.16 The tracheotomy was usually an emergency method to clear the 
airway of sudden life-threatening blockages if suction failed to do this. A tube was 
placed into the trachea through an opening made just below the thyroid cartilage of 
the throat. It not only opened the airway but provided easy access to keep passages 
clear by frequent suctioning.17  
Nurses attending patients with breathing inadequacy had to be finely attuned 
to their respiratory needs which placed a great burden on the staff.18 During the first 
few days of respiratory paralysis, patients needed to be treated on a one-to-one basis, 
attended by a doctor as well as at least one nurse. Suction, anaesthetic apparatus, 
intratracheal tubes and tracheotomy equipment all needed to be close at hand. A 
young Johannesburg nurse recalls the stress this imposed: 
One patient I will never forget was in an iron lung and it was a real 
performance to nurse him. Trying to juggle pressure, part care, 
suctioning, feeding and breathing was quite something. Fortunately for 
                                                 
15  Medical Research Council, ‘Breathing Machines and their Treatment’, p. 19. 
16  J. Trueta, Handbook of Poliomyelitis (Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1956), p. 66. 
17  Ibid., p. 83. 
18  J.C. Ross, ‘A History of Poliomyelitis in New Zealand’ (MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 
1993), p. 74. 
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me he had a couple of dedicated staff-nurses who took care of him and 
the nurses were only asked to help turn him, and fetch and carry. The 
sound of the motor haunted me.19 
 
7.2 ‘Straws in the Wind’: Polio Treatments in the 1940s 
Serum, although rejected as ineffective since the 1930s, was again briefly considered 
as a possible treatment. Late in December 1944, a newspaper reported a government 
plan to collect blood from members of the South African Defence Force who had 
recovered from polio, in order to manufacture serum which might prevent the onset of 
paralysis in current patients.20 However, various ‘eminent’ but unnamed medical 
authorities in Johannesburg21 responded to this article with a collective statement 
issued to the local press.22 ‘Asserting their scientific authority and knowledge’, they 
rebuffed any inference that South African medicine was in some way behind this 
report.23 The idea of serum use had been instigated by an ‘official announcement’ 
published in Germany the previous July, to the effect that the only useful precautions 
                                                 
19  J. Pearse, ‘Recollections of a Nurse in Training (1956-60), Part Two’, Adler Museum Bulletin, 
vol. 29, no. 2 (Dec. 2003), p. 17. 
20  Rand Daily Mail, 27 Dec. 1944. 
21  Author unknown: ‘Science, Civics, and Cripples’, p. 20. 
22  Rand Daily Mail, 28 Dec. 1944. 
23  Author unknown: ‘Science, Civics, and Cripples’, p. 20 
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against paralysis were injections of blood serum from recovered patients. The doctors 
were outraged that a suggestion from the ‘enemy’ should have been considered in the 
first place: 
Without further corroboration this German statement should, in our 
opinion, be regarded merely as a piece of wishful thinking or, perhaps, 
as indicative of a desire to do something spectacular without bothering 
about whether it is really useful or not.  
Peter Allan, the Secretary For Health, was less hot-headed about serum in his 
statement on ‘Acute Poliomyelitis’: ‘At best the convalescent serum could only 
produce a passive and therefore presumably short-lived immunity which would be of 
very limited application, while many doubt its usefulness altogether.’24 
Various theories from doctors and the public on how to prevent paralysis – 
other than by the standard means of bed rest and immobilisation – were published in 
newspapers. Dr B.F. Samson, a Durban pathologist, thought that nerve cell 
degeneration could be counteracted with ‘oxygen and an adequate supply of glucose, 
which helped the cells utilise oxygen’. His theory was based on evidence that the 
poliovirus ‘prefers oxygen-free substrata for its activity’.25 If applied shortly after 
paresis (weakening of the muscles), and maintained for three to four days, this might 
lessen the destruction caused by the virus. Sampson was somewhat hesitant, however: 
                                                 
24  SAB, GES, 533 2/12C, P. Allan, ‘Acute Poliomyelitis (Infantile Paralysis)’, circular 673, p. 
11. 
25  The Star, 3 Jan. 1945. 
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But where does all this get us? Even assuming it to be true, what benefit 
in treatment could be derived therefrom? The answer is that we are not 
in so good a position in this disease as to be able to disregard straws in 
the wind. No attack in treatment has been directed against a concept of 
this kind.26 
Sampson seemed to sum up the sense of frustration felt by both medical science and 
practitioners alike during the 1940s, but as Rutty points out, time and time again, it 
was important to be seen doing ‘something, anything’, rather than nothing at all.27  
During and even after the acute stage of the disease, muscle spasm was a 
painful condition and the analgesics used were often insufficient. As observed earlier, 
epidemics can attract unusual ideas about treatment which might even sway the most 
conservative and even-headed doctor. The level of desperation some felt watching a 
child in pain, slowly becoming paralysed or already immobilised, opened doctors to 
experiment with alternative medicine.28 Poison, used by South American Indians for 
centuries, and tried on polio cases in New Jersey to control pain, was one such 
example. A substance, siphoned from a ‘poison tree’ had the ability to paralyse nerve 
endings and, if used in the treatment of ‘infantile paralysis’, the muscles relaxed and 
                                                 
26  Dr B.F. Sampson, ‘A Suggested New Treatment of Poliomyelitis’, SAMJ, vol. 18 (23 Dec. 
1944), p. 421. 
27  This is a major focus of Rutty’s thesis: C.J. Rutty, ‘“Do Something! Do Anything! 
Poliomyelitis in Canada, 1927-1962’ (PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1995). 
28  Interview with Dr X, 22 Nov. 2002. 
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brought pain relief.29 An interviewee described a treatment with curare which appears 
to be the substance described above. 
One day the doctor arrived and explained that I would be treated by 
curare injections. He explained that this would apparently relax my taut 
muscles and somehow enable the affected muscles to improve and heal. 
For quite a while I was treated in this way. I’m not sure whether the 
treatment was given daily or at longer intervals. The injection would be 
given and within a minute or two all voluntary muscles in my body 
were completely paralysed. A special nurse remained with me and 
constantly checked my condition. This treatment was the most 
frightening and frustrating experience imaginable. I lay there totally 
paralysed unable to speak or bat an eyelid. Invariably an itch developed 
on my scalp or somewhere and I was powerless to scratch or rub. I was 
unable to tell the nurse of my problem and I lay there helplessly 
enduring this irritation for a few hours until my muscles gradually 
recovered. Luckily no one told me that curare was actually an Indian 
arrow poison and that it was not in favour with many doctors because 
an overdose could kill a patient. I was nothing but a guinea pig for this 
procedure which proved to be of no apparent benefit to me at all. I still 
                                                 
29  SAB, GES, 533 254/2/12A, Die Transvaler, 9 Oct. 1945. ‘Die middel word van ’n gifboom 
gemaak wat die eienskap besit om senupunte te verlam. Die uitwerking hiervan op 
kinderverlamming is om die spiere te laat verslap en verligting mee te bring.’ 
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do not understand how my muscles coped with breathing and how my 
heart managed to continue beating on those occasions.30 
Although there was little evidence as to the efficacy of some treatments ‘doctors 
needed to convince themselves, their patients and their families that everything 
possible was being done’.31 
We have seen that epidemics elicit responses from all levels of society. The 
lay public, united in fear and concern for their children, were keen to become 
involved in the ‘fight against polio’. Earlier medical victories over other infectious 
diseases such as malaria, and the discovery of infection-fighting drugs, such as anti-
biotics and ‘magic bullets’, used against venereal disease, engendered a sense of 
heightened expectation for medical expertise. ‘It was a kind of implicit contract’: 
medicine’s explanatory power offered emotional reassurance which increased faith in 
medical ideas.32  
Polio, the mystery disease, had broken that trust. Parents criticised doctors and 
the authorities. ‘Since the epidemic began [medical authorities] have not been able to 
give the public a clear statement’ about polio.33 Yet we have seen that many 
                                                 
30  Letter written by R. Steynberg, 8 Apr. 2005. 
31  T.M. Daniel and F.C. Robbins (eds), Polio (New York: University of Rochester Press, 1997), 
p. 58. 
32  C. Rosenberg,. Explaining Epidemics and Other Studies in the History of Medicine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 285. 
33  Rand Daily Mail, 13 Dec. 1944. 
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statements were made. The sad truth was that no one could explain the disease nor 
could anything stop it – once inside the human body, polio carried on its destructive 
work. Laypeople came forward to reassure parents. Some suggested alternative 
remedies which might help, others were sure that their own testimonies about polio 
would encourage parents not to give up.34 
No matter how unusual lay comments were, the Department of Health appears 
to have replied to some letters from the public and rather diligently filed others. Dr 
Allen interviewed a German nurse, Sister Baumann, who had arrived in South Africa 
in 1939. She hoped to find a remedy for polio by experimenting on live cats. ‘Her 
line’, Allen wrote in the margin of the memorandum, ‘is to cut various nerves and 
study the results to the spinal cord’. The fact that Baumann claimed that a respected 
Cape Town doctor ‘had offered to co-operate with her’ and that she was collecting 
funds towards her research could be the most plausible reason why this memorandum 
was even sent to records.35  
A resident in Marquad claimed that ‘donkey milk, taken every two hours while 
still warm’, had cured several children of ‘infantile paralysis’.36 Another advised, in 
all seriousness (although she accepted that it sounded laughable), that ‘Bel Gries,’ 
mixed with cuttings of cat hairs and smeared on the skin, behind the neck to the small 
                                                 
34  The Star, 20 Dec. 1944. 
35  SAB, GES, 533 238/2/12, memo for record from Dr P. Allen to the Chief Control Officer. 
36  SAB, GES, 533,109/2/12B, letter from D.J. Gouws to the Department of Health, 26 Nov. 
1944. 
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of the back, had cured an infant of ‘infantile paralysis’, twelve years earlier. One 
needed to ‘[c]ombine this with ‘Sinkpyn Spesifiek at the required dosage as set out on 
the bottle’.37 
Doctors were in the unenviable position of having to use a similar, limited 
arsenal of medication in treating polio patients which had hardly changed from the 
1918 epidemic. The eminent polio researcher, J.R. Paul, remarked: ‘It is clear … that 
contemporary physicians, in their efforts to do something, had allowed themselves to 
drift into a posture of trying to treat the acute disease in a mood of desperation not of 
wisdom, let alone one based on scientific principles.’38 
Fortunately an area of medicine that was beginning to develop was 
physiotherapy. A philosophy of rehabilitation emerged in the 1940s which 
emphasised ‘normalising’ people with disabilities to become productive members of 
society rather than to be ‘institutionalised’.39 In the 1940s, there were two opposing 
schools of thought regarding polio treatment. Sister Kenny advocated passive 
                                                 
37  SAB, GES, 533 110/2/12A, letter from Mrs. G. van Niekerk, Randfontein, 27 Nov. 1944. ‘Ek 
het ’n raad wat al die siekte van kinder verlamming genees het. Probeer dit op ’n persoon wat 
reeds kinderverlamming het, dan is ek seker die raad sal dit genees. Die raad is miskien 
belaglik, maar probeer dit maar. Smeer Bel Gries op ’n flennie lap, meng daarby kat haar 
(snipper oor Bel Gries) en slaan dit op van agter die nek af, tot onder by die kruis. Gee dan 
Sinkpyn Spesifiek vir die persoon soos dit op die bottle voorkom.’ 
38  J.H.S. Gear, The History of the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation (Johannesburg: 
Poliomyelitis Research Foundation, 1996), p. 8. 
39  Wilson, Living with Polio, p. 71. 
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movement within the patient’s pain threshold, while orthodox treatment preferred 
immobility and bracing for up to eight weeks to control contracture.40  
As the Kenny method had been turned down by South African medical 
authorities, many polio victims were caught in the middle and subject to the treatment 
of the doctor in charge. An experienced British physiotherapist, Mrs Elizabeth 
Hasketh, who had worked extensively with polio cases in London before war-time 
bombing had forced her to relocate to South Africa, emphasised the need to begin 
treatment early on polio cases before muscle wastage took place. She felt that early 
intervention could see a 50 per cent cure rate. The demand for treatment was evident, 
she added. ‘One has only to walk down a city street with one’s eyes open and see 
children in an iron caliper’ due to polio. Such children could, in many cases ‘become 
an asset instead of a physical drag to a nation’ with the timely intervention of 
therapy.41 Echoing Sister Kenny, a doctor also supported this view, adding that 
experience had shown him that ‘treatment should commence soon after the fever 
subsides’.42 There were only 130 known physiotherapists in South Africa at this 
time;43 Mrs Hesketh called physiotherapy ‘the Cinderella of medicine’ but she was 
encouraged that ‘many leading physicians and surgeons’ were beginning to regard 
                                                 
40  Ibid., p. 74. 
41  The Star, 7 Dec. 1944, a letter written by Mrs Elizabeth Hesketh, a member of the London 
Executive Society of Physiotherapy, an opinion later supported by L. Erlank, ‘Cripple Care in 
South Africa, Physiotherapy, vol. 4 (Sep. 1948), p. 8. 
42  The Star, 13 Dec. 1944. 
43  The Star, 22 Dec. 1944. 
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physiotherapy more favourably. It was, however, only available to those who could 
afford ‘the generous fees’,44 while hospitals offered such treatment to the poor. It was 
middle-class patients who were excluded from financial help, other than the few who 
remained in hospital or who attended the Hope Convalescent Home and underwent 
private physiotherapy for long periods during recovery – and polio was primarily a 
middle-class disease.45 
7.3 Living with polio 
No one came up with any cures or better alternatives to surgery. So 
shut up from the outside world, my life consisted of long periods in 
hospital and months encased in plaster of Paris. I was given 
insufficient time to physically and mentally rehabilitate myself 
between operations. As far as I was concerned most of the operations 
seemed little more than acts of cruelty.46 
Although many were able to walk out of hospital, others endured months of 
agonising therapy before movement returned.47 Some were never able to walk again 
unassisted, and needed braces, calipers or crutches, or were reliant on a wheelchair. 
                                                 
44  Ibid. 
45  Most interviewees who contributed to this thesis confirmed that physiotherapy sessions were 
paid by their parents. 
46  B. Michel, Footnote to a Dream: Memories of a Musician’s Journey through Adversity 
(Johannesburg: B. Michel, 2002), p. 79. 
47  Interview with G. Thom, 28 Aug. 2002. 
 218
Mobility was not a matter of will power, but a matter of how much damage the virus 
had done to the motor neurons in the early stages of infection and how successful the 
splinting or plaster casting had been in minimising deformities. If muscles had only 
been damaged rather than destroyed, improvement could be expected. Splints and 
plaster casts were temporary measures to maintain neutral muscle position, prevent 
later deformity and diminish pain, while braces or calipers were used to support 
structures in the body which had insufficient muscle control to allow satisfactory 
function. 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 7.5 
Leg brace and corsette 
 
Source: 
http:/milwaukee.brace.nu/Polio/French 
Combo.jpg 
 
 
Illustration 7.6 
A Milwaukee brace, used in the treatment of 
scoliosis of the spine 
Source: 
http://milwaukee.brace.nu/Polio/AtrophyMilwau
kee.jpg 
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Learning to walk became the ‘Holy Grail’ of polio survivors,48 but in order to 
get there it was necessary to learn to stand in braces, regain a lost sense of equilibrium 
and strengthen weakened muscles affected by the disease itself and months of 
inactivity. Crutches were made to measure as were calipers. Enid Foster, a 
Zimbabwean polio survivor, recalls having to place her legs on a large piece of brown 
paper while a technician made an outline of each leg and ‘measured her from toe to 
buttock’ for her calipers.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48  Wilson, Living with Polio, p. 85. 
49  E. Foster, It Can’t Happen to Me (Cape Town: Timmons, 1959), p. 86. Benni Michel was also 
‘measured on brown paper’ and gives the name of the company who made his calipers as 
‘A.C. Miller and Company, Parktown, Johannesburg’: Michel, Footnote to a Dream, p. 61. 
 
 
Illustration 7.7 
Child fitted with a caliper 
Source: http://xserver1.its.mu.edu/images/healthbsp 
Accessed 30 Oct. 2006 
In the 1940s the knee lock was invented 
which radically improved calipers. ‘Built 
into the rods on either side of the knee were 
little metal hinges. These were held rigid by 
spring -loaded catches which slid up, 
released the hinges and allowed the rods to 
bend … if the catches were correctly 
engaged, before standing up, they made a 
soft metallic click. It was a sound that 
governed my life’. 
Source: Michel, Footnote to a Dream, p. 94 
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These details then went to an orthopaedic technician who made the calipers.50 
Orthopaedic boots were necessary to wear with the calipers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50  L. Erlank, ‘Cripple Care in South Africa’, Physiotherapy, vol. 4 (Sep. 1948), p. 8. Due to a 
shortage of technicians, the National Council for the Care of Cripples in South Africa funded a 
five-year training course for five orthopaedic technicians at the Government Limb Factory. 
 
The specially crafted boots helped artificially equalise the 
length of the legs to make walking easier but with the knee 
brace this would be awkward. One senses the concentration this 
young boy is using to maintain his balance. Learning to fall was 
part of the curriculum for learning to walk.  
Polio dramatically affected the growth points in the bones 
which could be corrected by operations to either lengthen or 
shorten bones in younger patients. Otherwise orthotic boots 
would be used for life. 
 
Source: H. Bell, ‘Poliomyelitis Post-Paralytic Treatment-
Orthopaedic Aspect’, SAMJ, vol. 24 (20 May, 1950), p. 384 
 
Illustration 7.8 
Boy with caliper and built-
up boots 
Source: Photostat given by W. 
Bettzieche 
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Being unable to walk was referred to as the ‘iconic disability of polio’;51 
learning to walk again was the benchmark many set for themselves before they would 
acknowledge that they had recovered. It could be a painfully slow process. After 
months of disuse, contracted joints needed straightening before braces could be fitted. 
Stretching was like ‘the rack’.52 Muscles were stretched until a full range of motion 
was achieved. Alan Marshall remembers his mother trying to straighten his contracted 
calf muscles which kept his legs bent at the knees. Daily, he was placed on the kitchen 
table and his mother pushed down on his knees with all her might.53 The pain was 
unbearable.  
Unless muscle exercises were carried out early in polio rehabilitation, 
contractures might become fixed with time and could only be loosened by months in 
plaster and through surgery. The limb was put into a full cast with a slot at the joint 
where wedges could be inserted to slowly force the muscles to release and the joint to 
move. Alternatively the leg would be put into a cast and then, by opening the cast at 
the knee, the leg was forced to straighten a little. The hole was then filled with plaster 
to hold the extension. This could take up to six weeks and the pain was constant. After 
a leg operation Benni Michel described how his ankle was realigned before being 
recast in plaster. The surgeon felt that an anaesthetic was unnecessary as the 
‘procedure was simple’. While Benni lay on the operating table, after the stitches had 
                                                 
51  Wilson, Living with Polio, p. 85. 
52  Ibid., p. 81. 
53  A. Marshall, ‘I Can Jump Puddles’ (Hawthorn: F.W. Cheshire, 1955), p. 17. 
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been removed and the leg cleaned, the surgeon placed Benni’s foot against a wooden 
board that was strapped across his chest.  
Grasping my knee with both hands he pulled firmly towards him so that 
my ankle would remain in the required position for the time required for 
the plaster to set. The severity of the pain exceeded any other I had 
known. I couldn’t believe that this was actually happening to me … it 
seemed to carry on forever. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to muffle his screams someone placed a wad of gauze over his face. ‘I 
 
 
Illustration 7.9 
Post-operative foot plaster 
Source: Photostat received from W. 
Bettzieche 
Although her foot has been operated on, this 
young Hope Home pupil might face an operation 
for another polio deformity, ‘knock knees’, Genu 
Valgam. This deformity is usually a result of 
‘incorrect immobilisation during the acute stage 
of the disease and over-extension of the knee’ 
which develops as the child grows. 
 
 
 
Sources: H. Bell, ‘Poliomyelitis Post-Paralytic 
Treatment-Orthopaedic Aspect’, SAMJ, vol. 24 
(20 May 1950), p. 385; Dr G.T. du Toit, ‘The 
After-Care of Convalescent Poliomyelitis Cases’, 
SAMJ, vol. 19 (9 June 1945), p.193. 
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reflected that even animals are tranquilised prior to painful surgical procedures’.54 
Sadly for Michel, the operation, like most reconstructive and corrective operations he 
had undergone, was a failure. ‘My “pistol-grip” ankle was still “dropped”’.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 7.11 
      
                                                 
54  Michel, Footnote to a Dream, p. 109. 
55  Ibid, p. 111. 
 
 
Illustration 7.10
Post -operative leg plaster 
Michel remembers the boredom of hospital and spending his 
time making puzzles. At the Hope Home schooling continued 
even if one was recuperating from an operation. 
Source: Photocopy supplied by W. Bettzieche; Michel, 
Footnote to a Dream, p. 76. 
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Once the full range of motion had been restored, muscle strengthening 
exercises began. Foster described how the Guthrie-Smith apparatus helped once she 
had passed the painful acute stage of polio.  
She [the physiotherapist] placed a narrow, fitted sling behind my head, 
attaching it to the ropes with steel hooks; next the broadest sling was 
levered under my buttocks, another round my ribs, one round each 
elbow and wrist and two round each leg. Gently easing the cleats, she 
tightened the ropes until my head was clear of the mattress, then my 
legs, then my arms and chest and finally my hips. 
 
 
 
Illustration 7.12 
The wheelchair as an alternative to crutches 
‘Standing encased in steel and leather braces and expected to drag 
ones paralysed limbs along’ was exhausting. ‘With the braces and 
crutches, I faked it; with the wheelchair, I lived’. 
Source: Photostat supplied by W. Bettzieche; Wilson, Living with 
Polio, p. 115. 
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Water was a wonderful aid to the physiotherapist and polio patient. The sense of 
freedom was a happy release after weeks of bed rest, although it was not uncommon 
for patients to fear leaving the safety of their bed. Enid Foster, a non-swimmer, 
The Guthrie-Smith apparatus 
 
‘I was swinging freely, suspended a few inches above my bed and feeling as comfortable as if I 
were lying in a hammock. She showed me how to rotate my body from side to side, in a snake like 
movement. A few other types of exercises and I was lowered again’. 
 
Foster had the apparatus fixed to the ceiling in her bedroom at home and was able to exercise on her 
own, first one leg then the other, keeping it up for hours each day. Gradually the muscles began to 
strengthen. 
 
Source: Photograph supplied by W. Bettzieche. 
E. Foster, It Can’t Happen to Me (Cape Town: Timmons, 1959), p. 98. 
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needed ‘to fight her hydrophobia and polio’.56 An ordinary swimming pool was used 
for exercising polio cases.57 The question was asked why the various mineral water 
springs in the Union were not put to use, ‘some eminently suitable for the 
establishment of a centre specifically catering for cases of infantile paralysis’, but this 
idea was never seriously considered.58 
 
 
 
 
 
       
       
 
 
 
                                                 
56  Foster, It Can’t Happen to Me, p. 160. 
57  Interview with C. Webster, 25 Nov. 2003. Cilla was sent to the Open Air Convalescent 
Hospital in Durban and said that she had to ‘swim’ every day as part of her therapy.  
58  The Star, 3 Jan. 1945. 
 
Illustration 7.13 
 
 
Treatment in the bubble bath at the 
Children’s Hospital 
 
Source: photograph supplied by W. 
Bettzieche 
Water therapy at Tuskegee Institute, 
Alabama, 1946 
 
Source: 
http://americanhistory.si.edu/polio/howpolio/re
hab.htm, accessed 21 Apr. 2005. 
 
Illustration 7.14 
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The polio experience and its treatment were highly individualistic. Many polio 
survivors were too young to recall the acute phase of the illness, and some have fond 
memories of life on the ward and friendships made. ‘It was not all tears and agony. 
Looking back, I am astounded at how adaptable a child is. It was strange going home. 
I remember the new dress my mother made for the occasion. It wasn’t easy living 
with calipers and crutches but, when you are young, you adapt.’59 
The cultural values of the 1940s seem to have influenced the view some polio 
survivors adopted about their situation. Patients have pointed out that methods of 
treatment were seldom explained to them and they were expected to be stoical. ‘We 
weren’t allowed to feel sorry for ourselves. There wasn’t time for that.’60 The cultural 
values of the 1940s made people feel ashamed if they complained too much. Children 
who cried ‘were ostracised as “babies” by other kids’, while overworked nurses could 
become indifferent or abusive.61 ‘It was a culture of denial and suppression.’62 Yet the 
enormous efforts of doctors and nursing staff, who coped with large numbers of 
patients during an epidemic, were noticed. ‘When you can’t do anything for yourself, 
you quickly learn to behave and not annoy the nurse. She did everything for you, she 
                                                 
59  Interview with E. Broido, 19 Aug. 2002. 
60  Wilson, Living with Polio, p. 99. 
61  Ibid., p. 49. 
62  Ibid., p. 99. 
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moved you when you ached, and scratched you when you itched, and you made sure 
you didn’t get her mad.63 
 
 
                                                 
63  Interview with G. Thom, 28 Aug. 2002. A. Cameron remembers the pressure staff were under 
at the Fever Hospital during the 1948 epidemic. She was with a group of six girls who were 
put into an office for lack of space: interview with A. Cameron, 25 Aug. 2002. 
 
Illustration 7.15 
 
 
Self-portrait in bed with polio by John Percival 
 
A depiction of ‘the usual casting process’, on what appears to be a Robert Jones abduction frame, 
designed to lessen strain placed on ligaments and muscles. The artist captures the straight-jacket-
like treatment, spread-eagled and naked, in total subjugation to the disease while his anxious 
mother sits at his bedside. The ornate detail on the bed suggests that he was treated at home; the 
second figure is possibly a nurse on her daily rounds. 
 
Source: M. Shell, Polio and its Aftermath: The Paralysis of Culture (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), p. 47. 
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Once discharged from hospital, it was not always easy to reintegrate into the 
family unit. Polio also dramatically affected those closest to the survivor. Siblings 
could feel excluded and resentful because of the changed family routine. Parents felt 
guilt and remorse, sometimes blaming themselves ‘for allowing the disease to 
happen’. M. Goldfain, a Delmas farmer, remembers that his children had played near 
a seeping septic tank. ‘My wife and I always wondered whether that was how they 
contracted polio or from recent inoculations.’64 After rushing his eldest daughter to the 
Fever Hospital, he left his wife at her bedside to return for his twin boys who were 
ailing. For the Goldfain family, the 1944-1945 epidemic was life-changing. The little 
girl died within three days and the boys were severely paralysed, although they 
regained some degree of movement. ‘My wife never recovered, she had a nervous 
breakdown and was admitted to Tara [a hospital for emotional disorders in 
Johannesburg]. The farm was sold so that the boys could receive therapy in 
Johannesburg.’65 Driven by guilt or emotional pain, some parents never came to terms 
with the changes polio inflicted upon their child. Benni Michel’s father could not 
come to terms with his son’s disability and became abusive. ‘Since I was a physical 
cripple I felt that unless I steered clear of my father he would reduce me to a mental 
cripple too.’66 Other parents refused to speak about the illness.67 
                                                 
64  Interview with M. Goldfain, 27 Aug. 2002. 
65  Ibid. 
66  Michel, Footnote to a Dream, p. 123 and p. 81. 
67  Interview with E. Broido, 19 Aug. 2002. 
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And yet, once past the agonising trials of the disease, many excelled at what 
they chose to do later in life. It started with small victories over body and mind. 
‘Polio, I was to discover, is full of minor triumphs … the joy of being able to make 
the smallest movement, after a period of immobility, is indescribable.’68 
Others, however, refused to speak about the illness.69 ‘Polio paralysed and 
withered limbs and twisted torsos…young men and women had to find ways to 
surmount their internalised sense …de-formed, dis-eased, dis-abled, dis-ordered, ab-
normal and …in-valid.’70  There was perhaps something in addition to early physical 
disability, hospitalisation and isolation that resulted in some survivors becoming 
sensitive to criticism and failure. But evidence also suggests that the prevailing social 
and medical culture – ‘the culture of denial and submissiveness’ – drove individuals 
to overcompensate. ‘If the doctor suggested that you could not do something, you 
wanted to prove him wrong’.71 
                                                 
68  Foster, It Can’t Happen to Me, p. 27. 
69  Interview with E. Broido, 19 Aug. 2002. 
70  Wilson, Living with Polio, p.119. 
71  J.H. Smith, ‘Fear, Frustration and the Will to Overcome: A Social History of Polio in Western 
Australia’ (PhD, Edith Cowan University, 1997), p. 391. 
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7.4 Dr James Gear, ‘that Hallmark of a Genius’72 
In December 1944, James Gear and his team successfully transferred the poliovirus to 
a monkey.73 This success launched Gear’s future research programme into polio 
which would become extremely successful in South Africa and abroad. As the war 
was drawing to a close and having experienced the need first hand to become 
involved in polio research, Gear thought that it would be worthwhile to investigate the 
disease as it occurred in South Africa. The Virus and Rickettsial Diseases Research 
Unit of the SAIMR headed this research in collaboration with the State Health 
Department, the Johannesburg and Germiston Health Departments and the Fever 
Hospital.74 
It was evident that in tropical and subtropical countries, polio did not give rise 
to extensive epidemics. The disease occurred sporadically and the age at which cases 
                                                 
72  J.H.S Gear, ‘Some Highlights of Medical Technology in Southern Africa’, Presidential 
Address: The first South African Scientific Congress of the Society of Medical Laboratory 
technologists of South Africa, The S.A. Journal of Medical Laboratory Technology, vol. 14, 
no.3 (1968), p. 15. Gear described a scientist as someone with: ‘Luck … a fanatical interest in 
what he was doing and that hallmark of genius, never-ending patience and an infinite capacity 
for taking pains. He also had an expectant mind, tuned to the possibility of success, a seeing 
eye and an understanding heart’, all qualities Gear possessed in abundance and which were 
recognised and valued by fellow scientists both local and abroad. 
73  J.H.S. Gear and R.M. Yeo, ‘Studies in Poliomyelitis’, SAMJ, vol. 20 (11 Aug. 1945), p. 262. 
74  J.H.S. Gear, The History of the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation (Johannesburg: 
Poliomyelitis Research Foundation, 1996), p. 16. 
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were most commonly seen was lower than in the more highly developed countries of 
the temperate latitudes. Dr Albert Sabin (who eventually developed the oral polio 
vaccine), had found that, during the Second World War, American soldiers serving in 
tropical countries had a much higher incidence of paralytic attacks than indigenous 
people. In South Africa, during the 1944-1945 epidemic, a similar pattern between 
black and white cases was noted. Although Gear doubted the accuracy of the black 
figures in South Africa, he had nevertheless noted similar epidemiological trends in 
other African countries where records had been carefully kept.75 In all these regions, 
the incidence of paralysis among the white population was clearly much higher than 
among black communities. 
An analysis of the age distribution of paralytic cases shows that, in the tropics, 
the majority of cases occurred in children under five years of age, while in Canada, 
New Zealand and Australia, there was an increasing number of cases among young 
adults. Gear also noted that an epidemic in Malta in 1942, involving servicemen and 
Maltese children, recorded an elevated mortality rate of 19.3 percent for men in the 
services, in contrast to 3.5 per cent for the indigenous children. He concluded that the 
virus responsible for the epidemic was evidently an indigenous strain. Over the 
following three years, polio spread, most likely as a result of the war-time traffic, to 
the USA, which experienced its worst epidemic since 1916, to South Africa, 
Mauritius, Madagascar and St Helena, and to Australia. 
                                                 
75  J.H.S. Gear and L.M. Rogers, ‘Studies in Poliomyelitis: Poliomyelitis in Northern Rhodesia’, 
SAMJ, vol. 20 (9 Nov. 1946), pp. 670-73. 
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Unlike the USA, which depended on imported monkeys for research, South 
Africa had a plentiful supply of vervet monkeys which were suitable for polio 
research.76 Fortunately most farmers regarded the Cercopithecus oethiops pygerythrus 
as a pest. Dr R.M. Yeo, ex-administrative officer of the South African Medical Corps 
(SAMC), arranged for monkeys to be sent from the Eastern Cape, where Dr C. 
Harington, then Superintendent of the SAIMR in Port Elizabeth, knew several 
farmers. In addition, Dr S. Annecke, Director of the Malarial Research Institute in 
Tzaneen, and his team were able to supply monkeys. A vervet monkey colony was 
established at SAIMR in an old stable vacated by horses which had been moved to 
new stables at the Institute’s property at Rietfontein. A room was also set aside for 
polio work in the SAMC’s laboratory. 
The first aim in elucidating the picture of polio in South Africa was to 
determine the distribution of the virus in the community and its method of spread. In 
February 1945, during the epidemic, there was an outbreak of polio in a small 
children’s home in Johannesburg. One child contracted polio, but Gear and Yeo were 
able to test whether others, in the group of eight children, were carriers of the 
poliovirus by injecting a solution of specimen faeces from each child into several 
monkeys, at staggered intervals over two months. Evidence showed that silent 
infections were present in only two healthy contacts and that this infection persisted 
                                                 
76  Tests were carried out on a monkey in December 1944 using part of the spinal cord of a 38-
year old fatal polio case. Within ten days the monkey showed signs of paralysis. ‘Studies in 
Poliomyelitis’, SAMJ, (11 Aug. 1945), p. 262. The vervet monkey was susceptible to the three 
methods of transference of the virus: intracerebral inoculation, via the nose and intraperitoneal 
inoculation.  
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for at least a month; the rest were clear of the virus. What was not previously realised, 
and something which Gear and his unit established, was that ‘for every paralytic case 
of polio there were at least five to ten non-paralytic cases and even more silent, 
symptomless infections, all capable of spreading the disease’.77 It also explained why 
the public health measures adopted to prevent the spread of infection, such as the 
isolation of cases and family contacts, the closing of schools and prohibition of 
children in public places and gatherings had been largely ineffective in spreading the 
disease.78 Another instance which underlined these finding was the case of a young 
boy, a brother of a paralytic case, who left Johannesburg to stay with relatives in the 
country to escape infection. Within two weeks, the relatives’ own four children were 
infected, one of whom developed paralytic polio.79 
The report also carefully described how each monkey was anaesthetised 
before inoculations were given, fitted with a numbered belt for easy identification and 
placed alone, in numbered cages, ‘to eliminate the possibility of cross infection’. Tests 
were also run to determine the distribution of the virus in Johannesburg and to detect 
any non-human sources and their role in spreading the infection. ‘Samples of water, 
                                                 
77  M. Malan, In Quest of Health: The South African Institute for Medical Research 1912-1973 
(Johannesburg: Lowry Publishers, 1988), p. 227. 
78  Gear and Yeo, ‘Studies in Poliomyelitis’, p. 262. 
79  Malan, In Quest of Health, p. 227. 
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sewage, several batches of flies and bird droppings, including from the European 
swallow, were collected and tested but the results were negative in every case’.80 
The unit’s next objective was to trace the transmission of the virus from its source into 
the community. A profile of the contacts could be built up without the masking effect 
of silent carriers so prevalent during an epidemic. An infant girl of 19 months 
suddenly developed polio through no apparent link.81 Her home was in the northern 
suburbs of Johannesburg, relatively isolated from neighbours, on a large plot where 
animals grazed. The house was unscreened and a short distance away from a 
municipal sewage purification plant. There were two other children in the family, six 
and eight years of age. The infant girl was admitted to the Johannesburg Fever 
hospital, with bulbar polio. Within three weeks she began to recover. In the meantime, 
shortly after her diagnosis, her eight-year old brother spent the night at a friend’s 
house where he also attended a birthday party with 14 other children. Two days later 
his legs showed a sign of paresis (muscle weakness) and polio was confirmed. Eight 
days after this, his friend also became ill and died within two days, from respiratory 
complications. The dead boy’s sister also contracted polio and developed paralysis of 
both legs. The unit then tested eight of the other party guests and found that one child 
had suffered an abortive attack of polio, four were well but excreted the virus, and 
three were clear. Gear concluded that personal association with cases or carriers of the 
                                                 
80  Gear and Yeo, ‘Studies in Poliomyelitis’, p. 262. 
81  J.H.S. Gear and B. Mundel, ‘Studies in Poliomyelitis: The Study of an Outbreak of 
Poliomyelitis Occurring in a Suburb of Johannesburg’, SAMJ, vol. 20 (9 Mar. 1946), pp. 106-
110. 
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virus clearly played an important role in the spread of the infection.82 These early 
investigations helped Gear to piece together a model of how the poliovirus was 
transmitted; earlier research thought that any link between the victims of the disease 
was mostly random. Eleven years later, Gear’s results were still relevant to polio work 
and his diagrams were used as an illustration in Trueta’s textbook. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82  Ibid., p. 110. 
 
Illustration 7.16 
Diagram showing the dispersal of the poliomyelitis virus 
among contacts 
 
Source: J. Trueta, Handbook of Poliomyelitis (Oxford: Blackwell 
Scientific Publications, 1956), p. 7. 
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During the 1944-1945 epidemic, Gear was supplied with as much information 
on the polio cases as possible. Completed questionnaires from around the country 
were sent to him to analyse. Although he only received half the number of forms sent 
out, he felt that ‘the number was sufficiently large and representative to give a 
 Racial Distribution     Water Supply  
 European  308  City Supply 246 
 Native   135  Borehole 76 
 Indian   17  River 30 
 Coloured  16  Fountain 28 
      Well 23 
 Sexual Distribution     Tank 16 
 Male    245  Spring 11 
 Female   231  Dam 4 
      irrigation 3 
 Distribution of cases     Rail Supply 2 
 Town   344    
 Farm   106    
 Location  18    
 Railway siding  4  Sewerage  
 Small holdings   3  Water-borne 54 
 Native Compound  1  Pail 19 
      bucket 17 
 Type of Residence     Pit 5 
 Good  House  263  Vacuum Tank 4 
 Native Hut  94  Septic Tank 3 
 Poor House  64    
 Flats   14    
 Hotel   7    
 Mine House  1    
 Mine Compound  1    
 Mental Hospital  1    
 Boarding House  1    
Table 7.1 
Sample of the summary of analysis of returns from 476 cases of poliomyelitis, 1944-1945 
 
 
Source: J.H.S. Gear, ‘Poliomyelitis in Southern Africa, with Special Reference to the Epidemics of 
1944-1945’ (Paper presented at the 34th South African Medical Congress, Durban, 1946). 
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complete picture of the epidemic as a whole’.83 The name, race, age, sex, details on 
recovery, residual paralysis or deaths on 476 cases were collated.84 The questionnaire 
included information on home conditions, what food had been eaten prior to infection 
and even how it had been prepared. In his usual meticulous way, Gear examined what 
kind of pets and livestock were kept, the nature of the water supply and sewage 
systems, and whether individual households had been exposed to insects – 
endeavouring to understand what might have contributed to the spread of the disease. 
Gear presented a paper on his findings at the Durban Medical Conference the 
following year. 
 
7.5 Other Explorations into the 1944-1945 Polio Epidemic 
Doctors elsewhere in the Union wrote papers about their experiences with the 
epidemic, giving details on a cross-section of cases, discussing the diagnostic signs 
and symptoms, lumbar-puncture results and the progress of the disease up to the 
convalescent stage.85 They, too, attempted to speculate on the transmission of polio.  
                                                 
83  J.H.S. Gear, ‘Poliomyelitis in Southern Africa, with Special Reference to the Epidemics of 
1944-1945’ (Paper presented at the 34th South African Medical Congress, Durban, 1946), pp. 
10-19. 
84  SAB, GES, 533, 231/2/12A Letter from Gear to the Secretary of Health, 22 Jun. 1945. 
85  M.W. Kaplan, ‘Epidemic Poliomyelitis in Durban’, SAMJ, vol. 19 (24 Feb.1945), pp. 55-7; 
M.H. Finlayson and J.F. Wicht, ‘A Case of Suspected Poliomyelitis’, SAMJ, vol. 19 (24 
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Dr J. Henson seemed adamant that the polio vector, in the recent outbreak of 
the disease in Springs, was the fly. ‘It has been shown beyond all doubt that flies can 
carry the virus from such sources as exposed faeces or where the only apparent source 
of infection was refuse bins. In addition, the summer heat and cows grazing nearby 
had exacerbated the fly problem. ‘Most of the cases could have ingested foodstuffs 
contaminated by flies.’86 Significantly, Henson thought that a major predisposing 
factor to polio in the area was the new and relatively non-immune generation of 
children living in rural Springs. The last known polio cases had been 20 years earlier. 
In 1946 Gear followed up on the sewage link to polio, initially to locate the 
poliovirus in the Cydna sewage works in Johannesburg and then to examine the 
distribution of the virus during the process of sewage purification, which passed 
through five stages. To begin with, raw sewage flowed into settlement tanks from 
which raw sludge was drawn off into tanks to digest for 30 days. The settled sewage 
flowed onto sprinkler filter-beds and the effluent from here flowed into humus tanks. 
At this stage the effluent was discharged into streams or rivers and used for land 
irrigation. Some effluent was further purified through a sand filtration process and 
then used for irrigation. Samples taken from each stage were injected into monkeys to 
see whether the disease developed. The results showed that the poliovirus was present 
in sewage until the final stage of purification by sand filtration. Considering that the 
effluent, before the purification stage, was used for irrigation of cultivated lands, Gear 
                                                                                                                                            
Mar.1945), pp. 101-103; J. Henson, ‘An Epidemiological Study of the Poliomyelitis Outbreak 
in Springs, 1944-1945’, SAMJ, vol. 19 (24 Nov. 1945), pp. 422-26. 
86  Henson, ‘Poliomyelitis Outbreak in Springs’, p. 426. 
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warned that all produce grown in such conditions would be suspect, especially 
vegetables such as lettuce, which is usually eaten raw. He thought that it was 
remarkable that the poliovirus was still entering the sewage two months after the last 
recorded polio case in the vicinity. This meant that the poliovirus was still active, 
most likely in silent infections.87 
Gear’s early work into polio is significant for several reasons. Such studies 
had never been done on the disease in South Africa and were thus groundbreaking. He 
realised that one needed to concentrate on how the virus behaved during an epidemic 
in order to understand it better. By focusing investigations on the poliovirus within the 
community, Gear was able to push polio epidemiology beyond the earlier studies 
which concentrated on the disease in Westernised conditions. The South African 
context offered Gear a unique opportunity to investigate the racial incidence of the 
disease extensively. His prediction that black communities would become more 
vulnerable to polio as their living conditions improved was to be borne out in later 
epidemics.  
Gear was one of the ‘new generation’ polio explorers who recognised that 
prophylactic vaccinations, so successful in controlling and preventing other viral 
diseases like smallpox and yellow fever, was the way forward, but he was realistic 
about the time scale involved. ‘It must be confessed, in conclusion’, he declared at the 
Durban conference, ‘that much work remains to be done before we can control and 
                                                 
87  B. Mundel, J.H.S. Gear and D. Wilson, ‘Studies in Poliomyelitis: The Distribution of the Virus 
of Poliomyelitis in a Sewage Purification Works in Johannesburg’, SAMJ, vol. 20 (22 Jun. 
1946), pp. 336-338. 
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prevent this cruel, crippling disease … However there is every reason to hope that the 
desired vaccine will be evolved.’88 
 
                                                 
88  Gear, ‘Poliomyelitis in Southern Africa’, p. 22. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
A study of the early epidemics in Johannesburg is important as it provides a basis for the 
understanding and treatment of polio at a time when little was known about the disease. 
This period in polio’s history could so easily be relegated to a back shelf marked the 
‘Floundering Years’, particularly when compared to the later glorious period of success 
when news of a prophylactic vaccine made headline news and the front page of Time 
magazine.1 By the end of the 1950s, the reality of a vaccine was to defuse, to some extent, 
the overwhelming sense of helplessness which dominated the early epidemics.  
People were in the dark about almost all aspects of polio during the period with 
which this thesis has dealt. Very little was understood about the disease itself. Knowledge 
that the poliovirus had been discovered as early as 1908 was of limited value, and though 
this informed polio research, it offered little help to those who had to live through the 
epidemics and the experience of the disease. For many in Johannesburg, the reality of the 
1944-1945 epidemic was completely novel, while it reminded an older generation of their 
first experience of polio and their dread of the unknown, which was so much part of the 
1918 epidemic. The reality of polio on the streets of Johannesburg gave rise to tensions: 
                                                 
1  Time, 29 Mar. 1954. 
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health authorities did not know how to prevent the spread of the virus; doctors were filled 
with a sense of foreboding, as there was nothing they could do to stop the virus from 
multiplying inside the body; the general public became distraught as daughters, sons, 
school friends, neighbours, mothers and fathers were struck down by the disease within 
the very heart of the community. A terrifying aspect of polio is that it operated within the 
sanitised environment of the home, away from the familiar sources of disease, such as 
squalor and filth. Ironically, the more modern approach to living, with running water, 
water-borne sewage and improved diet, had been carefully prepared by years of public-
health schemes aimed at improving the lot of children. Polio showed up the limitations of 
medical science at the time. Still glorying in recent successes against malaria, yellow 
fever and typhoid, medical authority over disease was brought to its knees by the smallest 
virus yet discovered, which resisted the ‘magic bullets’ and infection-fighting drugs 
which were new to the arsenal of modern medicine.  
Health authorities and doctors in Johannesburg could only operate within the 
boundaries of their understanding of the disease at the time. The Medical Officer of 
Health (MOH) of Johannesburg resorted to using every means available to contain the 
spread of the virus. Quarantine measures, which had already been proved by others to be 
ineffective, were put in place within the municipal boundaries. Fly control measures were 
introduced once it was believed that the fly could be a vector of polio. During the 1944-
1945 epidemic, the Health Department insisted on weekly records of new cases, despite 
inaccurate figures, in the hope that the numbers would soon indicate an end to the 
epidemic. But the MOH of Johannesburg also tried to play down the presence of the 
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epidemic by not publishing records for a short period and advising parents that children 
should live normal lives, a misguided move that did not defuse anxiety. Yet, in the end, 
the trial-and-error approach to the early epidemics helped Johannesburg health officials 
build up a more effective polio policy.  
Doctors also followed a trial-and-error approach. Diagnosis of the disease was 
difficult as the symptoms of polio were similar to those of other childhood diseases. For 
years, the main portal of entry was believed to be the nose, and nasal sprays were used in 
an attempt to prevent the virus from entering the central nervous system. Serums were 
supposed to arrest the virus by boosting the body’s immune system with anti-bodies from 
other polio survivors. Doctors suspected that the intestine was also involved in the 
disease, but were unsure of what role this played. Thanks to the generous gift of Lord 
Nuffield, doctors in Johannesburg at least had an assortment of breathing machines to 
help with patients who developed respiratory problems. Such cases were doomed during 
the 1918 epidemic, but, other than the bulbar cases, most respiratory difficulties usually 
responded to treatment. Pain control and a policy of bed rest remained the core of 
treatment common to both early epidemics. The timely intervention of Sister Kenny and 
her ‘new method’ broke the stranglehold of immobility as the main treatment, and made 
life a little more bearable for the polio patients in future outbreaks. New areas of 
specialisation such as physiotherapy and orthopaedic surgery also helped treat polio 
patients, and Johannesburg was fortunate to have several surgeons with overseas 
orthopaedic training. Cripple care, initiated by wartime needs, became available to polio 
patients and Johannesburg’s Hope Home provided care and schooling for many of 
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Johannesburg’s polio cases throughout the polio years. 
The impact of war on the early epidemics is important. Each outbreak was caused 
by a virus or viruses imported from war zones, which were virulent enough to cause the 
disease to break out of its endemic state and assume epidemic proportions, infecting 
thousands. Wartime conditions were responsible for the rapid transmission of the virus 
and siphoned off vital medical personnel into war service. The fact that South Africa did 
not accept the Kenny method could be partly due to the financial demands of the war, 
although this decision was also influenced by the views from overseas and the fact that 
her method was not scientifically based. The psychological impact of war directed the 
way that polio was viewed on the domestic front. This comes through in the use of ‘battle 
rhetoric’ in local Johannesburg newspaper articles, medical reports in the SAMJ and the 
letters sent to the editor by concerned citizens of Johannesburg. Although the idea of 
disease as the enemy is not new, the wartime epidemics seem to have imposed an 
emotional overlay on the way people interpreted polio.  
The idea that polio was the number one enemy of childhood continued for years 
during the fight against polio. Polio was a hidden enemy, unseen by the naked eye, it 
attacked suddenly, often without warning, and its random choice of victims followed no 
clear battle formation which could be understood and stopped. What made polio so 
terrifying was the fact that it targeted innocent healthy children and young adults; polio’s 
ground troops and main source of transmission were the thousands of unidentified cases 
who were unaware that they had been infected. Polio tested the trust that people placed in 
medical science, it profoundly tested family relationships and brought into question the 
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way in which health authorities were viewed as guardians of public health. Above all, so 
many individuals were robbed of childhood aspirations and dreams by the disease as it 
changed their lives and the lives of those closest to them.  
As epidemics returned, polio shifted beyond infants to older age groups, and 
spread from whites to all groups in the country. The number of cases among blacks grew 
proportionately during 1944-1945, and was to increase further in the subsequent decade. 
Johannesburg remained the city with the highest number of cases. In 1945, white cases 
were ten times higher than those among blacks. One important avenue for future research, 
in order to gain a more complete picture of polio, is to explore the disease on a national 
level, and in particular how it affected blacks.  
The first-hand experience of polio gained during the early epidemics in 
Johannesburg prepared the community for future outbreaks, and, despite the level of 
apprehension and dread, there were positive repercussions. The emphasis laid on 
ineffective quarantine methods was reviewed and fine-tuned where possible. Improved 
methods of pain control were developed by doctors at the Johannesburg Children’s 
Hospital based on observations made during these two epidemics. Ordinary doctors 
became researchers, contributing to the knowledge of polio as it occurred in areas close to 
Johannesburg, in Natal and Cape Town. And, perhaps most importantly, a new leader, 
James Gear, responded to the medical crisis of wartime polio by emphasising the need for 
systematic and detailed research. With Gear’s decision to continue in polio research at the 
SAIMR, Johannesburg became the centre of polio research. With Gear at the helm, and a 
plentiful supply of monkeys, polio research was to develop rapidly after 1945. It was at 
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the instigation of Gear that plans for specialised laboratories were taken seriously after a 
new and even more serious epidemic struck Johannesburg during 1948, and plans to build 
the Poliomyelitis Research Institute were finalised. 
Despite their fear, Johannesburg’s parents – one of the groups hardest hit by 
epidemic polio – developed an ‘epidemic mentality’. It was the determined spirit of war-
time, combined with intense frustration, fear and the threat the disease posed to their 
children, which united the community of Johannesburg. One of the biggest fund raising 
events ever held in Johannesburg, started in 1948 to raise money to build the 
Poliomyelitis Research Institute, succeeded because of this united front and determined 
effort to conquer the threat of polio. 
One could argue, since the early epidemics in Johannesburg were separated by a 
gap of 26 years during which polio receded, Johannesburg experienced two ‘first’ 
epidemics, with all the drama, confusion and suffering such events command. The later 
1944-1945 epidemic received more attention in polio literature, while the 1918 epidemic 
remained cocooned in time, its part in the history of polio in Johannesburg largely 
ignored because of incomplete records. 
In 1949, the long-awaited breakthrough in polio research was made by American 
researchers, J.F. Enders, T.H. Weller and F.C. Robbins, who cultivated the poliovirus in 
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‘non-nervous tissue’2 which directly accelerated vaccine research.3 After 40 years of 
battling the disease in the gloom of unknowing, the first polio vaccine was developed in 
the USA in 1954. Gear’s groundbreaking research based on the 1944-1945 epidemic and 
later work on developing a South African vaccine played a significant part in the world-
wide fight against polio. 
In South Africa, meanwhile, the epidemic in 1944-1945 highlighted how little was 
known about the virus: its physical and biochemical properties had not yet been clearly 
defined; its method of spread was still uncertain; and culturing the virus needed a great 
deal of time and work. The SAIMR did not have accommodation for such research, nor 
could their resources undertake such a large financial commitment. The government, at 
this stage, declined to become involved so money would have to be found from other 
sources.4 In May 1948, an appeal committee was set up in Johannesburg under the 
chairmanship of the mayoress, Mrs E. Gordon, and the Poliomyelitis Research Appeal 
Fund was launched to fund the establishment of the Poliomyelitis Research Foundation. 
A new and vital phase in the polio story in Johannesburg, as well as in South Africa more 
broadly, would thus begin. 
                                                 
2  M. Marais, In Quest of Health: The South African Institute for Medical Research 1912-1973 
(Johannesburg: Lowry Publishers, 1988), p. 234. 
3  J.R. Paul, A History of Poliomyelitis (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 
373-394. 
4  Marais, In Quest of Health, p. 232. 
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